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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT

Case No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rules 26(e) and 37(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 702, Utah
Rules of Evidence, defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins") hereby moves the court for an order
excluding the expert testimony of Merrill Weight ("Weight").
The basis for this motion is that plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") has
repeatedly stated in its initial disclosures and discovery responses that it seeks only the principal
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amount it loaned to MSF Properties plus interest at the legal rate. These disclosures and
responses have never been supplemented as required by Rule 26(e). Weight's opinions as to
damages include additional theories that were not disclosed to the defendants until plaintiff
served Weight's expert report after the fact discovery deadline. Mr. Weight's damages
calculation should also be excluded because they find no basis under Utah law and the factual
assumptions these calculations are based on are contradicted by the evidence already obtained in
discovery.
This motion is supported by a memorandum filed herewith
Dated: June 28, 2007

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR,

P.C.

D&vidW.Wts
Erik A. Olson\
Jason R. Hull
Attorneys for Mark Robbins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
by

I hereby certify that on this ^ 7 *tlay of June, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and
foregoing MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to
be sent via hand-delivery to the following:
Richard D. Burbidge
Stephen B. Mitchell
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John A. Beckstead
HOLLAND & HART

60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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David \\ Tufts (8736)
Erik A. Olson (8479)
Jason R Hull (11202)
DURH \M JONLS & PlM (.AK, \'.L

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P.O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 U-4» i -i i
Telephone: (801)415-3000
Facsimile: (801)415-3500
Attorneys loi I Mi'iuk ul kl nl II Uobbm
IN Ml) 1IIIK1), ! ! l ) l ( I VI, J)ISTRICT COURT

s si i i M i < in r 11 s n i i in n n n
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utal
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

1IEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF (1)
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
I ESTIMON\ OE MERRILL WEIGHT
AND (2) MOTION TO REOPEN FACT
DISCOVERY AND EXTEND EXPERT
DE \DLINES

Case No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

Defendani Mai I Robbms heieby submits this memorandum in support of his motion to
exclude the expert testimony of Merrill Weight or in the alternative to reopen fact discovery and
extend expeit deadlines

»* h i

INTRODUCTION
i iiiou.jiiuii laii uisco\ CP. - that is now closed, Bodell. Consti ii.cl.ioi 1 Goi i lpany ( "Bodcll' )
repeatedly stated that the damages it seeks are the principal amount it loaned to MSF Properties
or Marc Jensen (collectively "Jenson") minus the amounts repaid •

JC:;M»II

puis unci-, -i .i :

legal rate. Despite these repeated representations and Bodeli's failure to amend its disclosures
and discovery responses as requirea oy lvLiR---MO. i u::; Km- - m *- =. d rroceuurcs,

IM^K-M

now

attempts, through its expert Merrill Weight, to claim damages based on three new theories: die
so-called "benelit ol me bargain Rule, Mourned Benefit of the Bargain i

. .uui me

"Reasonable Rate of Return" theory. Weight also provides a calculation for other consequential
damages. Because Bodell has failed to disclose these new damages theories prior to the end of
fact discovery, Weight should be t*\rluded from testifying thereon.
Moreover, Weight's new theories should ne exciuueu as improper, i ne Beneiu wi ;
Bargain" Rule and "Modified Benefit of the Bargain" Rule proposed by Weight do not match
any theory recognized by Utah courts. Moreover, these types of calculations have been rejected
by other jurisdictions. The "Reasonable Rate of Return" theory is not proper because Bodell
cannot show the causal link between the facts of this case and the reiurn Y\ cigni ^ claiming.
Finally, Weight's consequential damages analysis should be excluded for failing to show a
causal nexus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bodell s Initial Disclosures ana HIM O\ ar\ ((espouses on Damages
1.

On January 27, 2004, Bodell served its initial disclosures on the defendants in this

action. A. copy of Bod-; ;ll's initial disclosures are attached hei eto as Ex.1 i \
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disclosures expressly state: "Bodell's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with
interest at the le<:;d r:ik\ ! ^ •

]

'• " - \ | - 0 \ A .

Since January 27, 2004, Bodell has not amended these disclosures to include other
damages

il

.,. :^;e ^ « ;;! I K», I . ;
»n September 22, 2004, Bodell served responses to the first discovery requests of

h ••

/

^ e relevant pen tit )i is of these discovery i equesl s are attached hereto as

Exh. B. Included m these responses is the following:
I1N 1 E K K U I J A1UK\ NU. 1-.
Describe in detail all of the damages that
you allege you have suffered because of Robbins, giving a detailed calculation of
how you arrive at such damages and identifying all witnesses, documents or other
evidence that supports your claim for damages.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Bodell
objects
to
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome to the extent
that it calls for the identification of "all witnesses, documents or other evidence
that supports your claim for such damages." Subject to said objection and without
waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows" See Bodell's response to CW's
[Cherokee & Walker's] Interrogatory No. -1. !> akll has been damaged in the
principal sum of $4 million representing the amount that Bodell was
fraudulently induced to loan to MSF to in turn loan those fmids to Robbins.
Bodell also contends that it is entitled to recover interest at the legal rate.
Bodell also contends that it is entitled to recover punitive damages.
I he
documents supporting this calculation of damages have already been produced

REQUEST [FOR PRODUCTION! NO. 10:
All non-privileged doom lents
that discuss, memorialize, constitute, demonstrate, or pertain to any damages that
you claim to have suffered.
RESPONSE 1 O REQUES1 NO. 10:
All n o n - , - n . K ^ . a,, •
the scope of this request have already been produced.
See Exh. B (emphasis added).
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Since September 22, 2004, Bodell h a s not supplemented its r e s p o n s e to Robbings

Intei rogatory I Jo. 22 or Reqi lest foi Pi odi ictioi i T lo. 10. S ee C XH n t Dockel
5

On May 24, 2004, Bodell served responses to defendant Bank One's first

discovery requests. Relevant pen tions of those responses are attached hereto as Exh. C. Inch idc d
in these responses is the following:
R E Q U E S T IFOR ADMISSION! NO. 7. Admit that ii Bwdcli pic\ails on all
claims, the only amounts Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the
principal amount outstanding on the $4 million Bodell Eoan, interest on that
amount at the rate provided in I hah Code vjvj \* • ] ••••* I ; ' 4, and costs of
court.
R E S P O N S E : Bodell admits that at this time he is not seeking punitive damages
against Bank One. However, discovery is in its infancy and Bank one had not
been forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly, Bodell
reserves the right to amend the complaint and seek punitive damages should
subsequent discovery so justify.
See Exh, C.
6

On August 5, 2004, Bodell served a supplemental response to Bank One's

Request: for Ac Ii nission No. 7 listed ii i paragraph 5 above. A copy of this supplemental response
is attached hereto as Exh. D. The supplemental response is as follows:
SUPi'i.EiMEN I ' A L K I I S J ' U N M L : Admit. Discovery is in its infancy and Bank
One has not been forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly.
Bodell reserves the right to amend its Complaint: to seek punitive damages should
subsequent discovery justify such relief.
7.
i-!iu-"-a !•••! •<-•
8.

Since August 5, 2004, Bodell has not supplemented its response to Bank One's
. See Court Docket.
On April 9, 2004, Bodell served responses to defendant Cherokee & Walker's

f • -; -•! "{"discovery. R elevant portioi is of these i espouses are attached hereto as Exl i. E.
Included in these responses was the following:
IV
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INTERROGATORY NO. 7:
State specifically the amount of money
Bodell contends it is entitled to receive from Cherokee & Walker in this action
and explain in detail how that amount has been calculated.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:
Bodell contends it is entitled
to recover from Cherokee & Walker the principal sum of $4 million representing
the amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan to Robbins and by which
amount Bodell contends Cherokee & Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell
contends it is also entitled to recover interest at the legal rate.
See Exh. E.
9.

Since April 9, 2004, Bodell has not supplemented its response to Cherokee &

Walker's Interrogatory No. 7. See Court Docket.
Merrill Weight's Report on Damages
10.

Despite Bodell's repeated disclosure that the damages it seeks are "the principal

sum of $4 million" plus "interest at the legal rate," Weight's report includes several new theories
for calculation of damages including the "Benefit of the Bargain Rule," the "Modified Benefit of
the Bargain Rule", the "Comparable Rate of Return" theory, and consequential damages. See
Expert Report of Merrill Weight ("Weight Report") at 6-9. A copy of Weight Report is attached
hereto as Exhibit F. The first three of these theories appear to be alternative calculations. Weight
Report at 5-6.
11.

Weight's "Benefit of the Bargain Rule" analysis is based on the "contractual rate

of interest" between Jenson and Bodell of "one percent (1.0%) per week, accruing on the
outstanding balance weekly, in advance, at the beginning of each Wednesday, until it was
repaid." Weight Report at 6. Based on this analysis, Weight calculates the total amount of
damages after "[ajpplying interest at the contractual rate . . . and accounting for contractual loan
fees and default fees, and after making adjustments for monies received in from Jenson" plus

v
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"reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred by Bodell Construction" as "$18,843,290.39 (plus
attorney fees and costs through trial)." Weight Report at 6-7.
12.

Weight's "Modified Benefit of the Bargain Rule" involves "applying the terms

and conditions of the August 2000 loan agreement [between Jenson and Bodell] only through
October 3, 2000, the date specified in the contract for payment of all outstanding principal and
interest. . . [and] subsitut[ing] the statutory rate of interest (10%) for the contractual rate of
interest (one percent per week)." Weight Report at 8. Weight then adds attorneys' fees and
costs and interest payments as consequential damages to calculate a total damages figure of
$5,890,768.12. Id
13.

In both Weight's "Benefit of the Bargain Rule" and "Modified Benefit of the

Bargain Rule" calculation, Weight includes $127,281.18 in "consequential damages"
representing "the amount of interest Bodell Construction was required to pay on money it was
forced to borrow against its line of credit as a result of not receiving the payments promised in
connection with the August 2000 Jenson loan." Weight Report at 7.
14.

At no point prior to the end of fact discovery did Bodell provide Robbins with any

documentation or other information relating to "the amount of interest Bodell Construction was
required to pay on money it was forced to borrow against its line of credit" as a result of Jenson
not paying Bodell back the money it loaned him.
15.

Weight's "Comparable Rate of Return" analysis involves Weight estimating what

Bodell "could have achieved . . . had it invested elsewhere the four million dollars it was instead
induced to loan to Jenson." Weight Report at 9. Weight then "assume[s] a rate of 18 percent as
a comparable rate of return available through other investments." Id. With this assumption of 18

vi
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percent return, Weight calculates Bodell's damages at $7,510,352.96. Id. The 18% rate of
return assumption is based on loans made by MJB LTD. and James H. Bodell, not on loans that
were either presented to Bodell or were entered into by Bodell. Weight Report at 8.
16.

At no point in time prior to the end of fact discovery did Bodell provide Robbins

with information relating to Bodell's "comparable rate of return available through other
investments." Bodell has never provided information about potential loans it was presented with
or loans it has made in the past, other than the loans it made to Jenson.

vn
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ARGUMENT
L

BODELL SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE DAMAGES THEORY IT
DISCLOSED IN ITS INITIAL DISCLOSURES AND DISCOVERY RESPONSES.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a party to supplement its initial disclosures

and discovery responses. See Utah R. Civ. P.26(e). "If a party fails to disclose a witness,
document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) of Rules 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior
response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the
witness, document or other material." Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (emphasis added); see also Am.
Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App 16, K 14, 41 P.3d 1142 (refusing to allow
evidence relating to the total amount owed by the defendant where plaintiff had failed to
supplement its response to defendant's request for production). Rule 37(f)'s "preclusionary
sanction is 'automatic' absent a determination of either '[good cause]' or 'harmlessness.'"
Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 367 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);1 Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f).
Both Bodell's initial disclosures and discovery responses indicate that Bodell is only
seeking the $4 million in funds loaned to Jenson plus interest at the legal rate. See SOF fl 1, 3,
5, 6, 8. These statements have never been supplemented to state a basis for other measures of
damages, and Bodell has never provided any evidentiary support for such damages. See SOF fflf
2, 4, 7, 9. Prior to Weight's report, Robbins did not know that Bodell was seeking damages
based on Weight's new damages theories. Bodell's failure to supplement is not harmless and
Bodell can show no good cause for its failure.
A.

Bodell's Failure To Disclose its New Damages Theories is Not Harmless.

'"Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are
'substantially similar' to the federal rules." Tucker v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, % 7 n. 2, 53 P.3d
947 (citations omitted).
" "SOF" refers to the Statement of Facts above.

Bodelfs failure to disclose its new damages theory prior to the end of discovery and after
making numerous representations that its damages theory was limited to the principal loaned
plus interest at the legal rate is not harmless. " T h e burden to prove . . . harmlessness rests with
the dilatory party.'" Design Strategies, 367 F. Supp. at 635 (citations omitted).
Robbins "would thus be harmed if the Court were to permit [plaintiff] to pursue a [new]
theory of damages, in that Defendants would be required to either postpone a trial for which they
are otherwise prepared and which has already been significantly delayed, or proceed without
having had the opportunity to conduct adequate discovery on this issue. Therefore, the Court
[should] fmd[] that permitting [plaintiff] to advance a [new] theory of damages in this case
would not be harmless." Design Strategies, 367 F. Supp. at 635 (excluding evidence of lost
profits where plaintiff failed to disclose lost profits damages theory and failed to provide
sufficient discovery of its allegedly lost profits). See also Thibeault v. Square D Company, 960
F.2d 239, 246 (1st Cir. 1992) ("We think it is beyond dispute that an eleventh-hour change in a
party's theory of the case can be equally harmful, perhaps more harmful, from the standpoint of
his adversary.") (citations omitted). As in Design Strategies, Bodell never disclosed in its initial
disclosures or responses to discovery requests, the damages theories that Weight appears to put
forth—the Benefit of the Bargain Rule, Modified Benefit of the Bargain, Comparable Rate of
Return and consequential damages. Likewise, Bodell has never supplemented its initial
disclosures or discovery responses. Now that fact discovery is closed, Bodell should not be
allowed to advance new theories that were not considered in fact discovery. Allowing Weight to
testify as to these items is not "harmless" under Rule 37(f) and should be disallowed.
B.

Bodell has No Good Cause for Failing to Disclose its New Damages Theories.

2
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Bodell does not have "good cause" for failing to disclose its new damages theories: it
cannot identify any reason for waiting until after the close of fact discovery and years have
passed since it served its initial disclosures and discovery responses to identify its new damages
theories. See Thibeault, 960 F.2d at 247 (excluding evidence where years had passed since the
interrogatories were originally responded, fact discovery was complete and the plaintiff failed to
supplement its discovery responses and noting that the plaintiff "has identified no other unusual
circumstance that handicapped his ability to prepare his case in a timely fashion . . . it is simply
inexcusable for a party, already late in responding, not to supplement his interrogatory answers,
as required by Rule 26(e), as soon as practicable.").
During the pendency of this action, the facts providing the alleged basis for Weight's
opinion were in the control of Bodell. Bodell knew or should have loiown the "rates of return" it
now claims and any interest that it claims it was forced to pay as a result of Jenson not repaying
the loan. See Weight Report at 8-9. Bodell was also in the exclusive possession of documents
evidencing what it claims to be the "Benefit of the Bargain Rule" damages as well as documents
and other evidence showing its alleged "consequential damages." Bodell can identify "no other
unusual circumstance that handicapped its ability to prepare its case in a timely fashion;"
therefore, "it is simply inexcusable for" Bodell to now come forward with additional damages
theories. Weight should be excluded.

II.

WEIGHT'S "BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN" AND "MODIFIED BENEFIT OF
THE BARGAIN" THEORIES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE THEY ARE
IMPROPER THEORIES UNDER UTAH LAW.
Weight improperly puts forth two new theories of damages that he labels the "Benefit of

the Bargain" and "Modified Benefit of the Bargain." Weight's benefit of the bargain theory is

3
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nothing more than calculating the terms of the contract—including 52% interest—entered into
between Bodell and Jenson and claiming that figure as damages against the defendants who are
not parties to that contract. Weight Report at 6-7. Weight's modified benefit of the bargain
takes all of the terms of the contract between Jenson and Bodell and substitutes the statutory rate
of contractual interest (10%) for the period of time after Jenson was supposed to make payment.
Weight Report at 8. Neither of these theories have been adopted by Utah law.
In fraud cases involving the exchange of real estate or other tangible property, Utah
courts allow a plaintiff to recover the "difference between the actual value of what is received
and the value thereof if it had been as represented." Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah.2d 386, 389
(1967). Thus, "in an action for fraud and deceit the measure of damages is the difference
between the actual value of what the party received and the value thereof if it had been as
represented; this is the benefit of the bargain rule." Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah
1974). See also Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("[B]enefit of the
bargain damages are, in effect, a refund to the purchaser of the oveipayment in order to bring the
effective purchase in line with the actual value received. Both parties thereby received the full
benefit of the bargain."); Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952) (awarding the value of
reservoir rights as damages for fraud where seller misrepresented that the reservoir rights were
being sold with the property when the seller did not actually own the reservoir).
No Utah court has ever expanded the Benefit of the Bargain Rule beyond transactions
involving the transfer of real property or some other tangible asset. In fact, other jurisdictions
have rejected the application of this theory in the loan context. In McLean v. Charles Ellis
Realty, Inc., the plaintiff was induced by a third party to loan $100,000 to a borrower based on

4
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misrepresentations as to the borrower's experience, what was to occur with the money, and the
certitude of the money being repaid. 76 P.3d 661, 663-64 (Ore. Ct. App. 2003). The lender
received a $150,000 note payable within a year plus 20% interest for any additional time. Id. at
664. The loan was not timely repaid and the lender brought suit against the third party for fraud.
Id. at 665. The lender's expert provided the following "benefit of the bargain" calculation:
Starting with the face amount of the note of $150,000, [lender's expert] added all
expenditures incurred by the [lender] to recover their investment, plus interest of
20 percent, less proceeds on the sale of [the collateral], for net damages of
$303,945.
Id. at 426. The court found that this was an improper measure of damages for fraud in
inducing a loan explaining that the "benefit-of-the-bargain method [is not] particularly apt
where, as here, no property changed hands and a value comparison is not available." Id. at 667.
Weight's "Benefit of the Bargain" calculation is equivalent to that in McLean; he does
nothing more than add up what is due under the terms of Bodell's contract with Jenson. There is
no 'Value comparison" between the loan to Jenson as represented and the loan to Jenson as
actually made. As in McLean, Weight's benefit of the bargain calculations should be excluded.

III.

WEIGHT'S CALCULATION OF "CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES" SHOULD
BE EXCLUDED.
To receive consequential damages, Bodell "must prove that consequential damages were

in fact caused by the" alleged wrongdoing of Robbins. Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d
1204, 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (discussing consequential damages in breach of contract
context). Bodell cannot show that the interest payments Weight includes in his calculation of
consequential damages are actually attributable to Robbins' alleged wrongful actions; thus,
Weight's testimony on consequential damages should be excluded.

5
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Weight does nothing more than provide a spread sheet showing Bodell's line of credit
and all interest that has accrued on that line of credit since June 23, 2000. See Weight Report at
Exh. 9.3 Weight does not discuss how these interest payments are attributable to the $4 million
Jenson loan nor does Weight discuss other potential causes of this interest such as other
investments made by Bodell or, perhaps, Michael Bodell's divorce payments. See Deposition of
Marc Jenson ("Jenson Depo.") at 248, 251 (referring to conversations with Michael Bodell
where Bodell stated that he needed money to "settle [his] divorce"). Specifically, Weight does
not take into account the other $1 million loan Bodell made to Jenson that remained unpaid until
2003. Jenson Depo. at 248.
Moreover, a terse review of the spreadsheet attached to Weight's report—never produced
during discovery—shows that all the interest that Weight includes in his "consequential
damages" calculation cannot be as a result of defendants' actions. See Weight Report at Exh. 9.
Specifically, Bodell loaned Jenson only $4 million. Yet, throughout the spreadsheet, there are
periods of time where interest is accruing on more than $4 million. See Weight Report at Exh. 9
(8-17-06, Principal Bal. $4,117,153,97; 8-31-06 through 9-06-06, Principal Bal. ranging from
$4,232,603.22 to $5,081,805.86; 9-18-06, Principal Bal. $4,255,193.09; 9-21-06 through 10-1106, Principal Bal. ranging from $4,204,457.66 to $6,192,529.90; 10-10-06, Principal Bal.
$4,015,673.77; 10-12-06, Principal Bal. $5,027,002.88). Weight does not control for the interest
on amounts greater than $4 million.

The Court should also be aware that Exhibit 9 to Weight Report appears to be incomplete. Specifically, it is dated
6-23-00 to 12-31-06 but there are no entries from 6-23-00 through 4-01-02. Moreover, there are no entries between
1-31-03 and 3-03-05. See Weight Report at Exh. 9.
Relevant portions of Jenson Depo. are attached hereto as Exh. G.
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Bodell cannot show that but for Robbins actions it would not have had to incur interest on
its line of credit; therefore, Weight's calculation should be excluded.
IV.

WEIGHT'S COMPARABLE RATE OF RETURN THEORY SHOULD BE
EXCLUDED.
Bodell cannot show that the 18% "comparable rate of return" Weight uses in his

calculation of damages is equivalent to losses that are "a natural and proximate consequence of
the defendant's misrepresentations." Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1329, 1250 (Utah 1980).
Because an expert's calculations must be tied to the evidence and the evidence does not support
an 18% rate of return, Weight's Comparable Rate of Return calculation should be excluded.5
Weight's Comparable Rate of Return calculation fails because it is based on faulty
assumptions. As the United States Supreme Court has explained: "nothing . . . requires a district
court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data
and the opinion proffered." General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997). See also
Bass v. Spitz, 522 F. Supp. 1343, 1352 (E. D. Mich. 1981) (noting that without "connection"
between an assumption relied on by an expert and actual evidence, an expert will not be allowed
to base his testimony on those assumptions); Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Holland Colors Americas,
Inc., 408 F.3d 410, 415 (8th Cir. 2005) ("An expert opinion that fails to consider the relevant
facts of the case is fundamentally unsupported: 'If a party believes that an expert opinion has not
considered all of the relevant facts, an objection to its admission is appropriate. Even a theory
5

In Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) v. 1 lth Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993), the plaintiffs were awarded their reasonable
rate of return as proven by "uncontroverted expert testimony concerning the rate of return they would have received
if the money had been invested elsewhere." Id. at 453. As discussed below, Weight's expert testimony in this case
is controverted by the deposition testimony of Michael J. Bodell and Weight himself.
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that might meet certain Daubert factors, such as . . . general acceptance, should not be admitted if
it does not apply to the specific facts of the case.7") (citation omitted); Elcock v. Kmart Corp.,
233 F.3d 734, 755, 756 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming exclusion of damages expert who relied on
assumptions that lacked foundation in record and failed to consider relevant facts). Weight
makes several assumptions that are not supported by the evidence propounded during discovery:
(1) that Bodell would have had an opportunity to loan to someone else the $4 million it had
loaned to Jenson; (2) that Bodell would have attained roughly equivalent terms of loans made by
other entities or individuals making similar loans; and (3) that Bodell would have actually been
able to collect the principal and interest on its loan to someone else. See Weight Report at 8-9.
First, Bodell has presented no evidence that it would have actually had an opportunity to
fund a loan to someone else if it had not made the $4 million loan to Jenson. Rather, Weight's
own deposition testimony indicates that Bodell does not regularly have such opportunities: "if
we have excess funds that are available to make loans and we find an opportunity to loan those
funds, then we pursue that, and have made loans." Deposition of Merrill Weight ("Weight
Depo.")6 at 14:8-11. Nothing that has been produced by Bodell or relied on by Weight shows
that Bodell would have been able to "find an opportunity to loan" the funds it provided to
Jenson. hi fact, Bodell had limited opportunities to make such loans. Deposition of Michael
Bodell ("Bodell Depo.")7 at 13:22-15:16 (indicating that Bodell has only made 10 to 15 loans in
the past 15 years). Given the small quantity of loans it is unlikely that Bodell would have had
such an opportunity.

Relevant portions of Weight Depo. are attached as Exh. H.
Relevant portions of Bodell Depo. are attached as Exh. I.
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Second, Weight claims that Bodell would have been able to fund loans at 18% return.
This assumption is based on the loan documents of MJB Ltd. and James H. Bodell but not
Bodell's own interest rates on loans of this sort. Weight Report at 8-9. Weight ignores the fact
that Bodell construction does not have any sort of set interest rate for these transactions: "There
is not a typical rate of return." Bodell Depo. at 15:24-16:4. In fact, the interest rate on the loans
made by Bodell ranges from 8% to 50%. Id at 17:21-18:8. Bodell camiot show that it would
have actually attained loan terms equivalent to those of MJBN, Ltd. or James H. Bodell.
Finally and importantly, Weight assumes that if Bodell had achieved loans with terms
including 18% interest, Bodell would have actually been able to collect the principal plus 18%
interest. However, Bodell's track record with these types of loans indicates otherwise: "The rate
of return, I'd say, between 5 and 15 percent... to calculate them all, as a practical matter
sometimes you don't get paid as much as you want on the return or get paid in part." Bodell
Depo. at 16:7-18. See also Weight Depo. at 20:9-14 (There have been times that Bodell "didn't
get paid what [it was] expecting to receive pursuant to the tenns of the loans."); 20:14-21 ("there
were interest amounts on top of that that were not collected.").
Weight's key assumptions as to the amount of interest Bodell would have realized had it
been able to make other loans with the $4 million it loaned to Jenson are baseless in the current
discovery record. Therefore, Weight's "Reasonable Rate of Return" theory should be excluded.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Weight's Benefit of the Bargain theory, Modified Benefit of the
Bargain Theory, Consequential Damages calculation and Comparable Rate of Return calculation
should be excluded, hi the alternative, defendants should be granted additional time to conduct
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fact discovery relating to the facts that Weight bases his calculations on and the deadlines
expert disclosures should be tolled until such additional discovery can be had.
Dated: June 28, 2007

Du RHAM JONES & JfINEGAR, Jf.CJ

Frik A
Jason R. Hull
Attorneys for Mark Robbins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^ 7 ^day of June, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to be sent via hand-delivery to the following:
Richard D. Burbidge
Stephen B. Mitchell
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John A. Beckstead
HOLLAND & HART

60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492)
JEFFERSON W. GROSS, Esq., (#8339)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through
50,

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
RULE 26(a)(1) INITIAL
DISCLOSURES
Civil No. 030917018
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Bodell
Construction Company ("Bodell') hereby makes the following Initial Disclosures:
1. The name, and, if known, the address and telephone number of each
individual likely to have discoverable information supporting Bodell's claims, unless
solely for impeachment, and the subjects of the information are as follows:

1. Michael Bodell C/O Burbidge & Mitchell 215
South State Street, Suite 920, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
telephone (801)355-6677. Mr. Bodell has knowledge
concerning the loans made by Bodell to MSF Properties, L.C.
The communications relating to such loans and the
representations made to Bodell that induced it to make the
loans and the settlement entered into between Bodell, MSF
and Marc Jenson and the communications concerning the
settlement.
2. Merrill Weight C/O Burbidge & Mitchell. Mr.
Weight is an employee of Bodell Construction. He has
knowledge concerning the loans made by Bodell to MSF, the
amounts owing to Bodell on the loans and the settlement with
MSF and Jenson and the communications between the parties
concerning the settlement.
3. Marc Jenson 2069 East Normandy Woods Court,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117. Mr. Jenson is believed to have
knowledge concerning the loans made by Bodell and the
communications with, and representations made to Bodell
with respect to the loans, MSF's failure to pay the loans, the
representations made by Robbins to Jenson, and the
settlement between Bodell, MSF, and Jenson and the
communications relating thereto.

4. Mark H. Robbins C/O Jeffrey M. Jones, Durham
Jones, & Pinegar, 111 East Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111. Mr. Robbins is believed to have
knowledge concerning his transactions with Cherokee and
Walker, his communications with, and representations made
to, Robbins, the loans that he obtained from MSF/Jenson and
his failure to pay the loans.
2. Bodell has in its possession or under its control the following categories of
documents supporting its claims:
a. Documents relating to the MSF loans and the
amounts owing thereon.
b. The August 22, 2001 letter from Ben Lightner to
"Whom It May Concern" that is attached as Exhibit A to the
Complaint.
c. Documents relating to the settlement between
Bodell, MSF and Jenson.
3. Bodell's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with interest at the
legal rate, less the payment received from MSF. The precise calculations have not yet
been completed. Bodell will make available for inspection copying all discoverable
documents or other evidentiary material on which a computation is based.
4. There is no insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an
insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of the judgment that may be entered
in this case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgmej&i

DATED this

day of January, 2004.
BURBIDGE &

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492)
JEFFERSON W. GROSS, Esq. (#8339)
ROBERT J. SHELBY, Esq. (#8319)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
215 South State Street, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 111
Telephone: 801-355-6677
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT
COMPANY, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; CHEROKEE AND
WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company; BANK ONE, UTAH,
national Associations, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
RESPONSES TO ROBBINS' FIRST
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS
TO PLAINTIFF

Case No. 030917018
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's responses to Robbins' First Set of
Discovery Requests to Plaintiff.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent that: (1) they seek
information that is not within Bodell's possession, custody or control; (2) they seek
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other discovery conducted in
this matter and related matters or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, less expensive or is otherwise equally available to
Defendants; (3) they may be construed to require responses beyond the duties and
responsibilities of a responding party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
other applicable discovery rules, if any; and (4) they seek documents that no longer exist
or cannot be conveniently located.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they are vague,
unduly burdensome, ambiguous, overly broad and not identified with reasonable
particularity.
Bodell generally objects to the use of the terms "every," "each," "all," "any," or
other similar words of expansion as overly broad and unduly burdensome.
Bodell generally objects to the discovery requests to the extent they call for
information with respect to individuals or entities other than Bodell.
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell bases its answers, responses and
objections upon currently available information that is now known. Bodell's
investigation and search for responsive information is ongoing. Bodell has not completed
its investigation of the facts pertinent to its action or its discovery in preparation for trial
in its action and, therefore, reserves the right to amend, modify or supplement the
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answers, responses and objections stated herein. Bodell further states that by making its
general objection, it does not undertake any duty to supplement these discovery responses
except to the extent specifically required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell does not in any manner, waive or
intend to waive, but rather intend to preserve and is preserving: (1) all objections as to
competency, relevancy, materiality and admissibility; (2) all rights to object on any
ground to the use of any of the responses herein or documents in any proceeding, motion,
hearing or the trial of its or any other action; and (3) all rights to object on any ground to
further discovery requests involving or related to any of the requests herein.
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek information
protected by the attorney/client privilege or work product doctrine, including jointdefense work product. Privileged information responsive to any request below is not
provided. Bodell does not waive, intend to preserve and is preserving the attorney/client
privilege, the work product privilege, and every other privilege with respect to each and
every document protected by such privilege.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek
information not relevant to the issues raised in its lawsuit and not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they request
disclosure of confidential or proprietary information and further assert each and every
applicable privilege and rule governing confidentiality to the fullest extent provided by
law.
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq, (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C, a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through
50,

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
RESPONSES TO BANK ONE'S
FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSIONS,
INTERROGATORIES, AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS

Civil No. 030917018
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") hereby responds to
Defendant Bank One's First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories, and
Requests for Production of Documents as follows:

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent that: (1) they seek
information that is not within Bodell's possession, custody or control; (2) they seek
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other discovery conducted in
this matter and related matters or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, less expensive or is otherwise equally available to
Defendants; (3) they may be construed to require responses beyond the duties and
responsibilities of a responding party under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and other
applicable discovery rules, if any; and (4) they seek documents that no longer exist or
cannot be conveniently located.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they are vague,
unduly burdensome, ambiguous, overly broad and not identified with reasonable
particularity.
Bodell generally objects to the use of the terms "every," "each," "all," "any," or
other similar words of expansion as overly broad and unduly burdensome.
Bodell generally objects to the discovery requests to the extent they call for
information with respect to individuals or entities other than Bodell.
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell bases its answers, responses and
objections upon currently available information that is now known. Bodell's
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investigation and search for responsive information is ongoing. Bodell has not completed
its investigation of the facts pertinent to its action or its discovery in preparation for trial
in its action and, therefore, reserves the right to amend, modify or supplement the
answers, responses and objections stated herein. Bodell further states that by making its
general objection, it does not undertake any duty to supplement these discovery responses
except to the extent specifically required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell does not in any manner, waive or
intend to waive, but rather intends to preserve and is preserving: (1) all objections as to
competency, relevancy, materiality and admissibility; (2) all rights to object on any
ground to the use of any of the responses herein or documents in any proceeding, motion,
hearing or the trial of its or any other action; and (3) all rights to object on any ground to
further discovery requests involving or related to any of the requests herein.
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek information
protected by the attorney/client privilege or work product doctrine, including jointdefense work product. Privileged information responsive to any request below is not
provided. Bodell does not waive, intends to preserve and is preserving the attorney/client
privilege, the work product privilege, and every other privilege with respect to each and
every document protected by such privilege.
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Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek
information not relevant to the issues raised in its lawsuit and not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they request
disclosure of confidential or proprietary information and further asserts each and every
applicable privilege and rule governing confidentiality to the fullest extent provided by
law.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek
information and documents from time periods that are irrelevant to any issue in its
lawsuit.
These objections apply to each numbered response as if set forth therein unless
otherwise specified.
A republication or statement, in whole or in part, of any one or more of the
foregoing objections is not intended to waive an objection otherwise not stated.
By agreeing to produce documents in response to a particular request, Bodell does
not thereby intend to represent, nor does it represent, that any such documents in fact exist
or have ever existed in its possession, custody or control. Rather, by agreeing to produce
documents in response to a particular request, Bodell intends thereby to represent that it
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will produce non-privileged documents in its present custody, possession or control, if
any, that are responsive to the request.
Subject to such objections and without waiving the same, Bodell responds to the
discovery requests as follows.

INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Identify each person you will or may call as a

witness at trial and describe generally the matters to which each person is to testify.
(Please comply with the definition of the term "identify" as expressed in paragraph 4,
above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Bodell has not yet

determined the witnesses it will or may call as witnesses at trial or the matters to which
they will testify. Bodell is willing to exchange witness lists with the Defendants after
completion of discovery and a reasonable time prior to trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Identify each person you have consulted in

anticipation of or preparation for trial who is not expected to be called as a witness at
trial, specifying the purpose for which he or she has been consulted by you. (Please
comply with the definition of the term "identify" as expressed in paragraph 4, above.)
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that it seeks information that is protected under the work
product privilege. Subject to such objection and without waiving the same, Bodell has
not at this time consulted with any such person.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Identify each document that you will or may

introduce as an exhibit at trial. (Please comply with the definition of the term "identify"
as expressed in paragraph 9, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Bodell has not yet

determined the documents that it will or may introduce as exhibits at trial. Bodell is
willing to exchange exhibit lists with the Defendants after completion of discovery and a
reasonable time prior to trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Identify all communications between Mark

Robbins and Michael Bodell. (Please comply with the definitions of the term "identify"
and "communications" as expressed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Definition section,
above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Bodell objects to this

inteiTogatory on the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome. Subject to such
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows. The
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communications that Michael Bodell presently recalls with Robbins are set forth in
answer to Interrogatory No. 16.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Identify each and every communication you

attribute to Mark Robbins that you claim was fraudulent when spoken, and for each such
allegedly fraudulent communication describe in detail every action you took (or did not
take) in reliance on such communication(s). (Please comply with the definition of the
terms "you," "identify," and "communications" as expressed in paragraphs 1, 7, and 8 of
the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Bodell believes that

Robbins made to Jensen the representations alleged in paragraph 12(a), (b) and (c) of the
Complaint. Robbins then repeated these misrepresentations to Bodell. Bodell also
believes that Robbins and Jenson obtained the August 22, 2000 Ben Lightner letter
representing that Vtrax, Robbins and Jensen would be depositing $165 million into Bank
One coming from a loan agreement between Vtrax and Arimex Investments, Ltd., and
that Robbins knew or should have known that Jenson would utilize the letter to borrow
funds to lend to Robbins. Jenson also represented to Bodell that Robbins and Jenson
could repay the Bodell loan within thirty days. Jenson and Robbins failed to disclose to
Bodell that the letter from Bank One was false and that Madwagon, Vtrax and Wasatch
did not have a value any where near $16 million, that MSF's loan to Robbins' would
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therefore be in large part unsecured and that Robbins' ability to repay the loan was highly
suspect. In reliance upon these representations and omissions, Bodell made the $4
million loan to Jenson's company, MSF Properties, LC ("MSF"). Bodell has not yet had
an opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the information sought by
this interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, Lightner and Cherokee &
Walker ("CW") and other individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right
to supplement its answer after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

State the factual basis for your allegation in

paragraphs 22 and 27 of your Complaint that Robbins and the Doe Defendants "acted
fraudulently, maliciously and with the specific intent of injuring Bodell and/or with
reckless disregard of the substantial risk of harm to Bodell from their actions." (Please
comply with the definition of the "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of
the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

See Response to

Interrogatory Nos. 5 and 16. Robbins knew or should have known that Jenson and MSF
were going to borrow from third parties, including Bodell, the money that MSF loaned to
Robbins and that they would do so by repeating the representations that Robbins had
made with respect to the value of the companies, Robbins' net worth, Robbins' ability to
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acquire Mongoose, Robbins' ability to repay the loan and by providing the Bank One
letter. Robbins knew that the representations were false because the value of the
companies was far less than represented by Robbins, Robbins' net worth was far less than
represented and it was unlikely that he could acquire Mongoose or pay back the $8
million loan from Jenson. Robbins also knew, or should have known, that it was highly
speculative whether Robbins could ever repay the $8 million loan to Jenson and therefore
it was highly speculative whether Jenson could repay the $4 million loan from Bodell. In
this regard, Vtrax, was a start up company that had little or no value. Wasatch Cycles had
only been in business for one year and although documents reflect that it had made
significant bicycles sales, it did not manufacture the bicycles itself and its source of
supply was uncertain as was its ability to continue generating sales. Robbins had no
agreement to acquire Mongoose and did not have the financial resources to do so.
Contemporaneous financial statements prepared by Robbins vastly overstated his net
worth based upon extremely inflated values of his interests in these companies and other
assets. The agreements, financial statements, credit analyses, correspondence and other
documents that have been produced by Robbins, CW and Bank One reflect these facts.
Bodell has not yet had an opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the
information sought by this interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson,
Lightner and CW and other individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right
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to supplement its answer after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

State the factual basis for your allegation in

paragraph 24 (and paragraph 11) of your complaint that "Robbins and the Doe
Defendants formed and joined in a conspiracy with one another, the purpose of which
was to raise money from Bodeli and other third parties through fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions for the purpose of paying Cherokee $8,000,000.00 and
raising other funds in order to attempt to acquire Mongoose and for other purposes in
order to enrich said Defendants." (Please comply with the definition of the "state the
factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

See Responses to

Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Identify each and every person who participated

in any way in the "conspiracy" (as alleged in the Second Claim for Relief of your
Complaint), stating the factual basis of each persons' involvement in the alleged
conspiracy. (Please comply with the definitions of the terms "identify" and "state the
factual basis" as expressed in paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Bodeli has not yet

identified any members of the conspiracy other than Robbins. Bodeli has not yet had an
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opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the information sought by this
interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, Lightner and CW and other
individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right to supplement its answer
after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

Identify all communications or other acts that

were made in furtherance of the "conspiracy" as alleged in the Second Claim for Relief of
your Complaint. (Please comply with the definitions of the terms "identify" and
"communications" as expressed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

See Responses to

Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, 8 and 16.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

State the factual basis for your allegation that

Robbins has been unjustly enriched as alleged in the Fourth Claim for Relief of your
Complaint. (Please comply with the definition of the phrase "state the factual basis" as
expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

See Responses to

Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16. Robbins received $4 million of Bodell's money through
Jenson and MSF. Bodell believes that Robbins knew or should have known that the
money was being borrowed by Jenson and MSF from Bodell or at least that Jenson and
MSF were borrowing the money from one or more third parties and that Jenson would
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obtain the money by repeating the misrepresentations made by Robbins and providing the
Bank One letter to Bodell and other prospective lenders. It would be unjust to permit
Robbins to retain the money that he wrongfully acquired.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

State the factual basis for your allegation

(contained in paragraph 35 of your Complaint) that "the $4 Million loan made by Bodell
to MSF . . . was in turn paid to Robbins and ultimately Cherokee." (Please comply with
the definition of the phrase "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the
Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO, 11:

See response to

Interrogatory No. 16. Jenson informed Bodell that the $4 million that Bodell would loan
to MSF would in turn be loaned to Robbins and Robbins confirmed that fact also. Jenson
later confirmed that the money was loaned to Robbins. The documents that have been
produced by Bank One, Robbins and CW reflect that MSF made an $8 million loan to
Robbins which he deposited into his bank account at Bank One (which at the time was
overdrawn) including a deposit of $4 Million on August 30, 2000. The documents also
reflect that Robbins defaulted by failing to repay the loan. Finally, the documents reflect
that Robbins utilized the loan proceeds to pay to CW. CW's interrogatory answer no. 6
reflects that it received $6,079,862.52 from Robbins during the period from August 31,
2000 through September 11, 2000.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

State the factual basis for your allegation that

"Madwagon, Vtrax and Wasatch were worth little, if anything." (Complaint, <fl 36) (Please
comply with the definition of the phrase ustate the factual basis" as expressed in
paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

See Response to

Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

State the factual basis for all the allegations you

make in paragraph 12 of your Complaint, including, in particular, the factual basis for
your allegation that "Robbins knew and intended" that Jenson would repeat to Bodell the
statements alleged in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 12, (Please comply with
the definition of the phrase "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the
Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome. Subject to such
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows. See Responses to
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16 and Bodell's response to Bank One Interrogatory Nos. 7
and 8.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14:

State the factual basis for your allegation that

the statements found in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 12 of your Complaint
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were false when made. (Please comply with the definitions of the phrase "slate the
factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 14:

See Response to

Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16 and Bodell's responses to Bank One Interrogatory Nos. 7
and 8.
INTERROGATORY NO. 15:

State the factual basis for your allegation that

Robbins had some participation in obtaining the letter dated August 22, 2000, signed by
Ben Lightner of Bank One, as alleged in paragraph 13 of your Complaint, describing in
detail the full extent of any such participation. (Please comply with the definition of the
phrase "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section,
above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 15:

See response to

Interrogatory No. 16. The allegation in paragraph 13 is made on information and belief
based upon the fact that the letter represents that Vtrax, Jenson and Robbins would be
depositing $165 million into Bank One coming from a loan agreement between Robbins'
company, Vtrax and Arimex Investments, Ltd., that Robbins was a customer of Bank One
and that Jenson utilized the letter to raise funding for Robbins. Bodell has not yet had an
opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the information sought by this
interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, Lightner and CW and other
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individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right to supplement its answer
after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

Identify all communications between Mark

Jenson and anyone acting on behalf of Bodell Construction Company concerning the
$4,000,000 loan that Bodell made to MSF Properties, L.C. (Please comply with the
definitions of the terms "identify " and "communications" as expressed in paragraphs 7
and 8 of the Definitions section, above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 16:

See Bodell's response to

Bank One's Interrogatory No. 8. When the loans made by Bodell to MSF were not paid
as agreed, Mr. Bodell contacted Marc Jenson to inquire why the loans had not been
repaid. Jenson told him in substance that Robbins had not yet received the money that
was coming in on the bike deal but was expecting it shortly, and that as soon as Robbins
got the money he would repay Jenson who would then repay Bodell. During the period of
time from September through mid-November 2000, Mr. Bodell had several conversations
with Mr. Jenson in which these same types of statements were repeated. Mr. Bodell told
Mr. Jenson during these conversations that it was very important that Bodell be repaid the
money by the end of its fiscal year which was December 31, 2000. Jenson assured him
that the money would be repaid prior to that time.
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In approximately mid-November 2000, in response to continued inquiries from Mr.
Bodell, Jenson arranged a meeting between Jenson, Robbins and Mr. Bodell. The
meeting took place at the Market Street Grill in Cottonwood. At the meeting, Mr. Bodell
told Robbins in substance that Jenson had told him that the money to repay Bodell was
coming from Robbins and Bodell wanted some information and assurances as to when
Robbins was going to repay Jenson so that Jenson could repay Bodell. Robbins stated in
substance that he was glad for the opportunity to meet Mr. Bodell because he had not
been aware of all of the investors who had invested money with Jenson to loan to
Robbins. Robbins stated the loan he was obtaining for his bike business would close
shortly, that there was plenty of money in the loan to take care of Bodell, that Robbins
would see that Jenson was repaid shortly so that Jenson could repay Bodell and that
Robbins would certainly repay Jenson before the end of the year. After dinner, Robbins
and Jenson took Mr. Bodell to the Jazz game. Mr. Bodell does not recall any further
discussion about business at the Jazz game.
During the next few weeks, Mr. Bodell had a number of conversations with Mr.
Jenson inquiring when the loan was going to be repaid. Jenson assured him during each
conversation that the money would be forthcoming from Robbins shortly.
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Near the end of December 2000, in a telephone conversation, Jenson told Mr.
Bodell for the first time that it appeared that Jenson had been defrauded by Robbins, that
there was ao loan and that the value of the bike company was not as represented.
In approximately early 2001, Jenson told Mr. Bodell that he was taking over the
bike company because of Robbins' default and misrepresentations. Jenson said that he
would try to get Bodell repaid from other sources as soon as possible.
During the next several months, Mr. Bodell had a number of conversations with
Jenson in which Mr. Bodell would continually inquire as to the status of Jenson's efforts
to repay Bodell and Jenson would respond essentially that he was working on it, but
didn't have the money to do so yet.
During this period of time, Jenson and Mr. Bodell had approximately three
telephone conversations with Robbins. Jenson and Mr. Bodell were at Jenson's office.
During these conversations, the discussions centered on how Robbins was going to repay
the loan from Jenson so that Jenson could repay Bodell. Jenson accused Robbins of
misrepresenting the transactions to him and stated that Robbins had gotten him into
trouble by misrepresenting the transactions. Robbins admitted that he had misrepresented
the transactions and told Jenson and Mr. Bodell that he would try to do whatever he could
do to make it good.
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Sometime in the Summer or early Fall of 2001, Mr. Bodell attended a meeting with
Jenson and Robbins at Jenson's office. Bodell had heard that Robbins had thrown an
$80,000 New Year's Eve party and had purchased a $200,000 Ferrari and questioned
Robbins as to where the $8 Million he obtained from Jenson had gone. Robbins said that
most of the money had gone to Cherokee & Walker. Mr. Bodell asked him how much
Cherokee & Walker had made on the transaction. Robbins responded that Cherokee &
Walker made more than $3 Million on the deal.
During the same time frame, Jenson told Mr. Bodell that Robbins had impregnated
a woman out of wedlock and that her father was extremely wealthy. Jenson said that
Robbins had told him that Robbins had told the woman that he had defrauded Jenson and
could be in trouble with the legal authorities unless he repaid Jenson. Robbins further
told Jenson that the woman was attempting to convince her father to let her use family
assets so that Robbins could repay Jenson and they would get married. Jenson also told
Mr. Bodell during this time frame that he had actually spoken to the woman who
confirmed to Jenson that she was working on getting money to give Robbins to repay
Jenson. During a subsequent telephone conversation some time shortly thereafter,
Robbins confirmed this story to Mr. Bodell.
During the 2001-2002 time frame, Jenson told Bodell that he had retained
attorneys who were working on recovering from Robbins but gave no further details.
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Jenson told Mr. Bodeli that he wanted Robbins' cooperation in determining Cherokee &
Walker's liability so that Jenson could determine whether to pursue Cherokee & Walker
and that Jenson did not want to sue Robbins until he had obtained that information.
During late 2001 and early 2002, Mr. Bodeli continued to have conversations with
Jenson about repayment of the loan. Jenson continued to tell Mr. Bodeli that he was
working on other sources to come up with the money.
In early 2002, Mr. Bodeli ran into Robbins at a restaurant. Robbins told him that
he felt bad about what had happened and he was still working on trying to raise the
money to repay Jenson so that Jenson could repay Bodeli.
Sometime in 2003, Mr. Bodeli ran into Robbins at the XCEL Gym in Holladay.
Robbins again repeated that he felt bad about what had happened and that he was still
hopeful that he could repay the money.
Sometime during late 2002, Mr. Bodeli and Bodeli's attorney, Bruce Nelson, met
with Jenson and his attorney, Mark James. Demand was again made for repayment of the
loan. Mr. Bodeli threatened suit if the loan was not repaid shortly. Jenson acknowledged
the debt and said he just needed time to repay it. Mr. James said in substance that Jenson
had experienced financial problems before but always seemed to be able to come up with
the money to resolve the problems and requested additional time.
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During late 2002, Jenson told Mr. Bodell that he had some land up near Ogden that
the State of Utah was looking to purchase for a substantial amount of money that would
allow him to repay Bodell and that he was expecting this transaction to be completed
shortly.
In early 2003, Mr. Bodell and his attorney, Richard Burbidge, met with Jenson and
Mark James. At that meeting, Jenson was informed that unless the loan was paid
promptly, suit would be filed. Jenson again asked for more time and said he hoped to be
able to repay the loan shortly and paid $25,000 of the loan at that meeting. Jenson said
that he needed more time and that a lawsuit would jeopardize his ability to complete
transactions necessary to pay Bodell because his reputation is everything and a lawsuit
would be a matter of public record.
In March 2003, Jenson called Mr. Bodell and told him that he had received $3
Million in a transaction and that he was willing to pay it all to Bodell if Bodell would
release Jenson and MSF from further liability. Jenson said that the deal had to be done
that day. Bodell agreed to do so and an agreement was drafted and signed.
INTERROGATORY NO, 17:

Describe in detail all of the evidence that traces

the disposition of the $4,000,000 that Bodell Construction Company loaned to MSF
Properties LC. IF you do not have any such evidence, please say so. (See Complaint, ^]
15.)
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17:

The information to answer

this interrogatory is contained in the documents already produced by Bodell, as well as
the documents produced by Bank One, Robbins and CW demonstrating that Bodell
loaned $4 Million to MSF, which in turned loaned $8 million to Robbins who in turn
funded his Purchase and Settlement Agreement with CW with the proceeds. Bodell has
not yet obtained the records of MSF and Jenson with respect to these transactions. Bodell
has not yet had an opportunity to conduct relevant discovery with respect to the
information sought by this interrogatory, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson,
Lightner and CW and other individuals involved in the transactions, and reserves the right
to supplement its answer after discovery is completed to the extent required by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTERROGATORY NO. 18:

State the factual basis for the allegations you

make in paragraph 16 of your Complaint. (Please comply with the definition of the
phrase "state the factual basis" as expressed in paragraph 6 of the Definitions section,
above.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome. Subject to such
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows. See Responses to
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 19:

Identify all amounts that you have been paid on

the obligation that underlies the Promissory Note attached as an exhibit to your
Complaint, specifying the amount paid, the date it was paid, who paid it, who received the
payment, and identifying all documents that pertain to each such payment.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 19:

Bodell has already

provided this information in response to CW's interrogatory no. 4 and all relevant
documents have already been produced.
INTERROGATORY NO. 20:

Identify each person who took any action in

reliance upon fraudulent conduct you attribute to any of the defendants (including the Doe
Defendants), explaining in detail the action that person took and what fraudulent conduct
you attribute thereto.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 20:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the grounds that it is overbroad and burdensome, vague and
ambiguous. Subject to such objection and without waiving the same, see Responses to
Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6 and 16 and Bodell's responses to CW's and Bank One's discovery
requests.
INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

Identify each and every loan made by Bodell

Construction Company or Michael Bodell to Marc Jensen, Mark Robbins, or any entity
with which Mr. Jensen or Mr. Robbins is or was affiliated. (An adequate response should
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state the amount of the loan, the entity making the loan, the entity receiving the loan, the
purpose for making the loan, and the current status of the loan.)
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

This information has

already been provided in response to CW's Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4 and all relevant
documents have already been produced.
INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

Describe in detail all of the damages that you

allege you have suffered because of Robbins, giving a detailed calculation of how you
arrive at such damages, and identifying all witnesses, documents, or other evidence that
supports your claim for such damages.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome to the extent that it
calls for the identification of "all witnesses, documents or other evidence that supports
your claim for such damages." Subject to said objection and without waiving the same,
Bodell responds as follows: See Bodell's responses to CW's Interrogatory No. 4. Bodell
has been damaged in the principal sum of $4 million representing the amount that Bodell
was fraudulently induced to loan to MSF to in turn loan those funds to Robbins. Bodell
also contends that it is entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. Bodell also contends
that it is entitled to recover punitive damages. The documents supporting this calculation
of damages have already been produced. Persons having knowledge of these damages
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include Michael Bodell and Merrill Weight of Bodell Construction Company, Marc
Jenson and Mark Robbins.
INTERROGATORY NO. 23:

Describe in detail all contracts, covenants,

promises or expectations of performance that you have received for Marc Jensen.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 23:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous.
INTERROGATORY NO. 24:

Identify every communication that you, or

someone acting on your behalf, including your attorneys, has had with Marc Jensen.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 24:

See Bodell's responses to

Interrogatory No. 4 and Bank One's Interrogatory No. 8.
INTERROGATORY NO. 25:

If you deny all or any portion of any of the

Requests for Admission served herewith for any reason, state the factual basis for your
denial.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 25:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome. Bodell further objects
on the basis that this interrogatory constitutes a separate interrogatory for each Request
for Admission that Bodell denies and, therefore, Robbins has exceeded the 25
interrogatories permitted by the Scheduling Order. Subject to such objections and
without waiving the same, see Bodell's responses to the foregoing interrogatories.
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents identified in your response to the
interrogatories served herewith.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 2: All documents, mentioned, referred to, or relied on in your
response to any of the interrogatories served herewith.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 3: All documents that you claim support any of your claims pled
in your Complaint.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3:

Bodell objects to this request upon the

ground that it is overbroad and burdensome and does not describe a category of
documents with reasonable particularity and seeks work product of counsel.
REQUEST NO. 4: All documents pertaining to each of the factual allegations
contained in your Complaint.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 4:

See objection to Request No. 3.

REQUEST NO. 5: All documents that you will or may introduce as exhibits at
the trial of this matter.
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 5:

Bodell has not yet determined what

documents it will or may introduce as exliibits at the trial of this action. Bodell is willing
to exchange exhibits lists with Defendants after completion of discovery and a reasonable
time prior to trial.
REQUEST NO. 6: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or pertain
to any communication between you and Marc Jensen.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 6:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 7: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or pertain
to any communication between you and Robbins.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 7:

No such documents exist other than

documents relating to communications with Jenson.
REQUEST NO. 8: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or pertain
to any communication between you and any of the Doe Defendants.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 8:

Bodell has not yet identified what

individuals or entities may be the Doe Defendants. Bodell cannot therefore respond to
this request.
REQUEST NO. 9: All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or pertain
to any communication (including internal communications) between you and any person
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pertaining to the $4,000,000 loan that Bodell Construction Company made to MSF
Properties LC.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 9:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 10:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute,

demonstrate, or pertain to any damages that you claim to have suffered.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 10:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 11;

The journal, diary, calendar, day planner or similar

document(s) of Michael Bodell covering the time period from May 2000 to the present.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 11: Bodell objects to this request upon the
grounds that it is overbroad and burdensome and seeks documents that are irrelevant to
the subject matter of this action and the claims and defenses of the parties and are not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Subject to such
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell will produce responsive documents, if
any, containing entries relating to the transactions that are the subject of this action.
REQUEST NO. 12:

All financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss

statements, income statements or similar financial documents reflecting the financial
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condition of Bodell Construction Company as of the time of the $4,000,000 loan that
Bodell Construction Company made to MSF Properties LC.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO, 12:

Bodell objects to this interrogatory upon

the ground that it seeks confidential financial information that is irrelevant to the subject
matter of this action and the claims and defenses of the parties and is not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
REQUEST NO. 13:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to the negotiations, formation, or performance of that certain Settlement
Agreement entered into on March 18, 2003, by and among Bodell Construction Company,
Michael Bodell, Marc S. Jensen and MSF Properties LC.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 13:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 14:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute

any communication pertaining to that certain Settlement Agreement entered into on
March 18, 2003, by and among Bodell Construction Company, Michael Bodell, Marc S.
Jensen and MSF Properties LC.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 14:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
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REQUEST NO. 15:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to any loans made [sic] Bodell Construction Company to MSF Properties LC.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 15:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 16:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to all loans made [sic] Bodell Construction Company to Robbins or any entity
with which Robbins is or was affiliated in some manner.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 16:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced. Other than the loan made to Jensen,
the proceeds of which were then loaned to Robbins, no such documents exist.
REQUEST NO. 17:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to all loans made [sic] Bodell Construction Company to Marc Jensen or any entity
with which Mr. Jensen is or was affiliated in some manner.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 17:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 18:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to each and every loan made by Bodell Construction Company or Michael Bodell
to Marc Jensen, Mark Robbins, or any entity with which Mr. Jensen or Mr. Robbins is or
was affiliated.
29

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 18:

See Response to Requests Nos. 16 and

17.
REQUEST NO. 19:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to any communication to, from, or concerning those persons identified in your
response to interrogatory no. 1, above.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 19:

Bodell objects to this request as

overbroad and burdensome and upon the ground that it does not describe a category of
documents with reasonable particularity. Subject to such objections and without waiving
the same, Bodell responds as follows: Bodell has not yet determined what persons it will
or may call as witnesses at trial. Bodell cannot therefore respond to this request.
REQUEST NO. 20:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to those persons identified in your response to interrogatory no. 1, above.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 20:
REQUEST NO. 21:

See Response to Request No. 19.

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to any communications (including internal communications) involving Bodell
Construction Company or Michael Bodell, or their agents, employees, or attorneys,
pertaining to the transactions alleged in the Complaint.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 21:

Bodell objects to this request upon the

ground that it is overbroad and burdensome and does not describe a category of
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documents to be produced with reasonable particularity. Subject to such objection and
without waiving the same, Bodell believes that it has already produced all non-privileged
documents within the scope of this request.
REQUEST NO, 22:

All documents that constitute any communication

between (1) Bodell Construction Company or Michael Bodell, their agents, employees
and/or attorney, and (2) Marc Jensen, or his agents, employees, or attorneys.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 22:

All non-privileged documents within the

scope of this request have already been produced.
REQUEST NO. 23:

All documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, or

pertain to each and every contract, covenant, promise, or expectations of performance of
whatever nature that you have received for Marc Jensen.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 23:

Bodell objects to this request upon the

ground that it is vague and ambiguous.

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that there has never been any
communications between Mark Robbins and Michael Bodell.
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:

Denied. Michael

Bodell had direct communications with Mark Robbins. In addition, Michael Bodell had
direct communication with Robbins through his agent, Marc Jenson.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that there has never been any
communication between Mark Robbins and any agent of Bodell Construction Company.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2:

Denied. See

response to Request No. 1.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that there has never been any
communication between any agent of Mark Robins [sic] and any agent of Bodell
Construction Company.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3:

Denied.

See

response to Request No. 1.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that Mark Robbins did not receive
any of the proceeds of the $4,000,000 loan made by Bodell Construction Company to
MSF Properties, LC. (This is reference to the loan alleged in paragraph 15 of the
Complaint.)
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4:

Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that Mark Robbins did not benefit
in any way as a result of the $4,000,000 loan made by Bodell Construction Company to
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MSF Properties, LC. (This is a reference to the loan alleged in paragraph 15 of the
Complaint.)
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5:

Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit that you have not suffered any
damages whatsoever.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6:

Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that Mark Robbins was not
involved in any "scheme and conspiracy for the purposes of raising $8,000,000.00 in
order to Robbins to pay Cherokee and to raise other funds through fraudulent means."
(See Complaint, ^ 11.)
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7:

Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that Mark Robbins never had any
understandings with Marc Jensen whereby Mr. Robbins expected Mr. Jensen to make
false representations to Michael Bodell.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8:

Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that at no time has Marc Jensen
ever made any false representations to Michael Bodell.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9:
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Denied.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10:

Admit that as of August 2000,

Madwagon, Vtrax and Wasatch (as those terms are defined in your Complaint) had a fair
market value in excess of $16,000,000.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 10: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11:

Admit that you do not have any

evidence to support your allegation in paragraphs 22 and 27 of your Complaint that
Robbins and the Doe Defendants "acted fraudulently, maliciously and with the specific
intent of injuring Bodell and/or with reckless disregard of the substantial risk of harm to
Bodell from their actions."
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12:

Admit that you do not have any

evidence to support your allegation in paragraph 12 of your Complaint that Robbins
caused Jensen to make fraudulent statements to Michael Bodell.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13:

Admit that Mark Robbins did not

have any involvement whatsoever in the issuance of the August 22, 2004, letter signed by
Ben Lightner of Bank One.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Denied.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14:

Admit that the statements made in

the August 22, 2004, letter signed by Ben Lightner of Bank One are true and accurate in
every way.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15:

Admit that Mark Robbins did not

have any involvement whatsoever in the conversations between Marc Jensen and Michael
Bodell that resulted in Bodell Construction Company making a loan of $4,000,000 to
MSF Properties LC. (This is a reference to the loan alleged in paragraph 15 of the
Complaint.)
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15: Bodell admits that
Robbins was not directly involved in those conversations, but contends that Jenson acted
as Robbins5 agent in obtaining the loan from Bodell to in turn loan the proceeds to
Robbins and that Robbins knew or should have known that Jenson would make the
misrepresentations that he made to Bodell as set forth in the Complaint and above.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16:

Admit that Mark Robbins did not

participate in any common law fraud with respect to Bodell Construction Company.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17:

Admit that Mark Robbins did not

commit any common law fraud with respect to Bodell Construction Company.
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18:

Admit that Mark Robbins did not

participate in any common law fraud with respect to any person.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19:

Admit that Mark Robbins did not

commit any common law fraud with respect to any person.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20:

Admit that you do not have any

evidence to support your allegation in paragraphs 18 through 22 of your Complaint that
Mark Robbins participated in fraud with respect to Bodeil Construction Company.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21:

Admit that Mark Robbins is not

involved in any civil conspiracy with any Doe Defendants with respect to Bodeil
Construction Company.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21: Bodeil does not have
sufficient information to either admit or deny this request until Bodeil is able to conduct
further discovery in this action, including the depositions of Robbins, Jenson, Lightner,
CW and other individuals with knowledge of the transactions.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22:

Admit that you do not have any

evidence to support your allegation in paragraphs 23 through 27 of your Complaint that
Mark Robbins is involved in a civil conspiracy with any person with respect to Bodell
Construction Company.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Denied.

See

responses to interrogatories. See also Response to Request No. 21.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23:

Admit that you have not conferred

any benefit on Mark Robbins.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24:

Admit that Mark Robbins has not

retained any benefit that you have conferred on him.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Denied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25:

Admit that Mark Robbins has not

been unjustly enriched in any way with respect to the $4,000,000 loan made by Bodell
Construction Company to MSF Properties LC. (This is a reference to the loan alleged in
paragraph 15 of the Complaint.)
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Denied.
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26:

Admit that you do not have any

evidence to support your allegations in paragraphs 34 through 38 of your Complaint Mark
Robbins has been unjustly enriched by you.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: Denied.
DATED this t h e ^ day of September, 2004.

^ ^ ^ -

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

MICFIAEL BODELL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the
President of Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company in the above-captioned action; that he
has read the foregoing responses to Interrogatories and that the contents contained therein
are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

MICHAEL BODELL

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

^.2

day of

September, 2004.

,
My Commission Expires:
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NOTAWPUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah
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Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek
information and documents from time periods that are irrelevant to any issue in its
lawsuit.
These objections apply to each numbered response as if set forth therein unless
otherwise specified.
A republication or statement, in whole or in part, of any one or more of the
foregoing objections is not intended to waive an objection otherwise not stated.
By agreeing to produce documents in response to a particular request, Bodell does
not thereby intend to represent, nor does it represent, that any such documents in fact exist
or have ever existed in its possession, custody or control. Rather, by agreeing to produce
documents in response to a particular request, Bodell intends thereby to represent that it
will produce non-privileged documents in its present custody, possession or control, if
any, that are responsive to the request.
Subject to such objections and without waiving the same, Bodell responds to the
discovery requests as follows.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that the sole representation made by or attributable to
Bank One upon which Bodell relied in making the $4 Million Bodell Loan was the
Lightner Letter.
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that the only representation letter received by Bodell
attributable to Bank One was the letter signed by its bank officer, Mr. Lightner. The
letter, however, carries with it both facial and inferential representations. Bank One is
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believed to be one of the largest banks in the United States and advertises to the world its
financial soundness and trustworthiness. The representations in the letter inferentially
carry the representation that this bank and its authorized officer, with the bases upon
which to verify the representations made, were making representations of fact that Bank
One had confirmed. The letter was addressed "To Whom It May Concern" and thus
understandably was expected to be utilized in causing other individuals to rely on the
representations made.
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Bodell had no communications with or attributable
to Bank One concerning the $4 Million Bodell Loan prior to making $4 Million Bodell
Loan, other than the Lightner Letter.
RESPONSE: Admit, subject to response to Request No. 1 and specifically
including the public image and representations presented by Bank One and the common
perceptions generated as a result thereof.
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that Bodell took no action to investigate, confirm, or
verify the statements in the Lightner Letter prior to making the $4 Million Bodell Loan.
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that it gave full faith and credit to the letter based
upon the information and representations therein contained, together with inferential
information as referenced in response to Request No. 1. Further, the representations of
the letter were corroborated by Jenson, informing Bodell that the transaction was a "done
deal."

5

REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that, prior to making the $4 Million Bodell Loan,
Bodell did not determine whether the $165,000,000 deposit described in the Lightner
Letter had been made.
RESPONSE:

See response to Request No. 1. Bodell admits that he relied upon

the representations of the letter with regard to the $165,000,000 deposit.
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that, prior to Bodell making the $4 Million Bodell Loan,
no representation was made to Bodell that the $165,000,000 deposit described in the
Lightner Letter had been made.
RESPONSE:

Bodell admits that prior to making the $ Million Bodell Loan, no

specific representation was made to Bodell that the $165,000,000 deposit described in the
Lightner Letter had been made. However, the letter from Bank One states as a matter of
fact that the $165,000,000 will be deposited in Bank One and then further makes the
direct objective representation "The funding is coming from a loan agreement between
MaxTrax Group LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD, a
Bahamian company. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest bearing
account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members." [Emphasis
supplied] Those direct objective representations clearly confirm that Bank One has done
the confirmation necessary to make those representations.
REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that Bodell has received payment of at least three
million dollars pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.
RESPONSE:

Admit.

6

REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts
Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal amount outstanding on the
$4 Million Bodell Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§ 151-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court.
RESPONSE:

Bodell admits that at this time he is not seeking punitive damages

against Bank One. However, discovery is in its infancy and Bank One has not been
forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right
to amend the complaint and seek such punitive damages should subsequent discovery so
justify.
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: For each of the foregoing Requests for Admissions
for which your response was anything other than an unequivocal admission:
a. Set forth in detail all facts, identify all oral communications,
and identify all documents which support or evidence the basis for not
responding with an unequivocal admission.
b. Identify all persons with material knowledge of such facts and
summarize the knowledge of each person.
RESPONSE: Not applicable.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Itemize each and every payment and recovery you
have received on the $4 Million Bodell Loan and the $1 Million Bodell Loan, including
the date received, the amount, and the person who made the payment. Identify all
documents constituting such payments.
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RESPONSE: This information has already been provided in response to
Cherokee & Walker's discovery requests. All responsive documents have been
previously produced.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Itemize each and every payment and recovery you
have received pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, including the date received, the
amount, and the person who made the payment. Identify all documents constituting such
payments.
RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 2.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: As to the payments and recoveries identified in
response to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3, identify the obligations to which such payments
and recoveries were applied, set forth the calculations showing such applications in detail,
and identify all documents showing such applications.
RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 2.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: As to the payments and recoveries identified in
response to Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 3, set forth in detail all facts, identify all oral
communications, and identify all documents authorizing and justifying such application
of the payments and recoveries set forth in response to Interrogatory No. 4.
RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 2, Bodell is unaware of any oral
communications with respect to how the payments were applied.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify all persons, other than Lightner, who you
claim acted as an agent, representative, or on behalf of Bank One in connection with the

8

$4 Million Bodell Loan and set forth in detail all facts, identify all oral communications,
and identify all documents supporting your claim
RESPONSE: At the present time, Bodell is not aware of any such persons.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Do you claim that Bank One failed to disclose
any facts or information to Bodell which Bank One had a duty to disclose? If so:
a. Set forth in detail all facts or information which you claim
Bank One had a duty to disclose but failed to do so.
b. Set forth in detail the facts, identify all oral communications,
and identify all documents creating a duty on Bank One to disclose
such facts and information.
c. Identify all persons with material knowledge of such facts, oral
communications and documents and summarize the material
knowledge of each person.
RESPONSE: Bodell objects to this interrogatory on the basis that Bodell has not
yet received Bank One's documents that have been requested and has not yet been able to
conduct discovery concerning Bank One's knowledge, information and conduct with
respect to the subject transactions. Subject to such objection, and without waiving the
same, Bodell responds as follows: Yes.
As referenced above, the letter authored and signed by Ben Lightner, Wealth
Advisor, Private Banking Group for Bank One, makes certain factual representations,
including the fact that $165,000,000 will be deposited into Bank One. The letter goes on
to make the representation that "The funding is coming from a loan agreement between
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One had no reasonable basis for its representation and knew or should have known it was
unlikely the deposit would be made.
Mark Robbins, Ben Lightner and Marc Jenson. Bodell does not yet know the
exact information and knowledge these individuals have concerning the transactions.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: As to any due diligence, review, investigation
and/or decision to make the $1 Million Bodell Loan and/or the $4 Million Bodell Loan,
provide the following information:
a. Set forth in detail all such due diligence, review and
investigation which was performed.
b. Identify all persons who participated in such due diligence,
review, investigation and/or decision and describe the role and
participation of each such person.
c. Identify all oral communications constituting, evidence, and/or
referring to such due diligence, review, investigation and/or decision,
d. Identify all documents constituting, evidencing, and/or
referring to such due diligence, review, investigation and/or decision.

11

RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 7, incorporated herein.
a.

Jenson first contacted Michael Bodell, President of Bodell Construction, 30

to 60 days prior to Bodell making the $1 Million loan. Jenson asked to meet with Mr.
Bodell for lunch. They met at the American Grill at the Cottonwood Mall in May 2000.
Jenson had been a neighbor and member of the same LDS ward as Bodell many years
before. During the meeting, Jenson told Bodell that he was doing very well financially
and explained his hard money lending business. They agreed to stay in touch.
Approximately two weeks later, Jenson telephoned Bodell and told him that he was
looking for a loan at 25% interest that Jenson would then re-lend at a much higher rate.
Jenson said he would guarantee the loan. Mr. Bodell said he would consider such a loan.
Within a week after that conversation, Jenson and Mr. Bodell met at Bodell's office. Mr.
Bodell agreed to make the loan. Thereafter, the loan documents were prepared and
signed at Bodell's office.
Bodell next heard from Jenson in mid-August 2000. Jenson asked for a
meeting. Mr. Bodell and Merrill Weight met with Jenson at Bodell's office. Jenson
made the representations alleged in the Complaint. Jenson gave Mr. Bodell the Bank One
letter signed by Ben Lightner and told Bodell that the $165 Million transaction was a
"done deal", and that the amount would be deposited in Bank One shortly.
The letter in question was on Bank One's stationary signed by a bank officer
employed by Bank One. In the course of discovery, Bodell has received no information
indicating that Lightner was not such a bank officer and authorized to issue the letter on
bank stationary that was provided to Bodell. The letter is addressed "To Whom It May
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Concern" and thus obviously was to be utilized in providing the representations to an
indiscriminate number of individuals. Bank One is a large federally regulated banking
organization and presents itself to the public in public communications as a stable, sound
and trustworthy organization. Further, Bank one, on the face of the letter, as well as by
inference, would have the means by which to know concerning the information that was
represented.
Jenson stated that he was putting in $4 Million of his own money to purchase
Cherokee Walker's interest and the company was going to buy Mongoose Bicycle and it
was a real hot deal. Jenson stated he was giving a Rolex watch to Cherokee Walker's
President in order to extend the time to buy Cherokee Walker out until the next week.
Jenson represented the $4 Million loan from Bodell was required in order to purchase
Cherokee Walker's interest and that the $165 Million would be utilized to repay the loan,
to purchase Mongoose and the balance for Jenson's hard money lending business. Mr.
Bodell stated that Bodell was interested in considering the loan and asked Jenson for a
personal financial statement.
Jenson came back a day or two later with the financial statement. At that
meeting, Mr. Bodell was present. The financial statement showed Jenson had a
substantial net worth. Jenson stated repeatedly that he could easily repay the loan within
30 days. Jenson stated that his attorneys had checked out the $165 Million transaction
and that it was solid. Mr. Bodell stated that Bodell would consider the loan. Jenson
called back later that day and Mr. Bodell told him Bodell would make the $4 Million
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loan. Within a day or two after that the loan documents were signed and Bodell gave
Jenson a check.
b.

Michael Bodell, President of Bodell, negotiated the transactions. Merrill

Weight was present at some meetings with Jenson.
c.

Any responsive documents have already been produced with the exception

of Jenson's financial statement which is subject to a confidentiality agreement.
d.

See the documents previously produced.

INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Identify and describe in detail all business
transactions and dealings you have had with Jenson, Robbins, and/or any company or
entity in which Jenson and/or Robbins was involved.
RESPONSE:

None, other than the subject loans.

INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Describe in detail all actions taken by or on
behalf of Bodell to recover on the $1 Million Bodell Loan and/or the $4 Million Bodell
Loan and the results of such actions. Identify all documents evidencing such actions,
excluding pleadings filed in this lawsuit.
RESPONSE:

See documents previously produced.

INTERROGATORY NO. 11: With respect to your allegations in Paragraph 11
of the Complaint that "Robbins and the Doe Defendants entered into a scheme and
conspiracy for the purpose of raising $8,000,000.00 in order for Robbins to Pay Cherokee
and to raise other funds through fraudulent means", do you claim that Bank One was part
of that scheme and conspiracy? If so:
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a. Set forth in detail all facts supporting the claim that Bank One
was part of that scheme and conspiracy.
b. Identify all persons with material knowledge of that claim and
summarize the material knowledge of each such person.
c. Identify all oral communications supporting or evidencing that
claim.
d. Identify all documents supporting or evidencing that claim.
OBJECTION:

Bodell objects to Interrogatory No. 11 on the basis of the

objections above set forth. Bodell objects further on the grounds and for the reasons that
Bank One has not provided the information requested in discovery to which Bodell is
entitled. Subject to the foregoing objections and without waiving same, Bodell responds
as follows:
RESPONSE: At the present time, Bodell has not been permitted the discovery
necessary to determine whether Bank One was part of the scheme and conspiracy. Bodell
has yet to obtain discovery from Bank One and the other parties to the transactions
necessary to determine Bank One's precise involvement. Inferentially, by reason of the
fact the letter is addressed "To Whom It May Concern" and makes factual representations
concerning matters which a reasonable individual would expect Bank One to have means
to verify, it appears that Bank One may have been assisting users of the letter, namely
Jenson and Robbins, to garner funds. That appears a reasonable, if not the most probable,
explanation concerning why the letter was prepared in the first place, especially in light of
the fact that it was, in fact, being used to make misrepresentations of fact and raise funds.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 12: With respect to your allegations in Paragraph 13
of the Complaint that "Bank One knew, or should have known, that it had no reasonable
basis for the statements in the letter and/or acted in reckless disregard of the
consequences of providing the assurances contained in the letter without conducting
appropriate due diligence:
a. Set forth in detail all facts supporting this claim.
b. Identify all person with material knowledge of this claim.
c. Identify all oral communications supporting or evidencing this
claim.
d. Identify all documents supporting or evidencing this claim.
RESPONSE: See objection to Interrogatory No. 7 and responses to previous
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. Subject to such objection and
without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows:
a. Bank One gave Robbins and/or Jenson the Ben Lightner letter
representing that $165 Million would be deposited into a Bank One
account. That letter enabled Robbins and Jenson to raise funding
through fraudulent representations and omissions. Bank One has
come forward with no evidence that there was any reasonable basis for
the representations contained in the letter. Bodell believes that
discovery will demonstrate that Bank One was knowledgeable
concerning the financial condition of Jenson and Robbins and their
various companies and that there was no reasonable basis for the
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representations contained in the letter. Bodell further believes that
discovery will demonstrate that Bank One did not conduct any due
diligence or investigation to verify that $165 Million would be
deposited into Bank One. Bank One failed to disclose in the letter or
otherwise to Bodell that it had no reasonable basis for the
representations in the letter or that it had not conducted any due
diligence or investigation and was relying solely on representations
made to Bank One by Robbins and/or Jenson.
b. Bodell is presently unaware of all persons have material
knowledge of this claim. Bodell believes that Robbins, Jenson and
Lightner have knowledge concerning this claim.
c. Bodell is presently unaware of any oral communications
supporting this claim other than the representations that were made to
Bodell by Jenson as alleged in the Complaint and stated above at the
same time Jenson gave a copy of Bank One's letter to Bodell.
d. See documents previously produced.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: With respect to your allegations in Paragraph 24
of the Complaint that "Robbins and the Doe Defendants formed and joined in a
conspiracy with one another, the purpose of which was to raise money from Bodell and
other third parties through fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions", do you claim
that Bank One was part of that conspiracy? If so:
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a. Set forth in detail all facts supporting the claim that Bank One
was part of that conspiracy.
b. Identify all person with material knowledge of that claim and
summarize the material knowledge of each person.
c. Identify all oral communications supporting or evidencing that
claim.
d. Identify all documents supporting or evidencing that claim.
RESPONSE: See response to Interrogatory No. 11. Bodell has no information
at the present time that Bank One was part of the scheme or conspiracy.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: With respect to your allegations in Paragraph 35
of the Complaint that "Bodell has conferred a substantial benefit on Robbins, Cherokee
and Does 1 through 50", do you claim that any such benefit was conferred on Bank One?
If so:
a. Set forth in detail all facts supporting the claim that such
benefit was conferred on Bank One.
b. Identify all person with material knowledge of that claim and
summarize the material knowledge of each person.
c. Identify all oral communications supporting or evidencing that
claim.
d. Identify all documents supporting or evidencing that claim.
RESPONSE: Bodell has no information at the present time that any of the
funds loaned by Bodell were paid to Bank One or for its benefit

18

INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Identify each witness you may call at trial and
give a summary of the testimony you anticipate will be given by each witness.
RESPONSE: Bodell has not yet determined what witnesses it may call at trial.
Bodell is willing to exchange witness lists with the Defendants after completion of
discovery and a reasonable time prior to trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify each exhibit you may introduce at trial.
RESPONSE: Bodell does not yet know what exhibits it will introduce at trial.
Bodell is willing to exchange exhibit lists with the Defendants after completion of
discovery and a reasonable time prior to trial.
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Have you obtained a statement from any person
concerning this case? If so, provided the following information:
a. Identify the person who gave the statement.
b. Identify the person to whom the statement was given.
c. The date the statement was given.
d. Identify all documents constituting or evidencing the statement.
e. Identify all drafts and revisions to the statement.
RESPONSE: Bodell objects to this interrogatory upon the ground that it seeks
information that is protected under the work product privilege. Subject to such objection
and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as follows:
Bodell has not obtained any statements from any person concerning this case.
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Pursuant to Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant is requested to
produce for inspection and copying the following documents within thirty (30) days after
receipt hereof.
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents identified in Plaintiff Bodell Construction
Company's Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures dated January 27, 2004, which have not been
previously produced.
RESPONSE: All non-privileged documents within the scope of this request
have previously been produced.
REQUEST NO. 2: All documents identified in response to the foregoing
interrogatories.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 1.
REQUEST NO. 3: All files of Bodell on the $1 Million Bodell Loan, the $4
Million Bodell Loan, and the Settlement Agreement.
RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 1.
REQUEST NO. 4: All drafts of the Settlement Agreement, all copies of the
Settlement Agreement or any drafts thereof containing any notes, comments or markings,
all documents referring to the Settlement Agreement and/or referring to any draft or prior
version of the Settlement Agreement, and all documents containing any negotiation or
discussion of the terms of the Settlement Agreement, any prior draft or version of the
Settlement Agreement, or the terms of any proposed settlement concerning the $1 Million
Bodell Loan and/or the $4 Million Bodell Loan.
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RESPONSE: See response to Request No. 1.
DATED this / V ^ d a y of June, 2004.
BURBIDGE &

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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action; that he has read the foregoing responses to Admissions and Interrogatories and
that the contents contained therein are true and accurate to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

7

day of

June, 2004.

My Commission Expires:

r s^^rr& S ^

[bl^jc^

^AR^PUBLIC
(esiding in Salt Late City, Utah

^-~-3te
Notary
Public 1
ELIZABETH GRAHAM j
&ahUkfiClty,Utm84l15

i

Cyc^tJGf24,ZO04

19

D

Zaun

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)355-6677
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through
50,

PLAINTIFF BODELL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
BANK ONE'S FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

Civil No. 030917018
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendants.

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") hereby supplements its
response to Defendant Bank One's First Set of Requests for Admissions as follows:

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts
Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal amount outstanding on the
$4 Million Bodell Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§151-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: Admit. Discovery is in its infancy and
Bank One has not been forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly,
Bodell reserves the right to amend its Complaint to seek punitive damages should
subsequent discovery justify such relief.
DATED this Q

day of August, 2004.
BURBIDGE

RICHARD D T B U R B I D G E
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492)
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278)
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkside Tower
215 South State, Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)355-6677

Copy

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation
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Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a
Utah corporation; and DOES 1 through
50,
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Defendants.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent that: (1) they seek
information that is not within Bodell's possession, custody or control; (2) they seek
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other discovery conducted
in this matter and related matters or is obtainable from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, less expensive or is otherwise equally available to

Defendants; (3) they may be construed to require responses beyond the duties and
responsibilities of a responding party under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
other applicable discovery rules, if any; and (4) they seek documents that no longer
exist or cannot be conveniently located.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they are vague,
unduly burdensome, ambiguous, overly broad and not identified with reasonable
particularity.
Bodell generally objects to the use of the terms "every," "each," "all," "any," or
other similar words of expansion as overly broad and unduly burdensome.
Bodell generally objects to the discovery requests to the extent they call for
information with respect to individuals or entities other than Bodell.
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell bases its answers, responses
and objections upon currently available information that is now known. Bodell's
investigation and search for responsive information is ongoing. Bodell has not
completed its investigation of the facts pertinent to its action or its discovery in
preparation for trial in its action and, therefore, reserves the right to amend, modify or
supplement the answers, responses and objections stated herein. Bodell further states
that by making its general objection, it does not undertake any duty to supplement these
discovery responses except to the extent specifically required by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
In responding to these discovery requests, Bodell does not in any manner, waive
or intend to waive, but rather intend to preserve and is preserving: (1) all objections as
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to competency, relevancy, materiality and admissibility; (2) all rights to object on any
ground to the use of any of the responses herein or documents in any proceeding,
motion, hearing or the trial of its or any other action; and (3) all rights to object on any
ground to further discovery requests involving or related to any of the requests herein.
Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek information
protected by the attorney/client privilege or work product doctrine, including jointdefense work product. Privileged information responsive to any request below is not
provided. Bodell does not waive, intend to preserve and is preserving the
attorney/client privilege, the work product privilege, and every other privilege with
respect to each and every document protected by such privilege.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek
information not relevant to the issues raised in its lawsuit and not reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they request
disclosure of confidential or proprietary information and farther assert each and every
applicable privilege and rule governing confidentiality to the fullest extent provided by
law.
Bodell generally objects to these discovery requests to the extent they seek
information and documents from time periods that are irrelevant to any issue in its
lawsuit.
These objections apply to each numbered response as if set forth therein unless
otherwise specified.
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A republication or statement, in whole or in part, of any one or more of the
foregoing objections is not intended to waive an objection otherwise not stated.
By agreeing to produce documents in response to a particular request, Bodell
does not thereby intend to represent, nor does it represent, that any such documents in
fact exist or have ever existed in its possession, custody or control. Rather, by
agreeing to produce documents in response to a particular request, Bodell intends
thereby to represent that it will produce non-privileged documents in its present
custody, possession or control, if any, that are responsive to the request.
Subject to such objections and without waiving the same, Bodell responds to the
discovery requests as follows.

REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that on or before March 18, 2003, pursuant to a
Settlement Agreement, Bodell recovered from MSF at least $3 million of the money it
had previously loaned to MSF, Jenson, and/or Robbins.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1:

Admit.

REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Bodell does not seek to recover from Cherokee &
Walker the $80,000 loan fee, late charges, or accrued interest at the rate of one percent
per week that MSF agreed to pay Bodell in its Promissory Note dated August 30, 2000,
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2:

Admit.
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REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that prior to the filing of this action, there was never
any verbal, written or other contact between Bodell and Gregg Christensen, Shane Perry,
or any other representative of Cherokee & Walker.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3:

Admit, that there was no direct contact.

INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

If your answer to any of the foregoing Requests

for Admissions was anything other than an unconditional admission, please state by
number the precise Admission, or portion thereof, that Bodell did not unconditionally
admit, and state with reasonable particularity the basis for your denial or response and
identify all facts and documents that support your denial or response.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Not applicable.

Identify and generally describe each instance in

which Bodell loaned or otherwise conveyed money to MSF, Jenson, and/or Robbins,
including, but not limited to the date of each such transaction, the amount of each such
transaction, the recipient in each such transaction, and the general terms governing each
such transaction.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Bodell made a loan of $ 1

million to MSF guaranteed by Jenson on June 23, 2000. Bodell made a loan to MSF
guaranteed by Jenson in the amount of $4 million on August 30, 2000. The terms of these
transactions are described in the June 23, 2000 MSF Properties, L.C., Certificate of
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Participation, June 23, 2000 Guaranty, August 30, 2000 Promissory Note and August 30,
2000 Guaranty that are produced herewith.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

With respect to each of the transactions

identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2, identify each employee, agent, member,
manager, and/or attorney of Bodell who had any involvement in the transaction, and
generally describe the nature of each such individual's involvement.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Michael Bodell, president of

Bodell Construction Company negotiated the transactions. Michael L. Weight,
secretary/treasurer of Bodell Construction Company directed the preparation and delivery
of the checks and was present at one meeting with respect to each transaction.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

With respect to each of the transactions

identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2, set forth a detailed accounting of all funds
disbursed by or received by Bodell, including the date, amount, payment method, payor,
and recipient of each payment or receipt of funds.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

See Schedules attached hereto.

Except for this action, identify by case name,

court, and case number any legal action that Bodell has initiated relating in any way to
any of the transactions identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: None.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Identify each employee, agent, member,

manager and/or attorney of Bodell who had involvement in the negotiation, execution, or
performance of the Settlement Agreement executed by Bodell, Michael Bodell, MSF, and
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Jenson on or about March 18, 2003, and generally describe the nature of each such
individual's involvement.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Michael Bodell was involved

in the discussions and negotiations concerning the settlement and signed the agreement.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

State specifically the amount of money Bodell

contends it is entitled to receive from Cherokee & Walker in this action and explain in
detail how that amount has been calculated.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Bodell contends it is entitled to

recover from Cherokee and Walker the principal sum of $4 million representing the
amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan to Robbins and by which amount
Bodell contends Cherokee and Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell contends it is also
entitled to recover interest at the legal rate.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Identify all individuals, other than those listed in

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, who you
believe possess any knowledge or information concerning any of the allegations in the
Complaint, and briefly describe the knowledge or information you believe each such
individual possesses.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that is over broad and burdensome. Subject to such
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell is unaware of any persons that may have
knowledge or information concerning the allegations of the complaint other than is stated
in the parties' Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures.
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INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

State eveiy fact and identify every document

that you contend supports the allegation in paragraph 17 of the Complaint that "[tjhere is
now due, owing and unpaid to Bodell the sum of $4,280,000.00, together with unpaid
interest."
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the grounds that it is over broad and burdensome. Subject to such
objection and without waiving the same, the schedules attached hereto show the payments
and credits made with respect to the subject loan and how the amount of $4,280,000 was
calculated.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

State every fact and identify every document

that you contend support Bodell's claim in its prayer for judgment u[f]or compensatory
damages of $4,000,000.00, plus interest against Cherokee."
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10:

Bodell objects to this

interrogatory upon the ground that it is over broad and burdensome. Bodell further
objects on the basis that discovery has only recently commenced and Bodell has not
conducted the discovery necessary in order to fully answer this interrogatory. Bodell
reserves the right to supplement this answer to the extent required by the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Subject to such objections and without waiving the same, Bodell
responds as follows:
On January 7, 2000, Cherokee & Walker Investment Company, L.L.C.
("CWIC"), loaned Mark H. Robbins ("Robbins") $4,500,000. $500,000 of the loan
proceeds were contributed to Vtrax Sports, L.L.C, a newly formed company, in exchange
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for which Cherokee & Walker, L.L.C. ("CW"), received a 50% membership interest in
Vtrax. $3 million of the loan was to fund the repayment of bridge loans made to Robbins
for the repurchase of all outstanding shares of the capital stock of Wasatch Cycles,
$500,000 was to fund working capital of Wasatch Cycles and $500,000 went to Robbins
individually. Bodell is presently conducting discovery as to the assets and business of
Vtrax, but presently does not believe that Vtrax had any significant assets or business.
Greg Christensen, a CW principal, was appointed as an initial manager of Vtrax.
Consequently, CW and CWIC had detailed knowledge concerning 0Vtrax's business and
assets.
Effective June 10, 2000, CWIC and CW entered into a Purchase and Settlement
Agreement with Robbins pursuant to which Robbins agreed to pay $4,683,391.25 in full
payment of the loan previously made by CWIC and in addition to pay to CW
$3,316,608.80 on or before June 30, 2000, to purchase CW's membership interest in
Vtrax.
CWIC and CW knew that Robbins was going to have to borrow the money in
order to pay the money due under the agreement and specifically to purchase CW's
interest in Vtrax. CWIC and CW knew or should have known that Robbins had no way
to borrow such a large sum of money without misrepresenting the value of Vtrax and/or
related companies. CWIC and CW specifically knew that Robbins was borrowing money
from Jenson and checked the status of that loan on more than one occasion. Bodell is
presently conducting discovery with respect to these transactions and what knowledge
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CWIC and CW had of Robbins' financial affairs and the value of Vtrax and related
companies.
Jenson obtained a $4 million loan for his company, MSF Properties, Inc., from
Bodell on August 30, 2000, by repeating the misrepresentations Robbins had made to him
as alleged in the complaint. Robbins then paid the money to CWIC and CW to pay off
the CWIC loan and purchase CW's interest in Vtrax.
CWIC and CW would be unjustly enriched if they are permitted to retain the $4
million that Robbins fraudulently obtained indirectly from Bodell because they knew or
should have known that Robbins would have to fraudulently raise this money.
All non-privileged documents in Bedell's possession or control relating to these
transactions and to the claims asserted in the complaint are produced herewith.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: State every fact and identify every document
that you contend supports the allegation in paragraph 36 of the Complaint that "Cherokee
knew, or should have known, that its interest in Madwagon, Vtrax and Wasatach [sic]
were worth little, if anything, and that Robbins would raise funds to pay Cherokee by
using the amount for which he was purportedly acquiring Cherokee's interest in those
entities as proof of the value of those entities."
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11:

See Response to Interrogatory

10.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: State every fact and identify every document
that you contend supports Bodell's claim that Cherokee & Walker has been unjustly
enriched.
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO.12: See Response to Interrogatory
10.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify each individual who assisted in
responding to these requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production of
documents.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 13:

Michael J. Bodell and Merrill

L. Weight.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST NO. 1:

All documents and things that relate to, support, or

contradict the claims alleged by you in your pleadings.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 1:

Bodell objects to this request upon the

ground that it is over broad and burdensome and does not reasonably describe a
particularly category of documents. Subject to such objection, and without waiving the
same, all non-privileged documents within Bodell's possession or control that are
responsive to this request are produced herewith.
REQUEST NO. 2:

All documents that you identified or were requested to

identify in response to the foregoing interrogatories.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2:
REQUEST NO. 3:

See Response to Request No. 1.

All documents referred to or utilized in responding to

the foregoing requests for admission and interrogatories.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3:
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See Response to Request No. 1.

REQUEST NO. 4:

All "[documents relating to the MSF loans and the

amounts owing thereon," as described in Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule
26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 4:
REQUEST NO. 5:

See Response to Request No. 1.

All "[documents relating to the settlement between

Bodell, MSF and Jenson," as described in Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule
26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 5:
REQUEST NO. 6:

See Response to Request No. 1.

All documents that support or relate in any way to your

calculation of damages to which you claim Bodell is entitled.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 6:
REQUEST NO. 7:

See Response to Request No. 1.

All documents, including but not limited to daytimers,

journals, personal notes, e-mails, correspondence, memoranda, calendars, schedules,
contracts, financial statements, balance sheets, profit and loss statements, pro formas, and
any drafts or electronic versions thereof, that relate in any manner to MSF, Jenson,
Robbms, Cherokee & Walker, Bank One, Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon,
Mongoose, or Brunswick.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 7:
REQUEST NO. 8:

See Response to Request No. 1.

All documents, including but not limited to contracts,

agreements, check stubs, correspondence, notes, memoranda, loan documents, and any
drafts or electronic versions thereof, relating in any manner to any of the transactions
identified in response to Interrogatory No. 2.

12

RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 8:
REQUEST NO. 9:

See Response to Request No. 1.

All documents, including but not limited to contracts,

agreements, check stubs, correspondence, notes, memoranda, loan documents, and any
drafts or electronic versions thereof, relating in any manner to the Settlement Agreement
between Bodell, Michael Bodell, MSF, and Jenson
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 9:
REQUEST NO. 10:

See Response to Request No. 1.

All documents relating in any manner to any

communications between Bodell and MSF or Jenson concerning the transactions
described in Request Nos. 8 and 9 and/or relating in any manner to Robbins, Cherokee &
Walker, Bank One, Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, Mongoose, or
Brunswick.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 10: See Response to Request No. 1.
REQUEST NO. 11:

All documents relating in any manner to any

communications between Bodell and Robbins concerning the transactions described in
Request Nos. 8 and 9 and/or relating in any manner to MSF, Jenson, Cherokee & Walker,
Bank One, Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, Mongoose, or Brunswick
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 11: See Response to Request No. 1.
REQUEST NO. 12:

All documents relating in any manner to any

communications between Bodell and Bank One concerning the transaction described in
Request Nos. 8 and 9 and/or relating in any manner to MSF, Jenson, Robbins, Cherokee
& Walker, Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, Mongoose, or Brunswick.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 12: See Response to Request No. 1.
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REQUEST NO, 13:

All documents relating in any manner to any due

diligence conducted by Bodell in connection with any of its loans to MSF, Jenson, and/or
Robbins, including but not limited to any appraisals or investigations into the value of
Vtrax, Wasatch Cycles, Madtrax, Madwagon, Mongoose, or Brunswick, and/or any
investigations into the financial situation of MSF and/or Jenson.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 13: See Response to Request No. 1.
REQUEST NO. 14:

All documents relating in any manner to any payments

made by Bodell to MSF, Jenson, and/or Robbins.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 14: See Response to Request No. 1.
REQUEST NO. 15:

All documents relating in any manner to any payments

made by MSF, Jenson, and/or Robbins to Bodell.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 15: See Response to Request No. 1.
DATED this

of April, 2004.
BURBIDGE & MI

RICHARD D. BURBIDGE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
)ss.
COUNT OF SALT LAKE )
MICHAEL J. BODELL, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is
President of Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company in the above-captioned action; that he
has read the foregoing responses and that the contents contained therein are true and
accurate to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

MICHAEL J. BODELL
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this the

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in:
My Commission Expires:

15

day of April, 2004.
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through 5 0 ,

Judge B r u c e

Lubeck

Defendants.

A p r i l 2 7 , 2005

Location:

Reporter:

- 9:90

a.m.

SNELL & WILMER, LLP
Gateway Tower West
15 West South T e m p l e
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, U t a h

Kathy M o r g a n , CSR,

84101

RPR

N o t a r y Public in and for the State of U t a h

CitiCourt,

LLC

(801) 532-3441
a46a0e23-ba40-400d-bfb3-0ba1

Michael J. Bodell * April 27, 2005
Page 2
1

A P P E A R A N C E S
2

3

For the Plaintiff:
4

5

1

6

7
8

For the Defendants:
Representing
Bank One:

9

10

ROBERT J. SHELBY
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1

borrower on a transaction, I believe, if they're

2

the same company that's based out of east, back

3

east, and I think they're -- the ones I heard

4

about are a hard-money lender, bridge loans.

5
6

Q.

Have you ever had any dealings with

Unisource Cap?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

As you know, one of the companies that's

9

the subject of this lawsuit is Brunswick

10

Corporation and their Mongoose Bicycle division.

11

Have you ever had any communications with them?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Has anyone on behalf of Bodell

14

Construction?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

How long have you been President of

17
18
19
20
21

Bodell Construction?
A.

I think I mentioned that just a bit ago.

Approximately 2 5 years.
Q.

Tell me about your background and

experience as a lender.

Have you ever made loans?

22

A.

That's pretty

23

Q.

I can be more specific if you'd like.

24
25

...

Have you ever made loans?
A.

Yes.
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441
a46a0e23-ba40-400d-bfb3-0ba16e8b70b8 _^
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Q.

You or Bodell Construction?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Would this be through Bodell

Construction or personally?
A.

Both, but primarily through Bodell

Construction.

Well, actually, nothing personally

that I can think of.
Q.

Approximately how many loans have been

made by Bodell Construction?
A.

Oh, man.

That would be hard to say.

Including little loans to maybe -- if you're going
to include loans to, for example, to
subcontractors to meet their payroll until the
following payment request, it could be some, a lot
more numerous than what you might call a
loan-loan.
Q.

Let's exclude those.

A.

You know what I mean?

Q.

Yes.

Let's exclude loans to

subcontractors and payroll advances to employees,
things like that.
A.

If you're going to talk about loans

outside of the general contracting realm?
maybe kind of what you're
Q.

Is that

...

Yes.
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441
a46a0e23-ba40-400d-bfb3-0ba16e8b70b8
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

A.

I'm going to say between 10 and 15.

Q.

Over what period of time?

A.

15 years.

Q.

How many of those would be business or

commercial loans versus consumer loans?
A.

You'd have to -- I'd have to hear a

definition of consumer loan.
Q.

I would define that as a loan to an

individual for his personal or family uses.
A.

I would say, and this is a real rough

estimate, but 90 percent would be business.
Q.

Who would be the types of people or

businesses that you would make these loans to?
A.

For the most part they were entities

15

that were reloaning the funds to someone else or

16

reinvesting for an investment purpose.

17

Q.

Why does Bodell Construction do that

18

type of lending?

19

construction business.
A.
To increase the rate of return on some

20

It's obviously unrelated to your

21

of our working capital from time to time, as we've

22

had excess.

23

to investing it in the stock market.

24
25

Q.

As opposed, for example, as opposed

What type of return do you typically get

on these loans that you make?
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441
a46a0e23-ba40-400d-bfb3-0ba16e8b70b8

Michael J. Bodell * April 27, 2005
Page 16

MR. SHELBY:

Well, if there's a typical

rate of return, answer the question.

Otherwise if

you - A.

There is not a typical rate of return.

Q.

(By Mr. Beckstead)

Can you give me a

range of what the rate of return has been?
A.

Oh, you know, I don't think we've ever

really calculated over the long haul.

The rate of

return probably is, I'd say, between 5 and 15
percent.
Q.

Annually?

A.

Well, I'm making a wild speculative

guess on that because I've never done it, but to
calculate them all, as a practical matter
sometimes you don't get paid as much as you want
on the return or get paid in part.
know.

So I don't

I don't know the answer to your question, I

guess would have been the simple answer.
Q.

Let me see if I can be more specific so

it's easier for you to answer.
A.

Okay.

Q.

Of the 10 to 15 times, 90 percent

business loans that you've made, were they all
structured, other than the one we've seen with
Marc Jenson, as a promissory note?
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441
a46a0e23-ba40-400d-bfb3-0ba16e8b70b8
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A.
I don't remember. By the most part,
they would have been.
Q.
Are they all structured in a way that
the borrower agrees to pay you a fixed rate of
interest?
A.
By the most part. There may have been
some exceptions to that.
Q.
How many of them does the borrow agree
to pay you a rate of interest higher than 15
percent per annum?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
Is that because you just don't remember
or are you just giving -A.
I just -- there's been enough of them
that there's a broad range, I mean.
MR. SHELBY: Try to allow Mr. Beckstead
to finish his question before you start to answer
so the court reporter can get down everything
you're saying.
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay.
Q.
(By Mr. Beckstead) Can you give me a
sense of when you're making one of these types of
loans what you consider an average return that's
acceptable to you? And I'm asking what the
borrower agrees to pay, not what you actually
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441
a46a0e23-ba40-400d-bfb3-0ba16e8b70b8
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receive.
A.

It would depend on the terms and the

circumstances and the times, so to speak.

But I

would say anywhere between, on a per annum basis,
between 8 percent and it could be -- if it was a
per annum it sounds high, but they're never really
year-long deals -- but on a per annum basis, it
could go up to 40 and 50 percent.
Q.

How do you decide what rate to charge?

A.

Well, it's a variety.

Often it's what

the person, the borrower, if you will, in some
cases states, tells what they're willing to pay.
Q.

Do you negotiate the rate?

A.

Sometimes.

Q.

Of the 10 or 15 business loans you've

made, how many lenders -- excuse me -- how many
borrowers are involved?
A.

I'm really not certain.

I'd say that if

you pin me down on a range, I'd say five to eight.
Q.

One of those is Marc Jenson?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And we're aware of two transactions: a

million dollar loan in June of 2000 and a $4
million loan in August of 2000.

Did you ever do

any other loans with Mr. Jenson?
CitiCourt, LLC
(801) 532-3441
a46a0e23-ba40-400d-bfb3-0ba16e8b70b8
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EXPERT WITNESS REPORT

Bodell Construction Company, a Utah corporation
v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et. al.

Submitted by:

Merrill Weight
Date of Report
June 11, 2007

I.

INTRODUCTION
I am the Secretary and Treasurer at Bodell Construction Company

("Bodell Construction"). In that capacity, I have been asked to calculate the damages
suffered by Bodell Construction as a result of the events described in a lawsuit filed in
Third District Court, State of Utah, styled Bodell Construction Company v. MarkH.
Robbins, et al, Civil Case Number 030917018.
This report and the attached schedules describe and reflect my work in connection
with calculating the damages, summarize my opinions concerning the amount of those
damages, and provide the bases for those opinions. The opinions and findings expressed
herein are based upon my own investigation and work to date, as well as the facts of the
discreet transactions at issue in this case as I understand them. My opinions and findings
are also based upon my review of the documents and information itemized in Exhibit 1 of
this report.
In preparing this report, I have made no assumptions concerning who is liable for
the claims alleged by Bodell Construction. While I have made certain assumptions about
the facts of this case for purposes of my analysis, I do not intend to opine on the veracity
of any specific evidence other than that with which I have personal knowledge and
information by virtue of being a fact witness to some of the events at issue in this case. I
may supplement, update or modify this report at a later date if additional information
becomes available.
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II.

QUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESS
I have a B.S. degree with a major in Accounting and a minor in Business

Management from Brigham Young University. I am a Certified Public Accountant
licensed to practice by the State of Utah.
I am presently employed as the Secretary and Treasurer at Bodell Construction. I
have held that position since September 1, 2000. In that capacity I am responsible for all
accounting functions, financial reporting functions, and financial management for the
Company. I have considerable experience in managing investments of the Company and
in preparing financial analyses. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a copy of my resume. I have not
testified as an expert at trial within the last four years. I have, however, testified in
various depositions and in arbitrations and trials purely as a fact witness within the last
four years.
III.

CASE BACKGROUND
The following is a summary of certain events leading up to this litigation and is

not meant to be testimony regarding the factual background of the case; it simply serves
as a frame of reference for the opinions that follow this section.
Michael Bodell met Marc Jenson ("Jenson") many years ago when the two were
neighbors. After a period of many years without much interaction, Jenson approached
Mr. Bodell in early summer 2000 with a business opportunity. Jenson told Mr, Bodell
that he operated a "hard money" lending company, MSF Properties, that provided highreturn, short-term bridge loans. Jenson persuaded Mr. Bodell to cause Bodell
Construction to lend MSF Properties one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in June 2000 for
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use in hard money loans to third-parties. The terms of the June 2000 loan agreement are
the subject of a Private Placement Agreement and a Guaranty, both dated June 23, 2000.
Benjamin Lightner, who was a Wealth Advisor in the Private Banking Group of
Bank One (a predecessor in interest of Chase), and its authorized agent, authored a letter
(the "Letter") dated August 22, 2000, addressed 'To Whom it may concern'5 and
representing that:
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members Mark Robbings
and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be depositing $165,000,000 into Bank One,
Utah NA. The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax Group,
LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a Bahamian
corporation. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest bearing
account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members.
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the
undersigned.
Lightner drafted the Letter at Mark Robbins' ("Robbins") request. Bank One and
Lightner acknowledge these representations were false at the time they were made.
Bodell alleges that Lightner and Bank One made those representations knowing that they
were false or, at a minimum, that Lightner and Bank One negligently made those
misrepresentations. Bodell further alleges that Lightner knew or could reasonably
foresee that potential third-party lenders, a class that included Bodell, could see and rely
on the Letter and, as a result, providefinancingto Robbins, Jenson or MadTrax Group.
Jenson obtained a copy of the Letter from Robbins and used it to induce Bodell to make a
four million dollar ($4,000,000.00) loan in August 2000. Bodell claims it reasonably
relied upon the representations and assurances made in the Letter in making the loan.
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Bodell would not have made the loan absent the Letter from Bank One and the
representations contained therein.
Consistent with the stated purpose of the loan, Jenson combined the four million
dollars from Bodell Construction with another four million dollars from another source
and loaned a total of eight million dollars ($8,000,000.00) to Robbins to retire a personal
loan and repurchase a fifty percent interest in Robbins5 bicycle business. Robbins
thereafter defaulted on the Jenson loan, and Jenson in turn defaulted on the four million
dollar loan from Bodell Construction.
Jenson made several payments to Bodell Construction for the June loan, and one
payment earmarked for the August loan. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Bodell Construction
settled its claims against Jenson in exchange for a settlement payment.
IV.

SUMMARY OPINIONS AND GROUNDS THEREOF
A. Damages Related To Fraud
I am informed that the court will instruct the jury on the law governing the

calculation of damages. I am not an attorney, nor do I intend to offer opinions at trial
about the law applicable to the calculation of damages.
For purposes of my calculations, I have been instructed that when a plaintiff is
fraudulently induced to enter into a transaction, Utah courts award damages based on the
so-called ''benefit of the bargain rule." I am instructed that under the benefit of the
bargain rule, a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the loss of his bargain and is not
limited to his out-of-pocket damages. I have also been instructed that, in at least one
case, a Utah appellate court affirmed an award of damages based on an alternative theory.
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Under this alternative theory, the plaintiff was awarded damages based on the rate of
return the plaintiff would have received if he had invested his money elsewhere. I will
henceforth refer to this theory as the comparable rate of return rule.
I have been further instructed that under either the benefit of the bargain rule or
the comparable rate of return rule, a plaintiff is also entitled to compensation for any
additional pecuniary loss that was a consequence of the fraud (i.e., consequential
damages).
1. Benefit Of The Bargain Rule
As a result of thefraudulentmisrepresentations in the Letter, Bodell Construction
made a four million dollar ($4,000,000.00) loan to Jenson. Bodell Construction, in
return, was promised that it would receive interest on the loan at the rate of one percent
(1.0 %) per week, accruing on the outstanding balance weekly, in advance, at the
beginning of each Wednesday, until it was repaid. The specific repayment terms of the
loan are set forth in a Promissory Note signed by Jenson on August 30, 2000. I
understand that courts that have applied the benefit of the bargain rule in similar
situations have awarded damages based on the contractual rate of interest.
Bodell Construction made the loan on August 30, 2000. Applying interest at the
contractual rate described in the Promissoiy Note, and accounting for the contractual loan
fees and default fees, and after making adjustments for monies received in from Jenson,
the outstanding amount of principal and interest due and owing on the loan as of October
22, 2007 (the first day of trial) is $18,449,872.41. The Promissory Note also provides
and Bodell bargained for "all reasonable costs of collection or other costs incurred in the
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protection of [Bodell Construction], including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys
fees and costs incurred by [Bodell Construction] if [the] Promissory Note is referred to an
attorney for collection." Through April 30, 2007, Bodell has incurred $393,417.98 in
attorneys5 fees and costs attempting to recover for breach of the Promissory Note. That is
part of the agreement Bodell Construction bargained for. Adding that sum to the total for
principle and interest, Bodell Construction is entitled to $18,843,290.39 (plus attorneys'
fees and costs through triall) if the jury concludes it should receive the benefit of the
bargain it made in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentations made by Bank One in its
Letter. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a spreadsheet detailing the specific calculations used to
reach this figure.
I am informed that consequential damages are also recoverable in fraud cases. I
am instructed that consequential damages include (but are not necessarily limited to) the
following: expenses resulting from the misrepresentations; loss of goodwill; any amounts
expended in mitigation of damages; lost earnings; pre-judgment interest; and interest on
loans required to finance plaintiffs business due to the unpaid loan. For purposes of my
analysis, I have conservatively identified as consequential damages only the amount of
interest Bodell Construction was required to pay on money it was forced to borrow
against its line of credit as a result of not receiving the payments promised in connection
with the August 2000 Jenson loan. Attached as Exhibit 9 is a spreadsheet detailing my
calculations of those actual consequential damages incurred by Bodell as a result of the
$4,000,000 loan it was induced to make. As shown in Exhibit 9, those damages total
$127,281.18.
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Adding Bodell Construction's consequential damages to the other totals results in
total damages of $18,970,571 57 under the benefit of the bargain rule
Acknowledging that Bodell Construction entered into the August 2000 Jenson
loan with an expectation that the loan was to be relatively short-term m nature, I have
been asked to perform a modified benefit of the bargain rule analysis as an aid to the jury
For purposes of this analysis, I applied the terms and conditions of the August 2000 loan
agreement only through October 3, 2000, the date specified m the contract for payment of
all outstanding principal and interest (and fees, etc ) From that date forward, I
substituted the statutory rate of interest (10%) for the contractual rate of interest (one
percent per week) For purposes of this analysis, I also excluded the default and late fees
for which the contract provides All other aspects of my previous calculation remained in
effect (attorneys' fees and costs per the contract, and interest payments as consequential
damages) Applying the statutory rate of return, instead of the contract rate, from the date
on which all the principal and interest was due and owing, results m total damages to
Bodell Construction of $5,890,768 12 under the modified benefit of the bargain rule
Attached as Exhibit 6 is a spreadsheet detailing the specific calculations used to reach this
result
2. Comparable Rate of Return
MJB Ltd , a Bodell Family Partneiship and James H Bodell, a Bodell
Construction Stockholder have made loans to other budge loan companies ovei the years
that have had rates of return ranging between 18 and 36 percent, with 25 percent
representing a fair estimate of the average rate of return for this kind of transaction This
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figure is confirmed by loan documents generated in connection with those loans. Bodell
Construction very likely could have achieved returns above 18 percent had it invested
elsewhere the four million dollars it was instead induced to loan to Jenson. Nonetheless,
for purposes of my comparable rate of return analysis here I have assumed a rate of 18
percent as a comparable rate of return available through other investments. Applying that
rate from the date of the Jenson loan, it is my opinion that Bodell Construction would
have earned $3,510,352.96, in addition to the payments applied to the note, had Bodell
Construction invested in its traditional method the four million dollars it was instead
fraudulently induced to loan to Jenson. Thus, Bodell Construction's damages under the
comparable rate of return rule is $7,510,352.96 including the $4,000,000.00 of the
original loan. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a spreadsheet detailing my calculations of those
damages.
Because this calculation is not directly based on the contractual terms of the
Jenson loan, I have not included in this analysis attorneys' fees, costs or consequential
damages, such as interest paid on lines of credit Bodell Construction was forced to tap
when Jenson failed to make payments on the August 2000 loan.
3. Total Fraud Damages
Based on the calculations described above, it is my opinion that the fraudulent
misrepresentations made in the August 22, 2000 letter caused Bodell Construction to
incur damages totaling $18,970,571.57 under the benefit of the bargain rule;
$5,890,768.12 under the modified benefit of the bargain rule; or totaling $7,510,352.96
under the comparable rate of return rule. These amounts do not include any allocation for
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punitive damages, which I am told are subject to a separate analysis for the jury to
conduct after instruction by the court.
B. Damages Related to Negligent Misrepresentations
I have been instructed that the proper measure of damages in an action for
negligent misrepresentation is that amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the
pecuniary loss to him for which the misrepresentation is the legal cause, and often is
measured as the difference between the value received in a transaction and any value
given for it, plus any additional pecuniary losses otherwise suffered as a consequence of
the misrepresentation (i.e., consequential damages). I am informed that under Utah law
the total measure of such damages includes statutory prejudgment interest at a rate of
10% per annum as the damages become liquidated.
L Difference Between Value Received and Value Given
In this case, the difference between the value that Bodell Construction received in
connection with the August 2000 loan and the value given was $4,000,000, minus funds
received from Jenson and applied against the August 2000 loan. Exhibit 10 shows the
$4,000,000 loan accruing interest at the statutory rate (10%) from the date of the loan
through the first day of trial, making adjustments for payments received by Jenson
against the August 2000 loan. Statutory interest is applied here because the damages
were liquidated when Bodell Construction made the loan in August 2000. After
accounting for the Jenson payments, the difference between the value given and the value
received is $4,939,195.32.
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As I did previously in the benefit of the bargain analysis, I conservatively apply as
consequential damages here only interest payments Bodell Construction was forced to
make when it had to draw on its line of credit as a result of Jenson missing payments
under the August 2000 loan. As shown in Exhibit 9, those payments totaled $127,281.18.
2.

Total Negligent Misrepresentation Damages.

Adding consequential damages to the analysis above for the difference between
the value given and the received in connection with the August 2000 loan, Bodell
Construction's damages under a negligent misrepresentation analysis conservatively total
$5,066,476.50. This does not include application of prejudgment interest to the
consequential damages as they became liquidated.
V.

COMPENSATION AND PUBLICATIONS

Save for my regular salary, I am receiving no compensation for my work on this
report. There have been no publications authored by me within the preceding ten years.
As this case progresses, I reserve the right to supplement this report as needed or
as additional relevant information becomes available.

Sincerely,

yLm\\

Weight

~~/
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EXHIBIT 1

Bodell Constriction Company
v
JPMorgan Chase Bank
DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REVIEWED BY MERRILL L WEIGHT FOR
PREPARATION OF EXPERT WITNESS REPORT
MSF Properties, L C Certificate of Participation, dated June 23, 2000
MSF Properties Private Placement Agreement, dated June 23, 2000
Guaranty, dated June 23, 2000.
Promissory Note, Dated August 30, 2000
Guaranty, dated August 30, 2000
Payment documentation for payments on the Certificate of Completion and Promissory
Note
Legal fees and cost billmgs for collection actions on the Certificate of Completion and
Promissory Note
Bank and accounting information for mteiest paid on the Bodell line of credit
Letter, dated August 22, 2000 from Benjamin Lightner
Bridge Loan terms from Waterford Funding, LLC, and Cypress Capital

JODELL CONSTRUCTION
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EXHIBIT 2

As Secretary and Treasurer of Bodell Construction Company, Mr.
Weight is responsible for all financial operations within the Company.
This includes the preparation of financial statements, management
reports, corporate and field office administration, tax management, and
resolution of perception differences.
Bodell Construction Company maintains it's financial stability and
viability, due to Mr Weight's years of experience and accounting
responsibilities.
Summary of Experience

Merrill L Weight
Secretary / Treasurer
Construction
Experience:
37 years
Experience with
Bodell Construction
Company:

Prior to joining Bodell Construction, Mr. Weight worked for the following
organizations:
Project Analysts, Executive Vice President
Mr Weight was responsible for office administration, sales, preparation
of construction claims and expert witness testimony.

17 years
Credentials
BS Accounting
Brigham Young University

Jelco, Inc., Secretary /Treasurer

Licensed Certified
Public Accountant

Responsible for accounting operations, including financial and job cost
management, income taxes, and corporate/field office administration.

Specialized project
costing and reporting

Cooper & Lybrand, Senior Staff Auditor

Income l a x Planning

Mr. Weight performed certified audits of client financial statements and
prepared income tax returns, with construction clients as a specialty.

Extensive knowledge
of the construction
industry

JODELL CONSTRUCTION
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EXHIBIT 3

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

6/11/07

Print Date
MSF PROPERTIES, L X .
$4,000,000 NOTE
COMPARISON TOTALS
As At 10-22-07 (LEGAL FEES AND COSTS ONLY THROUGH 4-30-07)

I
L

Exhibit 4

Exhibits

Par Original
Note Terms

Comparable
Interest
Rate
at_1B% APR

~]

Exhibit 6
1
Alternative 1
Ujiing Original 1
Note Terms
Excluding
Default Penalty
Through 10-3-00
Subsequent at
i
10% APR
|

Principal Balance

$4,280,000.00

$4,000,000.00

$3,694,000.12

Accrued Interest Balance

14,169,872.41

3,510,352.96

1,699,240.06

Subtotal For Principal And Interest

18,449,872 41

7,510,352.96

5,393,240.18

Legal Fees And Costs Through 4-30-07 (Exhibit 7)
Subtotal Including Principal, Interest, and Legal Fees And Costs
Consequential Damages - Interest on Bank Line of Credit Borrowing
Total including Principal, Interest, Legal Fees and Costs, and Consequential Damages

393,417.98
18,843,290.39

370,246.76
7,510,352.96

127,281.18
$18,970,571.57

5,763,486.94
127,281.18

$7,510,352.96

$J±890,768.X2

BODELL

CONSTRUCTION
PRINT DATE

MSR P R O P E R T I E S , L.C.
$4,000,000-00
AMORTIZATION

ORIGINAL PER N O T E TERMS

NOTE
SCHEDULE

I N T E R E S T RATE

DESCRIPTION

1.00% PER WEEK IN ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY

DATE
8/30/2000

NUMBER

PRINCIPAL

1

TOTAL

INTEREST

INTEREST

OF WEEKS

INCREASE
.00
$4,,000,, 000.
200,, 000.
.00
80,,000..00
42,,800..00

J

PAYMENT

ACCRUBP

PAID OR ADJ

$200,,000-00

$200,,000-00

o.oo
o.oo

0.00
0-00
0.00

O R I G I N A L LOAN
I N T E R E S T ADDED TO P R I N C
LOAN F E E
LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
PAYMENT (NOTE 1)
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
PAYMENT

5/2/2001
3/18/2003
3/18/2003

30
0
98
0

INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

.0/23/2007

240

10/3/2000
10/3/2000
10/3/2000
5/1/2001

5
0
0

TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 10/23/2 0 07
PRINCIPAL
INTEREST
TOTAL PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST
LEGAL F E E S , COLLECTION COSTS THROUGH

1,296,,840-00

o.oo

$250,,000..00

4,194,, 400 - 00

o.oo

1,386,.167..59

10,272,.000-00

$4,280,000.00
14,169,872.41
18,449,872.41
4/30/07

COMBINED
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER W E E K SUBSEQUENT TO
PRINCIPAL BALANCE
TIMES W E E K L Y RATH

393,417-98
$18,843,290.39

10/23/2007

WEEKLY INTEREST CHARGES I N ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY
(NOTE 1)

EXHIBIT 4
6/11/2007 15:44

$4,280,000.00
1.00%
$42,800-00

PAYMENT APPLIED FIRST TO LATE FEE AS REDUCTION OF PRINCIPAL, AND REMAINDER TO

INTEREST

207,,200-00
0.00
1,386,,167.59
0.00

INTEREST
BALANCE
$0.00
0.00

o.oo
0.00
, 840.00

1,,296,
1,,089,,640.00
5,,284,, 040.00
3,,897,,872.41
14,,169,.872.41

PRINCIPAL
PAID
$0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
42,800-00
0 .00

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$4,000,000.00
4,200,000.00

0.00

4,280,000.00
4,322,800.00
4,322,800.00
4,280,000 . 00
4,280,000.00
4,280,000.00

0.00

4,280,000.00

BODELL

EXHIBIT 5

CONSTRUCTION
PRINT DATE

MSF P R O P E R T I E S , L - C .
$ 4 , 0 0 0 / 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE
AMORTIZATION SC.HKDTTLB
I N T E R E S T RATE

I S . 0 0 % APR
3 6 5 DAY YEAR.

DATE

O R I G I N A L LOAN

8/30/2000

PRINCIPAL
INCREASE

NUMBER
OP DAYS

5/2/2001

245

PAYMENT

5/2/2001

0

I N T E R E S T ACCRUAL THROUGH

3/18/2003

685

PAYMENT

3/18/2003

0

10/22/2007

INTEREST
ACCRUED

1,386,167.59

$4,000,000.00
3,510,352.96
7,510,352-96
10/22/2007
$4,000,000.00
0.0493%
$1,972.00

INTEREST
BALANCE

INTEREST
PAID OR ADJ

.. _.
$250,000.00

1,679

TOTAL 3ALANCE DUE THR.OUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 07
PRINCIPAL
INTEREST
TOTAL P R I N C I P A L AND INTERS ST
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO
P R I N C I P A L BALANCE
TIMES DAILY RATE
DAILY INTEREST CHANGES

TOTAL
PAYMENT

$4,000,000.00

INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

THROUGH

15:46

COMPARABLE RATE

DESCRIPTION

INTEREST ACCRUAL

6/11/2007

._.. .—

PRINCIPAL
PAID

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$4,000,000.00

$0.00

483,287.67

0.00

483,287.67

0.00

4,000,000.00

0.00

250,000-00

233,287.67

0.00

4,000,000.00

1,351,232.88

0.00

0.00

4,000,000.00

0.00

1,386,167.59

0.00

4,000,000.00

3,312,000.00

0.00

1,584,520.55
198,352.96
3,510,352.96

0.00

4,000,000.00

BODELL

CONSTRUCTION

EXHIBIT 6
PRINT DATE

HSF P R O P E R T I E S ,
54,000,000.00
AMORTIZATION
INTEREST

L.C.

ALTERNATIVE PRE-JUDGMENT

RATE A F T E R O R I G I N A L

6/11/2007

15:47

DUE DATE

NOTE
SCHBDULE

RATE

1.00%

PER WEEK I N ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY THROUGH

1 0 . 0 0% APR SUBSEQUENT TO 1 0 - 3 - 0 0

CALCULATED

10-3-00

ON DAYS

OUTSTANDING

3 6 5 DAY YEAR
NUMBER OF T
DESCRIPTION
ORIGINAL

DATE

LOAN

MEEKLY OR

WEEKS/DAYS j DAILY CALC

8/30/2000

PRINCIPAL

|

TOTAL

INTEREST

INTEREST

INTEREST

PRINCIPAL

INCREASE

j

PAYMENT

ACCRUED

PAID OR ADJ

BALANCE

PAID

$4,000,000.00

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$4.000,000.00

$0.00

INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC

10/3/2000

5

WEEKLY

200,000-00

$200,000.00

$200,000.00

0.00

$0.00

4,200,000.00

LOAN F E E

10/3/2000

0

WEEKLY

80,000.00

0.00

0-00

0.00

0.00

4,280,000.00

WEEKLY

0.00

4,280,000.00

LATE

CHARGE

INTEREST

ON D E F A U L T

(1

ACCRUAL THROUGH

PAYMENT
I N T E R E S T ACCRUAL

THROUGH

PAYMENT
INTEREST

ACCRUAL THROUGH

TOTAL BALANCE

DUE THROUGH

10/3/2000

0

5/2/2001

211

DAILY

5/2/2001

0

DAILY

3/18/2003

685

DAILY

3/18/2003

0

DAILY

1 0 / 2 2 / 2 007

1,67 9

DAILY

$3,694,000.12

INTEREST

1,699,240.06

PRINCIPAL

LEGAL F E E S ,

AND I N T E R E S T

COLLECTION

COSTS

5,393,240.18
8/1/03

THROUGH

4/30/07

370,246.76

COMBINED

INTEREST
PRINCIPAL

$5,763,486.94
ACCRUAL

NOTE

10/22/2007
$3,694,000.12

RATE

INTEREST

(1)

P E R DAY S U B S E Q U E N T TO

BALANCE

TIMES DAILY
DAILY

1,386,167.59

10/22/2007

PRINCIPAL
TOTAL

$250,000.00

0.0274%

CHARGES

L A T E CHARGE ON D E F A U L T NOT A S S E S S E D

$1,012.16

IN THIS

CALCULATION

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

247,419.18

0.00

247 419.IS

0.00

4,280,000.00

0.00

247,419-18

0.00

2 580.82

4,277,419.18

802,748.53

0.00

802 748.53

0.00

4,277,419.18

0.00

802,743.53

0.00

583 419.06

3,694,000.12

1,699,240.06

0.00

699 240.06

0.00

3,694,000.12

60DELL CONSTRUCTION

Fax 8012611020

Jun 11 2007 15 57

EXHIBIT 7
6/11/07

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
MSF PROPERTIES / MARC JENSON NOTES RECEIVABLE
LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION ACTIONS THROUGH 4 30 07
AND APPLICATION OF 3/18/03 PAYMENT

INVOICE DATE

LAW FIRM

INVOICE AMOUNT

4/30/01
5/31/01
11/30/01
1/18/02
2/28/02
6/30/02
1/31/03
2/28/03
3/31/03

$415 00
230 00
125 00
717 50
11500
262 60
5 104 50
9 695 12
6.0S4 09

BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIOGE & MITCHELL

4/30/03
5/31/03
7/31/03

368 75
2 360 00
2,249 50

BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
8URBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIOGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE MITCHELL &
BURBIDGE MITCHELL &
BURBIDGE MITCHELL &
BURBIDGE MITCHELL &

8/31/03
9/30/03
10/31/03
11/30/03
12/31/03
1/31/04
2/29/04
3/31/04
4/30/04
5/31/04
6/30/04
7/31/04
8/31/04
9/30/04
10/31/04
11/30/04
12731/04
1/31/05
2/28/05
3/31/05
4/30/05
5/31/05
6/30/05
7/31/05
8/31/05
9/30/05
10/31/05
11/30/05
12/31/05
1/31/06
2/28/06
3/31/06
4/30/06
5/31/06
6/30/06
7/31/06
8/31/06
9/30/06
10/31/06
11/30/06
12/31/06
1/31/07
3/13/07
3/31/07
4/30/07

103 75
1 496 25
1 807 50
4 939 46
8 605 40
3 680 79
5 704 84
3 068 50
6 711 07
1 088 15
3 965 75
1 285 00
2 264 75
11 52100
8 381 75
752 00
935 75
1 497 75
708 75
494 00
7 800 71
30 625 42
39 381 35
7 673 23
8 255 65
6 232 77
627 43
120 00
455 25
3 192 25
6 371 05
2 337 25
17 730 10
41 564 35
31 616 92
2 635 85
14 395 15
20 854 10
2 591 75
2 629 75
3 443 89
10 394 72
9 729 32
6 452 38
24 141 91

NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTFNSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
BUR8IDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

GROSS
GROSS
GROSS
GROSS

TOTAL LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION THROUGH 4/3O/07
ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE FOR FEES THROUGH 3 31 03
NOTE DATED 6/23/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT
NOTE DATED 8/30/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT

6/23/2000 NOTE PRINCIPAL (TO EXHIBIT 8)
6/23/2000 NOTE INTEREST (TO EXHIBIT 8)
6/23/2000 NOTE LEGAL FEES AND COLLECTION COSTS (ABOVE)
8/30/00 NOTE INTEREST (TO EXHIBIT 4)

SUBTOTAL

ORIG PRINC
$1 000 000 00
4 000 000 00
55 000 000 00

$1 128
480
4
1 386

541
746
543
167

94
73
74
59

$3 000 000 00

ALLOCATED T O
ALLOCATED TO
6 23 00 NOTE 2 0 %
8 30 00 NOTE

S22 718 71

$4 543 74

370 264 76

$397 96172
|

APPLICATION OF 3/18/03 PAYMENT

TOTAL 3/18/03 PAYMENT

P 07

$397 961 72
|

PERCENT
20 00%
80 00%
100 00%

370 264 76

$4 543 74

$393 4i7~9(T

BODELL.

CONSTRUCTION

PRINT DATE
MSF P R O P E R T I E S ,
$1,000/000.00
AMORTIZATION

L.C.

EXHIBIT 8
6/11/2007 15:51

ORIGINAL PER NOTE TERMS

NOTE
SCHEDULE

INTEREST RATE

25.00% APR
365 DAY YEAR
NUMBER

DESCRIPTION
ORIGINAL LOAN
INTEREST ADDED TO PRXNC
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC
PAYMENT
PAYMENT
PAYMENT
PAYMENT

DATE
5/23/2000
9/21/2000
12/22/2000
2/5/2003
2/11/2003
2/14/2003
3/18/2003

OF DAYS
90
92
775
6
3
32

PRINCIPAL
INCREASE
$1,000,000.00
61,643.84
66,898.10

TOTAL
PAYMENT

$100,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
1,609,288.67

INTEREST
ACCRUED
$61,643.84
66,898.10
S99,054.80
4,637.84
2,318.92
24,735.17

INTEREST
PAID OR ADJ$61,643.84
66,898.10
100,000.00
25,000.00
25,000.00
480,746.73

INTEREST
BALANCE
$0.00
0.00
0.00
499,054.80
478,692.64
456,011.56
0.00

PRINCIPAL
PAID
$0.00
0.00
O.OO
0.00
0.00
1,128,541.94

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$1,000,000.00
1,061,643.84
1,128,541.94
1,128,541.94
1,128,541.94
1,128,541-94
0.00

BODELL CONSTRUCTION

Fax 8012611020

Jun 11 2007 15*57

P 09

EXHIBIT 9

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
CALCULATION OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-O0 TO 12-31-06
FROM

04/01/02 J
05/01/02
06/01/02
07/01/02
08/01/02
09/01/02
10/01/02
11/01/02
12/01/02
01/01/03
03/03/05
03/03/05
03/04/05
03/07/05
03/08/05
03/08/05
03/09/05
03/09/05
03/01/05
03/10/05
03/11/05
03/14/05
03/14/05
03/15/05
03/15/05
03/16/05
03/17/05
03/17/05
03/18/05
03/18/05
03/21/05
03/21/05
03/22/05
03/22/05
03/23/05
03/25/05
03/28/05
03/29/05
03/30/05
03/31/05
04/01/05
04/01/05
04/01/05
04/04/05
04/04/05
04/05/05
12/27/05
12/27/05
12/28/05
12/28/05
12/29/05

TRANS TYPE
TO
04/30/02 1ADV/PAY/INT I
05/31/02 ADV/PAY/INT
06/30/02 ADV/PAY/INT
07/31/02 ADV/PAY/INT
08/31/02 ADV/PAY/INT
09/30/02 ADV/PAY/INT
10/31/02 ADV/PAY/INT
11/30/02 ADV/PAY/INT
12/30/02 ADV/PAY/INT
01/31/03 ADV/PAY/INT
03/04/05 ADVANCE
03/04/05 INTEREST
03/07/05 PAYMENT
03/08/05 ADVANCE
|
ADVANCE
!
03/09/05 ! INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/10/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
03/11/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
03/15/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/16/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
03/18/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/21/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/22/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
03/23/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
ADVANCE
ADVANCE
ADJ INTEREST
ADVANCE
04/04/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
04/05/05 INTEREST
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
12/28/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/29/05 INTEREST
ADVANCE

12/29/05

12/30/05 INTEREST

I 01/09/06

I PAYMENT

PRINC BAL INT ACCRUE
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
RATE
4,938,899 46 I 3,549,064 15 I 1,389,835 31 I
7,010 97 I
1,930,609 68
5,050,101 70 4,509,327 33
706 06
426,485 23
2,099,312 36 3,603,436 81
5,257 55
426,485 23
123 59
426,485 23
92 17
426,485 23
72 72
426,485 23
426,485 23
426,485 23
1,629,279 49
1,202,794 26
400,987 22
400,987 22
400,987 22
61.26 5 50%
44,067 80
356,919 42
163.59 ! 5 50%
975,872 64
618,953 22
149.09 ; 5 50%
101,509 74
1,077,382 38
1 077,382 38
164 60 5 50%
1,647,352 22
569 969 84
1,647,352 22
251 68 5 50%
744,109 84
903,242 38
903,242 38
138 00 5 50%
903,242 38
327,409 77
327,409 77
327,409 77
50 02 5 50%
160,248 95
487,658 72
487,658 72
74 50 5 50%
487,658 72
396,272 47
396,272 47
396,272 47
60 54 5 50%
162,545 95
558,818 42
558,818 42
256 13 5 50%
291,637 34
850,455 76
850,455 76
129 93 5 50%
118,899 81
969,355 57
969,355 57
154 83 5 75%
969,355 57
213,993 63
213,993 63
110,635 40
103,358 23
330,434 38
433,792 61
102,687 16
536,479 77
213,594 17
750,073 94
750,073 94
393 82 5 75%
153,046 42
903,120 36
903,120 36
432 75 5 75%
78,005 21
825,115 15
825,115 15
13179 5 75%
825,115 15
446,268 24
446,268 24
446,268 24
89 87 7 25%
838,179 58
1 284,447 82
1,284,447 82
258 67 7 25%
188,457 32
1,472,905 14
I 1 472,905 14
296 63 7 25%

I 1,472 905 14 I
Page 1 of 5

J

1,654 17
958 36

645 17

BODELL CONSTRUCTION

Fax 8012611020
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P 10

LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
FROM

TO

TRANS TYPE

ADVANCE

PAYMENT

08/16/06

I 08/17/06

I

PRINCBAL

INT ACCRUE

2 117 321 53 I
ADVANCE
I 2 117,321 53 I
374,057 19 1,743,264 34
PAYMENT
1,743,264 34
INTEREST
1,743,264 34
ADJ INTEREST
1,743,264 34
INTEREST
1,868,068 38
124,804 04
ADVANCE
1,868,068 38
INTEREST
61,471 82
ADVANCE
1,929,540 20
1,929,540 20
INTEREST
PAYMENT
592,799 13 1,336,741 07
INTEREST
1,336,741 07
PAYMENT
1,336,741 07
!
743,621 24
743,621 24 ]
ADVANCE
743,621 24 j
INTEREST
830,254 93
ADVANCE
1,573,876 17
1,573,876 17
INTEREST
|
243 271 19 i
ADVANCE
i
1,817,147 36
1,817 147 36
INTEREST
ADVANCE
913,087 95
2,730,235 31
INTEREST
2,730 235 31
606,082 19
ADVANCE
3,336 317 50
3,336,317 50
INTEREST
ADVANCE
287,413 20
3,623,730 70
INTEREST
3,623,730 70
265,578 75
ADVANCE
3,889,309 45
PAYMENT
918,550 48 2,970,758 97
ADVANCE
564,088 83
3,534,847 80
205,555 25
ADVANCE
3,740,403 05
PAYMENT
34,026 19 3,706 376 86
ADVANCE
127 329 81
3,833,706 67
ADJINTEREST
3,833,706 67
ADVANCE
231,143 07
4,064,849 74
INTEREST
4 064,849 74
ADVANCE
135,706 00
4,200,555 74
INTEREST
4,200,555 74
PAYMENT
! 1,669,388 76 2,531,166 98
INTEREST
2,531,166 98
[PAYMENT
5 193 15 2,525,973 83
INTEREST
2,525,973 83
[ADVANCE
461,353 99
2,987,327 82
INTEREST
2,987,327 82
213,764 20
ADVANCE
3,201,092 02
INTEREST
3,201 092 02
ADVANCE
263 816 02
3,464,908 04
INTEREST
3,464,908 04
ADVANCE
200 39105
3,665,299 09
INTEREST
3 665,299 09
PAYMENT
269,770 50 3 395,528 59
INTEREST
3,395,528 59
ADVANCE
583,959 63
3,979,488 22
INTEREST
3,979,488 22
PAYMENT
327,177 55 3,652,310 67
INTEREST
3 652,310 67
ADVANCE
297,305 87
3,949,616 54
3 949,616 54 I
08/17/06 INTEREST
I
167,536 43
(ADVANCE
]_4 117,152 97 j

06/30/06 I
1
06/30/06
06/01/06 06/30/06
07/01/06
07/01/06 07/03/06
07/03/06
07/03/06 07/05/06
07/05/06
07/05/06 07/06/06
07/06/06
07/06/06 07/07/06
07/07/06
07/14/06
07/14/06 07/17/06
07/17/06
07/17/06 07/18/06
07/18/06
07/18/06 07/19/06
07/19/06
07/19/06 07/20/06
07/20/06 I
07/20/06 , 07/21/06
07/21/06 |
07/21/06 07/24/06
07/24/06
07/25/06
07/26/06
07/27/06
07/28/06
07/31/06
08/01/06
08/01/06
08/01/06 08/02/06
08/02/06
08/02/06 08/03/06
08/03/06
08/03/06 08/04/06
08/04/06
08/04/06 08/07/06
08/07/06
08/07/06 I 08/08/06
08/08/06
08/08/06 08/09/06
08/09/06
08/09/06 08/10/06
08/10/06
08/10/06 08/11/06
08/11/06
08/11/06 08/14/06
08/14/06
08/14/06 08/15/06
08/15/06
08/15/06 08/16/06
08/16/06

Page 2 of 5

RATE

10,866 46
204 08
799 00

8 00%
8 00%
8 25%

856 20

8 25%

442 18

8 25%

306 34

8 25%

511 24

8 25%

360 68

8 25%

416 43

8 25%

625 68 | 8 25%
764 57

8 25%

2,491 32

8 25%

(464 37) 8 25%
931 53

8 25%

962 63

8 25%

580 06

8 25%

1,736 60

8 25%

684 60

8 25%

733 58

8 25%

794 04

8 25%

839 97

8 25%

2,334 42

8 25%

911 97

8 25%

836 99

8 25%

905 12

8 25%

INT PAID

BODELL CONSTRUCTION

Fax:8012611020
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
FROM

TO

TRANS TYPE

ADVANCE

PAYMENT

PRINC BAL

4,117,152 97 I
I
08/18/06] INTEREST
2,686 445 71 1,430,707 2 6 ]
PAYMENT
1,430,707 2 6 |
08/21/06 INTEREST
3,164,120 48
1,733,413 22
ADVANCE
3,164,120 48
08/22/06 INTEREST
725,654 30 2,438,466 18
PAYMENT
2,438,466 18
08/23/06 INTEREST
90,302 15
2,528,768 33
ADVANCE
2,528,768 33
08/24/06 INTEREST
2,885,829 44
ADVANCE
357,061 11
2,885,829 44
09/01/06 INTEREST
170,100 73 | 2,715,728 71
PAYMENT
1,664,334 95 | 1,051,393 76
PAYMENT
J
772,719 81
1,824,113.57
ADVANCE
!
88,900 74 !
1,913,014.31
ADVANCE
4,556,799 18
ADVANCE
2,643,784 87 ,
ADJ INTEREST
4,556,799 18
PAYMENT
324,195 96 4,232,603 22
4,232 603 22
09/05/06 INTEREST
5,081,805 86
849,202 64
ADVANCE
5,081,805 86
09/06/06 INTEREST
2,270,701 62 2,811,104 24
PAYMENT
2,811,10424
09/07/06 INTEREST
464,810 82
3,275,915 06
ADVANCE
3,275,915 06
09/08/06 INTEREST
3,885,397 51
ADVANCE
609,482 45
3,885,397 51
09/11/06 INTEREST
1,745,091 11 2,140,306 40
PAYMENT
2,140,306 40
09/12/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
2,255,214 62
114,908 22
09/13/06 INTEREST
2,255,214 62
ADVANCE
1,223,622 59
3,478,837 21
I 3,478,837 21
09/14/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
3,674,736 38
195,899 17
09/15/06 INTEREST
3,674,736 38
ADVANCE
125 82
3,674,862 20
09/18/06 INTEREST
3,674,862 20
ADVANCE
580,330 89
4,255,193 09
09/19/06 INTEREST
4,255,193 09
PAYMENT
1 801,057 86 2,454,135 23
09/20/06 INTEREST
2,454,135 23
ADVANCE
344,621 89
2,798,757 12
09/21/06 INTEREST
2,798,757 12
ADVANCE
1,405,700 54
4,204 457 66
10/01/06 INTEREST
4,204,457 66
ADVANCE
141,51407
4,345,971 73
ADVANCE
292,225 58
4,638,197 31
ADVANCE
444,077 56
5,082,274 87
ADVANCE
5,391,255 71
308t980 84
ADVANCE
242,503 49
5,633,759 20
ADVANCE
83,500 33
5,717,259 53
ADJ INTEREST
5,717,259 53
10/02/06 INTEREST
5 717,259 53
ADVANCE
116,859 20
5,834,118 73
5,834,118 73
10/02/06 10/03/06
| 5,959,846 36
[ADVANCE
]
125,727'63
I 10/03/06

08/17/06 I
08/18/06
08/18/06
08/21/06
08/21/06
I 08/22/06
08/22/06
08/23/06
08/23/06
08/24/06
08/24/06
08/25/06
08/28/06
08/29/06
08/30/06 i
08/31/06 i
09/01/06
09/01/06
09/01/06
09/05/06
09/05/06
09/06/06
09/06/06
09/07/06
09/07/06
09/08/06
09/08/06
09/11/06
09/11/06
09/12/06
09/12/06
09/13/06
09/13/06
09/14/06
09/14/06
09/15/06
09/15/06
09/18/06
09/18/06
09/19/06
09/19/06
09/20/06
09/20/06
09/21/06
09/21/06
09/22/06
09/25/06
09/26/06
09/27/06
09/28/06
09/29/06
10/01/06
10/01/06
10/02/06

Page 3 of 5

INT ACCRUE

RATE

943 51 ] 8 25% I
983 61

8 25%

725 12

8 25%

558 81

8 25%

579 51

8 25%

5,290 69

8 25%

(620 65) 8 25%
3,879 88

8 25%

1,164 58

8 25%

644 21

8 25%

750 73

8 25%

2,671 21

8 25%

490 49

8 25%

516 82

8 25%

797 24

8 25%

842 12

8.25%

2,526 47

8 25%

975 15

8 25%

562 40

8 25%

641 39

8 25%

9,635 21

8 25%

1,690 75
1,310 20

8 25%
8 25%

1,336 99

8 25%

INT PAID

BODELL CONSTRUCTION

^

Fax:8012611020

11 2007 15:57

P. 12

LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
FROM

TO

TRANS TYPE

ADVANCE

I
10/04/06 I INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/05/06 INTEREST
388,195.68
ADVANCE
10/06/06 INTEREST
101,290.36
ADVANCE
10/10/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/11/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/12/06 INTEREST
1,723,509.83
ADVANCE
10/13/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
|
10/16/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/17/06 INTEREST
250,458.34
ADVANCE
10/18/06 INTEREST
271,227.40
ADVANCE
10/19/06 INTEREST
161,473.52
ADVANCE
10/20/06 INTEREST
159,832.07
ADVANCE
10/23/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
10/24/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
161,893.54
11/01/06 INTEREST
113,759.22
ADVANCE
ADVANCE
1,473,610.85
PAYMENT
PAYMENT
.ADVANCE
146,376.74
ADJ INTEREST
PAYMENT
11/02/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
ADVANCE
595,905.01
11/06/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
150,925.18
11/07/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
527,937.71
11/08/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
457,252.40
11/09/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
11/10/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
11/13/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
100,718.99
11/14/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
135,450.13
11/15/06 INTEREST
81,239.68
ADVANCE
11/15/06
I 11/15/06 I 11/16/06 I INTEREST

10/03/06 I
10/04/06
10/04/06
10/05/06
10/05/06
10/06/06
10/06/06
| 10/10/06
10/10/06
10/11/06
10/11/06
10/12/06
10/12/06
10/13/06
10/13/06
10/16/06
10/16/06 |
10/17/06 !
10/17/06
10/18/06
10/18/06
10/19/06
10/19/06
10/20/06
10/20/06
10/23/06
10/23/06
10/24/06
10/24/06
10/25/06
10/26/06
10/27/06
10/30/06
10/31/06
11/01/06
11/01/06
11/01/06
11/02/06
11/03/06
11/03/06
11/06/06
11/06/06
11/07/06
11/07/06
11/08/06
11/08/06
11/09/06
11/09/06
11/10/06
11/10/06
11/13/06
11/13/06
11/14/06
11/14/06

J

PAYMENT
256,802.50

2,176,856.13
702,180.72

2,643,061.14
45,916.79

2,098,713.24

84,258.31
1,992,182.23

68,451.57

PRINC BAL

INT ACCRUE

5,959,846.36 I
5,703,043.86
5,703,043.86
6,091,239.54
6,091,239.54
6,192,529.90
6,192,529.90
4,015,673.77
4,015,673.77
3,313,493.05
3,313,493.05
5,037,002.88
5,037,002.88
2,393,941.74
2,393,941.74
2,348,024.95
2,348,024.95
2,598,483.29
2,598,483.29
2,869,710.69
2,869,710.69
3,031,184.21
3,031,184.21
3,191,016.28
3,191,016.28
1,092,303.04
1,092,303.04.
1,254,196.58
1,254,196.58
1,367,955.80
2,841,566.65
2,757,308.34
765,126.11
911,502.85
911,502.85 I
843,051.28
843,051.28

RATE

1,365.80 I 8.25% I
1,306.94

8.25%

1,395.91

8.25%

5,676.49

8.25%

920.26

8.25%

759,34

8.25%

1,154.31

8.25%

1,645.84

8.25%

538.09

8.25%

595.48

8.25%

657.65

8.25%

694.64

8.25%

2,193.83

8.25%

250.31

8.25%

2,299.37

8.25%

1,232.61 i 8.25%
193.20

8.25%

409.69

8.25%

171.15

8.25%

292.13

8.25%

396.92

8.25%

349.15

8.25%

793.71

8.25%

287.66

8.25%

318.69

8.25%

843,051.28 I
595,905.01
595,905.01
746,830.19
746,830.19
1,274,767.90
1,274,767.90
1,732,020.30
1,732,020.30
208,478.89
1,523,541.41
1,523,541.41
369,042.87
1,154,498.54
1,154,498.54
1,255,217.53
1,255,217.53
1,390,667.66
1,390,667.66
1,471,907.34
I 1,471,907.34 I
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337.32 J J.25%

INT. PAID

BODELL CONSTRUCTION

Fax:8012611020

ou,. 11 2007 15:57

P. 13

LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06
FROM

TO

TRANS TYPE

ADVANCE
I
I 11/16/06 I
11/16/06 11/17/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/17/06
11/17/06 11/20/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/20/06
11/20/06 11/21/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/21/06
! 11/21/06 11/22/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/22/06
11/22/06 12/01/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
11/24/06
ADVANCE
11/27/06
PAYMENT
11/28/06
PAYMENT
11/29/06 I
ADVANCE
11/30/06
ADJ INTEREST
12/01/06
ADVANCE
12/01/06
12/01/06 12/04/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
12/04/06
12/04/06 12/05/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/05/06
12/05/06 12/06/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/06/06
12/06/06 12/07/06 INTEREST
PAYMENT
12/07/06
12/07/06 12/08/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/08/06
12/08/06 12/11/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/11/06
12/11/06 12/12/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/12/06
12/12/06 12/13/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/13/06
12/13/06 12/14/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/14/06
12/14/06 12/15/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/15/06
12/15/06 ! 12/18/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/18/06
12/18/06 12/19/06 INTEREST
ADVANCE
12/19/06
12/19/06 12/20/06 INTEREST
12/20/06
ADVANCE
12/20/06 12/21/06 INTEREST
M2/21/06
PAYMENT
12/21/06 01/01/07 INTEREST
PAYMENT
12/22/06
ADVANCE
12/26/06
12/27/06
(PAYMENT
JADJI INTEREST
I 12/31/06 [

ADVANCE

PAYMENT

PRINCBAL

94,991.14 I

INT ACCRUE

RATE

359.08

8.25%

1,203.11

8.25%

415.57

8.25%

516.29

8.25%

5,133.36

8.25%

1,566,898.48 I
1,566,898.48
1,749,982.34
1,749,982.34
1,813,407.21
1,813,40721
2,252,878.67
2,252,878.67
2,488,901.59
2,488,901.59
2,859,879.74
3,179,766.66
1,056,754.96
50,097.51
405,425.31
405,425.31
558,100.90
558,100.90
376,518.65
376,518.65
1,213,981.24
1,213,981.24
1,479,288.06
1,479,288.06
1,433,210.62
1,433,210.62
1,587,420.65
1,587,420.65
•1,762,701.10
1,762,701.10
1,877,857.23
1,877,857.23
2,007,160.87
2,007,160.87
2,055,992.14
2,055,992.14
2,289,160.80
2,289,160.80
2,940,394.91
2,940,394.91
3,099,251.95
3,099,251.95
3,188,323.49
3,188,323.49
835,076.99
835,076.99
309,371.78
366,682.76
(0.00)

183,083.86
63,424.87
439,471.46
236,022.92
370,978.15
319,886.92
2,123,011.70
1,006,657.45
355,327.80
152,675.59
181,582.25
837,462.59
265,306.82
46,077.44
154,210.03
175,280.45
115,156.13
129,303.64
48,831.27
233,168.66
651,234.11
158,857.04
89,071.54
2,353,246.50
525,705.21
57,310.98
366,682.76

J

TOTAL INTEREST COSTS

(0.00)J

(951.19) 8.25%
383.69

8.25%

86.29

8.25%

278.20

8.25%

339.01

8.25%

328.44

8.25%

1,091.35

8.25%

403.96

8.25%

430.34

8.25%

459.97

8.25%

471.17

8.25%

1,573.80

8.25%

673.84

8.25%

710.24

8.25%

730.66

8.25%

2,105.09

8.25% !

(1,546.10) I 8.25%
$127,281.18
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"$127,281.18

BODELL

EXHIBIT 10

CONSTRUCTION
PRINT DATE

$4,000,000.00

16:10

STATUTORY PREJUDGEMENT RATE

MSP P R O P E R T I E S , L-C.
AMORTIZATION

6/11/2007

NOTE
SCHEDULE
1 0 . 0 0 % APR
3 6 5 DAT YEAR

I N T E R E S T RATE

DATE
8/30/2000

DESCRIPTION
ORIGINAL LOAN

NUMBER
OF DAYS

PRINCIPAL
INCREASE

TOTALPAYMENT

245
0

$250,000.00

INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

5/2/3001
3/18/2003

PAYMENT

3/18/2003

685
0

1,386,167.59

PAYMENT

10/22/2007

INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH
TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH

1.679

10/22/2007

PRINCIPAL

$3,383,010.49
1,556,184.83
4,939,195.32

INTEREST
TOTAL P R I N C I P A L AND INTEREST
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO
P R I N C I P A L BALANCE
TIMES DAILY RATE
DAILY INTEREST CHARGES

INTEREST
PAID OR ADJ

INTEREST
BALANCE
$0.00

$4,000,000.00

5/2/2001

INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH

INTEREST
ACCRUED

10/22/2007
$3,383,010.49
0.0274%
$926.94

268,493.15
0.00
750,684.93
0.00

0.00

268,493.15

250,000.00
0.00
769,178.08

18,493.15
769,178.08
0.00

1,556,184.83

0.00

1,556,184.83

PRINCIPAL
PAID
0.00
0,00
0.00
616 989.51
0.00

PRINCIPAL
BALANCE
$4,000,000.00
4,000,000.00
4,000,000.00

4,000,000.00
3,383,010.49
3,383,010.49

H
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1

IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3

BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY,
a Utah corporation

4

Civil N o .

030917018

Plaintiff,

5

H o n . B r u c e C.

6
7
8
9
10

Lubeck

vs .
M A R K H. R O B B I N S ; C H E R O K E E &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
LLC; a U t a h limited
liability company; BANK ONE,
UTAH NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a
U t a h corporation; and
DOES 1 through 50,

11
Defendants.

12
13

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION
OF M A R C J E N S E N , V O L U M E 2

14
15

TAKEN AT:

16

Burbidge & Mitchell
215 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t
Suite 920
Salt L a k e C i t y , U t a h 84111

17
DATE:

J u n e 9,

TIME:

9:28

2 005

18
a.m.

19
REPORTED BY:

20
1 21
• 22

23
24
25

K e r r y J.

Sorensen,

CSR/RPR
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APPEARANCES

1
2
3

For the Plaintiff:

4

Mr. Robert J. Shelby

5

BURBIDGE & MITCHELL

6

215 South State Street, Suite 920

7

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2311

8
9

For Marc Jensen:

10

Mr. Mark F. James

11

HATCH, JAMES & DODGE, P.C.

12

10 West Broadway, Suite 400

13

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

14
15

Mr. Eric W. Pearson

1 6

ARGUE PEARSON HARRISON & MYERS, LLP

17

10 West Broadway, Suite 500

18

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1
2
3

had that specific conversation.
Q.

Where were you when you had that

conversation?

4

A.

In my office.

5

Q.

Was that on or about March 18?

6

A.

It was March 18th.

7

Q.

2003?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

You say that it was your understanding

10

that Mike Bodell was releasing all claims against

11

all other parties.

12

remember Mr. Bodell telling you in connection

13

with, with your understanding about that.

14

A.

Tell me everything you

I--we had the--we had signed--he was

15

on--I think he was on the phone with his lawyer;

16

I was on the phone with mine.

17

some language, and that's this language that I

18

handwrote in here.

19

little bit of back and forth on that.

20

Mike wanted to add

And so I guess there was a

I had the $3 million cashier's check

21

there.

We signed it and, and Mike said, "This is

22

great.

This helps me.

23

my divorce."

24

You should go get yours.

25

off the hook."

I can now go and finish

He said, "I've got my money now.
Don't let these guys

He said, "You know, I"--he said,

Deposition of Marc Jensen, (Volume II)
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1

"You know, I don't know anything about Mark

2

Robbins, but you've got to collect some payment."

3

He said, "You need to go to Bank One.

4

got deep pockets.

5
6

Q.

They'll pay you something."

Do you remember any--Mr. Bodell saying

anything besides what you've just told us?

7
8

They've

MR. TUFTS:

Objection.

Vague as to

time. (Multiple voices.)

9

A.

10

best.

11

He felt very good at that time.

12

very good that night.

13

understanding and my intention of this agreement

14

to retain those other claims for myself.

15

Q.

He said, "I"--he said, "I wish you the
I hope that you can recover from this."
He felt very,

And it, and it was my

My, my question for you is whether we

16

exhausted your memory of specific comments made by

17

Mr. Bodell during that meeting, as it would relate

18

to any waiver of any claims.

19
20
21

MR. TUFTS:
A.

Vague.

That's, that's pretty much what I

remember offhand right now.

22

BY MR. SHELBY:

23

Q.

Can you direct me to where the

24

settlement agreement--there's reference to Mr.

25

Bodell making a waiver of the claims against

Deposition of Marc Jensen, (Volume II)
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1

everyone besides yourself?

2
3

MR. JAMES:

MR. BECKSTEAD:

MR. TUFTS:

BY MR. SHELBY:

9

Q.

11

Would you like a minute to review the

document?
A.

12
13

I'll join in both those

objections.

8

10

It also asks him for a

legal interpretation of the document.

6
7

The agreement

speaks for itself.

4
5

Objection.

Yes.
MR. SHELBY:

Why don't we take a short

break and see if we can't--

14

MR. JAMES:

15

MR. SHELBY:

Well, I--I'm-Well, go ahead.

Why don't

16

we stay.

17

don't we go ahead and have you answer that.

18

whatever time you need.

19

A.

There's a question pending to you.

Why
Take

(Pause)

It says here under 2B, "Without

20

limiting the generalities, the foregoing

21

acknowledges that Bodell and BCC from self and

22

others acknowledges and agrees that the

23

obligations of the MSF parties in connection with

24

the loans, including all principal and interest

25

that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon

Deposition of Marc Jensen, (Volume II)
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1

are-~have been f u l l y s a t i s f i e d and r e p a i d in

2

full."

3

Q.

You said earlier that Mr. Bodell told

4

you he got his money and now you go get yours, or

5

words to that effect. Is that right?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

You owed Mr. Bodell in excess of $5

8

million in March of 2003?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

You paid him far less than that?

11

A.

I paid him about--almost 3.8 total.

12

And there was a time when Mike Bodell came to my

13

office and said, "Marc, I need 2.8.

14

2.8, I can settle my divorce, my divorce in the

15

courts."

16

and you'll get all of your money."

17

Q.

If I get

I said, "Mike, just a little bit longer

Well, you agree that Mr. Bodell--or

18

Bodell Construction was not paid in full of their

19

loans to you from early 2000?

20

MR. BECKSTEAD:

Objection.

He

21

(multiple voices) just read from a document that

22

states--

23

BY MR. SHELBY:

24

Q.

25

Well, my question-MR. BECKSTEAD:

Let me make my objec-

I

Bodell C o n s t r u c t i o n v. Robbins, e t
A p r i l 26, 2005

al.

IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T
IN A N D FOR S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E OF U T A H

BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
) Case N o .

030917018

Plaintiff,
Videotaped
Deposition of:
M E R R I L L L. W E I G H T

vs .
M A R K H. R O B B I N S ; C H E R O K E E
Sc W A L K E R I N V E S T M E N T
COMPANY, L L C , a U t a h
limited l i a b i l i t y c o m p a n y ;
BANK ONE U T A H , N a t i o n a l
Association, a Utah
c o r p o r a t i o n ; and D O E S 1
through 5 0 ,

Judge Bruce

Lubeck

Defendants.

A p r i l 2 6 , 2005

Location:

Reporter:

- 10:30

a.m.

S N E L L & W I L M E R , LLP
G a t e w a y T o w e r West
15 W e s t S o u t h T e m p l e
S u i t e 1200
S a l t L a k e City, U t a h

K a t h y M o r g a n , CSR,

84101

RPR

N o t a r y Public in and for the State of

Utah

C i t i C o u r t , LLC
801.532.3441
^ m h n p ^ - 1 h*Q-41 hH-R^h-rffppRhprM QS

Bodell Construction v. Robbins, et al.
April 26, 2005
Page 2
1

A P P E A R A N C E S
1

2

3

For the Plaintiff:
4
5
6
7
8

For the Defendants:
Representing
Bank One:

9
10
11

ROBERT J. SHELBY
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
215 South State Street
Suite 920
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-6677
JOHN A. BECKSTEAD
SHANI KENNEDY
SNELL & WILMER, LLP
15 West South Temple
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 257-1900

84101

12
13

Representing
Mr. Robbins:

DAVID W. TUFTS
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR
111 East Broadway
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 415-3000

Representing
Cherokee & Walker:

JAMES T. BLANCH
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street
Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
(801) 532-1234

14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21

Also present:

Michael Bodell
Max Nelson, Videographer

22
23
24
25

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441
a^0?hnp^.1haq-41hH-Ra^b-cffee8bed195

Bodell Construction v. Robbins, et al.
April 26, 2005
Page 14

participated in securing lines of credit for the
company to borrow.
Q.

Does Bodell Construction company make

loans as part of their business?
6
7
8
9

A.

Yes.

Q.

What would be the circumstances under

which they'd make loans?
A.

Well, there are a number of them.

If we

have excess funds that are available to make loans

10

and we find an opportunity to loan those funds,

11

then we pursue that, and have made loans.

12
13

14
15
16

Q.

How do you identify people that would be

interested in making a loan?
A.

You mean in -- I need you to rephrase

that question.
Q.

When Bodell Construction Company has

17

some excess funds and they want to make loans, do

18

you run advertisements?

19

mouth?

20

from you?

Do you do it by word of

How do you find people wanting to borrow

21

A.

Generally it's by word of mouth.

22

Q.

What type of people do you loan to?

23

A.

Various and sundry kinds of people, I

24
25

mean.
Q.

Are they -- I'm sorry, I cut you off.
CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

Bodell Construction v. Robbins, et al.
April 26, 2005
Page 2 0
1
2
3
4
5

Same objection.

It's also

asked and answered.
A.

No.

(By Mr. Beckstead) Other than the
Qtransactions with Mr. Jenson, have you ever had a

6

loss on any of these hard-money loans in the last

7

five years?

8

i

MR. SHELBY:

9
10
11

A.

I guess I need you to define "loss."

You didn't get paid what you were
Q.
expecting to receive pursuant to the terms of your
loan.

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.
A.

How many times has that happened?

14
15
16
17

A couple of times.

How large were the losses that you
Q.
incurred?
A.

Well, the reality is we collected all of

18

the principal that had been advanced, and so there

19

were interest amounts on top of that that were not

20

collected

21

mind.

22
23
24
25

Q.
A.

And I don't have the amounts in my
Did any of those result in litigation?
No.

Have you had problems collecting on any
Q.
of those other loans?
CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441
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Defendant.

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Bank One, N.A.
("Bank One"), hereby joins the Motion of Mark Robbins to Exclude the Testimony of Merrill
Weight ("Robbins Motion").
Bank One also moves to change the dates for submitting its rebuttal expert reports. Bank

One is seeking to exclude the testimony of both expert witnesses designated by Bodell
Construction. The matter of exclusion cannot be resolved prior to the current deadline for
designate rebuttal expert witnesses. Bank One requests that the date for its rebuttal expert
reports be extended to avoid incurring the substantial expense of designating potentially
unnecessary rebuttal witnesses. The reasons for this Motion are more fully set forth in the
accompanying Memorandum.
Bank One requested Plaintiffs assent to delay the dates for submitting Bank One's
rebuttal expert reports until after the motions to exclude are decided, but Plaintiff declined.
Dated t h i s / ^ day of July, 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

John A. Bedstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
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MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
BANK ONE'S JOINDER IN ROBBINS
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Judge John P. Kennedy

Defendant.

Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Bank One, N.A.
("Bank One"), has joined the Motion of Mark Robbins to Exclude the Testimony of Merrill
Weight ("Robbins Motion"). Bank One also moves to change the dates for submitting its
rebuttal expert reports.

Bank One is seeking to exclude the testimony of both expert witnesses designated by
Bodell Construction. Exclusion will not be resolved prior to the deadline to designate rebuttal
expert witnesses. If the deadlines are not extended, Bank One may be forced to incur substantial
unnecessary expense in designating unnecessary rebuttal witnesses.
Bank One requested Plaintiffs assent to delay the dates for submitting Bank One's
rebuttal expert reports until after the motions to exclude are decided, but Plaintiff declined.
A.

The Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight Should Be Excluded, and The Time To
Identify a Rebuttal Expert On The Issue of Damages Postponed Until The Robbins
Motion Is Decided.
Plaintiff served the expert report of Merrill Weight on June 11, 2007. On June 28, 2007,

Defendant Mark Robbins moved to exclude Mr. Weight's testimony on several grounds,
including Plaintiffs failure to disclose Mr. Weight's damage theories earlier, and because Mr.
Weight relies on damages theories that are not allowed under Utah law. Bank One has joined in
the Robbins Motion.
Bank One further requests that the time for designating any rebuttal expert on the issue of
damage calculations, currently set in the scheduling order for July 20, 2007, be postponed until
such time as the Robbins Motion is decided. The Court has broad discretion over scheduling
orders, which are designed to allow the parties to prepare for trial and save the parties from
unnecessary expenses. See DeBry v Cascade Enters , 879 P.2d 1353, 1361 (Utah 1994). If the
Robbins Motion is granted, Bank One will not need to identify a rebuttal witness, and substantial
expense will be avoided. If the Robbins Motion is denied, Bank One requests that the time to
identify its rebuttal witness be postponed until after it has an opportunity to depose Mr. Weight

2

and learn the basis for his opinions. Such a change to the scheduling order will be modest and
likely can be done without impacting the trial schedule, currently set for October 22, 2007.
The need for this modification to the scheduling was caused by Plaintiffs failure to
disclose its damage theories on a timely basis, as set forth in the Memorandum supporting the
Robbins Motion. Bank One should not be financially punished for that conduct of Plaintiff.
B.

The Time for Bank One To Identify An Expert to Rebut The Testimony of Gary
Schwartz Should Be Postponed Until Bank One Has Had The Opportunity To
Depose Mr. Schwartz and Bring A Motion to Exclude His Testimony.
Plaintiff served the expert report of Gary Schwartz on June 11, 2007. Bank One sought

to depose Mr. Schwartz at the earliest possible opportunity in order to bring a motion to exclude
Mr. Schwartz's testimony. His deposition has been scheduled for July 19, 2007. The basis for
the motion will primarily be that Mr. Schwartz is not qualified to render opinions as to the
reasonableness of the reliance Plaintiff placed on an alleged communication from Bank One.
The deposition is necessary to develop the facts concerning Mr. Schwartz's qualifications.
Bank One therefore requests that the Court grant a continuance of its deadline to name a
rebuttal expert witness to Mr. Schwartz, currently set for July 20, 2007, until such time as Bank
One has the opportunity to depose Mr. Schwartz and have its motion to exclude his testimony
decided. If the motion to exclude Mr. Schwartz's testimony is granted, Bank One will not need
to identify any rebuttal expert, and the unnecessary expense of engaging an expert and filing an
expert report will be avoided. If the motion to exclude is denied, the resulting delay will be
minor, and should not impact the trial schedule.

3

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the expert testimony of Merrill Weight should be excluded.
The time for Defendants to submit the reports of their rebuttal experts should be postponed until
such time as the motions to exclude the testimony of Messrs. Weight and Schwartz have been
decided.

>7/ *

Dated this U/ day of July, 2007.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

Jofin A. Beckstead
H. Douglas Owens
Romaine C. Marshall
Attorneys for Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., successor to Bank One, N.A.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah
limited liability company; JPMORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A., a National
Association; and DOES 1 through 50,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF BODELL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT MARK ROBBINS'
MOTIONS:
(1) TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF
MERRILL WEIGHT; AND
(2) TO REOPEN FACT DISCOVERY
AND EXTEND EXPERT
DEADLINES
Civil No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") responds here to the arguments made
by Defendant Mark H. Robbins ("Robbins") in his separate motions to: 1) Exclude Expert
Testimony of Merrill Weight; and 2) Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines.

v^n

INTRODUCTION
Bodell timely served on June 11, 2007 the expert report of Merrill Weight ("Weight")
calculating the damages to Bodell flowing from Bodell's reliance on a fraudulent letter written
by Bank One at Robbins' request. In his motion seeking exclusion of Weight, Robbins asks the
Court to grant extraordinary relief for an ordinary and routine practice. Claiming unfair surprise,
Robbins seeks an order excluding Weight as an expert witness at trial. Robbins' claim of
prejudice is nonsensical. Indeed, Weight's expert report - produced over four months in advance
of trial - is overwhelmingly based upon known and undisputed facts, most of which are set forth
in loan agreements in Robbins' possession for several years.1 As is customary, Weight has taken
those facts, applied established Utah law to them, and calculated BodelPs damages based upon
that application.2
To the extent Weight's report provides calculations of damages flowing from those
largely undisputed facts that expand upon the damages Bodell identified years ago in preliminary
Interrogatories at the outset of discovery, the expert discovery period is open and Robbins may
depose Weight in detail concerning the bases of his opinions and the facts supporting those
opinions - including, of course, any facts relied upon by Weight in forming his opinions that

Under the stipulated schedule in place, Robbins had twelve weeks from service of Weight's report to conduct
expert discovery, and another seven weeks after that to prepaie for trial, which is still at the time of this filing over
three months away
" With only two limited exceptions, Weight merely provides m his leport mathematical calculations based on the
established facts. The two exceptions are references to other loans Bodell might have made and interest paid on a
line credit Bodell had to tap because it was not repaid under the loan m was induced to make Defendants already
deposed Weight with respect to the former, and he is available for deposition about the latter.
li

were not previously developed by Defendants during fact discovery. Tellingly, Robbins has
never requested Weight's expert deposition. Rather than simply avail himself of the opportunity
to depose Weight concerning the facts and opinions cited in Weight's report, Robbins elected to
move the Court for unnecessary and incredibly prejudicial relief that could prevent a proper
accounting of Bodell's damages for the jury at trial.
The damages theories identified in Weight's report are premised upon clear and settled
Utah law, equally available to any of the parties who wished to research what damages are
available to plaintiffs in fraud actions in Utah. For this reason, there can be no legitimate claim
of surprise concerning the damages theories available to BodelL Moreover, the damages theories
cited by Weight are proper. The established method of damage calculation in fraud cases in
Utah is the "benefit of the bargain," and Robbins' attempt to narrow the application of this rule
here is unsupportable because it is based on a flawed interpretation of a completely different,
inapplicable rule applied by a foreign court that has adopted a different (and minority) approach
to fraud damages.
Finally, Robbins has shown no good cause for modification of any expert discovery
deadlines, which likely will disturb the October trial date set many months ago. To the contrary,
this case has been pending for over four years. Bodell finally has a tnal date, and there simply is
no reason to jeopardize the trial setting merely because Robbins would like the Court to decide
months in advance of trial whether or not he should retain an expert to rebut Weight's opinions.
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Weight is the Chief Financial Officer of Bodell He is the person most knowledgeable about Bodell's damages in
this matter, the accounting of those damages, and other investment opportunities for Bodell In short, he is the
person most knowledgeable about the facts supporting Bodell's damages calculations
in

Robbins should do what all parties do, continue to prepare for trial while these issues are
considered by the Court.
For these reasons and those that follow, Robbins's motions to exclude Weight's
testimony and to extend discovery deadlines should be denied.
ARGUMENT
I.

ROBBINS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF
MERRILL WEIGHT SHOULD BE DENIED
a. The Court Should Reject Robbins's Timeliness Arguments Because the
Operative Facts are Known and Undisputed, and He Has Ample Time to
Conduct Further Discovery Concerning any Facts Not Adequately Developed
by Defendants in Fact Discovery
Robbins's principal argument for the exclusion of Weight's expert opinion is that Bodell

should have identified for Defendants certain damages theories before the close of fact
discovery. Robbins attempts to vilify Bodell for what is a customary occurrence: damage
calculations being disclosed by a damages expert during expert discovery based upon facts
uncovered in fact discovery. Cf. Tyson v. Amerigroup Illinois, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 538, 540-42 &
n.5 (N.D. 111. 2005) (denying motion to compel interrogatory response regarding damage theories
before beginning of expert discovery); In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litig., No.
05MD1695, 2007 WL 274800, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. January 29, 2007) (written discovery relating to
damages properly reserved until close of expert discovery). The operative facts relating to
Bodell's damages in this case—including the date Bodell made its loans, the amounts of those
loans, the terms of those loans, and the subsequent defaults on the loans—are well-known by the

1

parties and largely undisputed.4 Of course, Utah law governing damages is settled and equally
available to all of the parties, hi his expert report, Weight merely applied that settled Utah law to
the facts here and computed BodelPs damages - hardly a surprising or prejudicial event.
Further, though fact discovery has closed, expert discovery was open at the time of the
disclosure of the Weight report and still is open for another six weeks. Expert discovery is the
appropriate time to inquire regarding expert opinions, including damages calculations, and the
factual bases for those opinions. See id. In this case, nearly all of the relevant facts were the
subject of fact discovery. Weight himself was previously deposed during fact discovery and
testified about the facts surrounding the subject loan and Bodell's lending practices. (See, e.g.,
Deposition of Merrill Weight ("Weight Dep.") at 14:3-23:23 (Ex. A).) In his moving papers
Robbins even cites some of Weight's deposition testimony on damages in an effort to show that
his report is somehow inconsistent with his previous testimony.
Of course, Robbins has the right to depose Weight in his capacity as an expert to explore
Weight's opinions and the factual bases for those opinions. As Bodell's CFO, Weight is the
person most knowledgeable about the facts underlying Bodell's damages claims. In this regard,
Robbins is better off with Weight as an expert than some retained third-party expert who may
lack the foundation to fully and completely answer questions the Defendants may have about the
facts supporting Bodell's damages. There will be no fact presented at trial by Bodell that
Robbins will not have had the opportunity to discover.
4

The one fact allegedly unknown to Robbins before receipt of Weight's expeit report is that Bodell was forced as a
result of Defendants' fraud to tap a line of credit, resulting in accumulated mteiest, which is recoverable as
consequential damages in Utah
As discussed below, this is subject matter for cross-examination, not exclusion of a witness. It does show,
however, that Defendants had an opportunity (which they used) to depose Weight concerning damages very early in
the case That testimony covered nearly all the factual subjects m Weight's leport.
2

Tellingly, Robbins has never requested Weight's expert deposition and has undertaken no
effort whatsoever to conduct discovery about any facts allegedly not disclosed prior to the close
of fact discovery. Nor does Robbins ask in his moving papers for a continuance, or additional
time to conduct Weight's deposition, retain an expert and provide a report rebutting Weight's
opinions. Robbins' motion appears designed to accomplish only one thing: to keep from the jury
at trial an accounting of Bodell's recoverable damages under Utah law. Robbins' motion is
obviously not designed to remedy any true prejudice or permit discovery of any "surprising"
facts. Accordingly, he has no basis to seek the "extraordinary sanction" of exclusion of Weight's
testimony. See Seymour v. Consol Freightways, 187 F.R.D. 541, 542 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
The cases relied upon by Robbins are equally unpersuasive. For example, in Thibeault v.
Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1992), the plaintiff served a 37-page document
disclosing several new theories and seven previously undisclosed experts just four days before
trial. 960 F.2d at 241-42. In Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D.N.Y.
2005), the court disallowed the plaintiff from putting forward a damages theory because the
plaintiff failed to produce adequate facts to support the theory asserted. 367 F. Supp. 2d at 635.
Neither of these cases supports the proposition that expert testimony should be excluded where a
party produces its expert report within the timeframe proscribed by the court, and over three
months before trial, and that expert report merely contains expert calculations based upon the
application of settled law to largely known and undisputed facts. See id.; Thibeault, 960 F.2d at
241-42.
Perhaps most importantly, Robbins cites no case where expert testimony was stricken as
untimely disclosed where purportedly new damages theories were disclosed before the close of
3

expert discovery. And rightfully so; the appropriate time for Robbins to make inquiry
concerning those theories is during expert discovery. See Tyson, 230 F.R.D. at 540-42 & n.5
(damages theories to be pared down "when expert discovery begins"); In re Veeco, 2007 WL
274800 at *2 (same).
Experts nearly always perform original calculations, analyses, computations or the like in
preparation of their reports. Those calculations and analyses nearly always rely upon some
discreet facts that were not previously uncovered in fact discovery. Those facts are then
disclosed as supporting the expert's opinions, and they become the subject of expert depositions.
This routine occurrence is exactly what we have here and Robbins can show no prejudice
flowing therefrom, let alone prejudice sufficient to justify excluding Bodell's only damages
expert.
b. Even if Bodell's Damages Calculations Could Have Been Disclosed Earlier,
Any Attendant Delay is Harmless to Robbins and Does not Warrant the
Severe Sanction of Exclusion
Even accepting Robbins' assertion that Bodell should have (and could have) disclosed
every aspect of its damage calculations and every conceivable factual bases for them before
expiration of fact discovery, Bodell's alleged failure to do so is plainly harmless. For his part,
Robbins merely asserts a generalized claim of harm - he cites no specific prejudice that has
resulted or will result. Nor can he. At its core, Robbins really complains only about two sets of
facts he claims Bodell failed to disclose: 1) the existence of a line of credit Bodell had to tap
because it was not repaid the money it was due under the loan agreements; and 2) the basis for
Bodell's assertion that it could have earned money elsewhere had Bodell not been induced to
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loan it here.6 Robbins had at the time Weight's report was served twelve weeks to conduct any
expert discovery he wanted on those topics, and an additional seven weeks after the close of
expert discovery to prepare to meet at trial any new facts. As noted, expert discovery is still
open (though the clock is running, without any request to date by Robbins to take Weight's
deposition). Any prejudice flowing to Robbins at this point is of his own making by failing even
to try to conduct discovery on the issues he claims are so surprising. Regardless, any prejudice
to Robbins resulting from this purportedly late disclosure does not warrant the "extraordinary
sanction" of exclusion of Weight's testimony. See Seymour, 187 F.R.D. at 542.
c. Weight's Damages Opinions are Proper and Should not be Excluded
i. The Benefit of the Bargain Rule Applies to All Actions for Fraud in Utah
As Robbins concedes, Utah has expressly adopted the benefit of the bargain rule for
fixing damages in fraud cases:
[T]he rule in this jurisdiction [is] that in an action for fraud and deceit the measure
of damages is the difference between the actual value of what the party received
and the value thereof if it had been as represented; this is the benefit of the
bargain rule. Under this rule the defrauded party is compensated for the loss of his
bargain and is not confined to his out-of-the-pocket damages.
Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974) (citing Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 P.2d 136
(1967)); see also Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 150-51 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Contrary to
Robbins' suggestion, Utah courts have never limited application of the benefit of the bargain rule
in fraud cases to only those involving real property - nor would such an arbitrary restriction
make sense given the rationale for the rule. Cf. id.
Of course, Robbins cites in his moving papers testimony by Weight in his fact deposition on Bodell's lending
piactices, the availability of other loans and the rates of returns on those loans. Robbins is simply wiong when he
contends he did not have discoveiy of facts relating to returns Bodell might have received on other loans had it not
been induced to lend the money m reliance on the fraudulent Bank One letter.
5

"The purpose underlying the benefit-of-the-bargain rule is to put the defrauded party in
the same financial position as if the fraudulent representations had in fact been true." Mike
Finnin Ford, Inc. v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977-78 (N.D. Iowa
2001); see Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). For that reason, the benefit of the
bargain rule is the majority rule. Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 425 P.2d 891, 895 (Wash.
1967) ("In commercial transactions such as this, where damages are sought as a result of fraud
and deceit, the majority of the courts appear to favor applicability of the 'benefit of the bargain'
measure of damages."); Stewart v. Potter, 104 P.2d 736, 739 (N.M. 1940) ("The great weight of
authority sustains the general rule that the defrauded purchaser may recover the difference
between the real and the represented value of the property, regardless of the fact that the actual
loss suffered might have been less."). Utah's benefit of the bargain rule is completely
inconsistent with the small minority of jurisdictions that apply the "out-of-pocket rule," limiting
damages to out-of-pocket costs resulting from the fraud. Cf. Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
449 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1058-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing out-of-pocket rule as minority rule
and applying benefit of the bargain rule).
Notwithstanding binding precedent in Utah holding that the measure of damages in a
fraud case is the "benefit of the bargain," Robbins asks this Court to make new law narrowing
application of the rule. Robbins attempts to distinguish Lamb and its unqualified application of
the benefit of the bargain rule in fraud cases by asserting that it applies only in the context of real
or personal property and should not apply where a party is fraudulently induced to make a loan.
No Utah decision draws any such distinction. Accordingly, as his only support, Robbins cites
McLean v. Charles Ellis Realty, Inc., 76 P.3d 661 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). However, McLean does
6

not stand for the proposition for which Robbins cites and likewise does not support his novel
theory.
Oregon is among the minority of states that apply the out-of-pocket rule. Galego v.
Knudsen, 573 P.2d 313, 318 (Or. 1978). It does so with one twist that appears to be unique to
Oregon; it allows benefit of the bargain damages "if the fraudulent representation also amounted
to a warranty." Selman v. Shirley, 85 P.2d 384, 394 (Or. 1938). Thus, Oregon law looks to the
type of representation in deciding which rule to apply; it does not make the distinction that
Robbins attempts to make here regarding the type of asset that is the subject of fraud. Cf.
Sorensen v. Gardner, 334 P.2d 471, 476-77 (Or. 1959) (holding that out-of-pocket damages were
proper in fraud regarding real property); McLean, 76 P.3d at 667 (holding that out-of-pocket
damages were proper in fraud regarding loan). Even so, Bodell is unable to find any other
jurisdiction to make such a distinction, and Robbins cites none. Cf. Sigman, 425 P.2d at 895
(affirming application of the benefit of the bargain rule with respect to fraud in connection with
mortgage loan); Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 463 (1996) (benefit of the
bargain rule applied in the context of insurance policy). In other words, Robbins's only basis for
exclusion of benefit of the bargain damages here is his own flawed interpretation of a minority
application of a minority rule in a foreign jurisdiction.
Benefit of the bargain damages are the unquestionable measure of damages in this case
based on the clear and unqualified holdings of Utah appellate courts in Lamb, Brown, Dilworth,
and Dugan, among others. See, e.g., Lamb, 525 P.2d at 609; Brown, 840 P.2d at 150-51. As
such, the Court should reject Robbins's attempt to exclude Weight's opinions on benefit of the
bargain damages.
7

ii. Weight's Consequential Damages Calculations are Properly Supported
Robbins does not dispute that consequential damages are available in fraud cases. Cf.
Ong Ml

(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993). He has, however,

taken issue with Weight's consequential damages calculation, claiming there is an insufficient
causal link between the damages and his own conduct in causing Bodell's loss. This causal link,
however, need not be absolute; Bodell need only offer evidence supporting a "just and
reasonable inference" of the causal connection. In re Men's Sportswear, Inc., 834 F.2d 1134,
1139 (2d Cir. 1987); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
(1931). In this respect, Bodell's logic is simple. From 2002 to 2006, Bodell maintained a line of
credit with its bank. Had the loan Bodell was fraudulently induced to make been timely repaid,
Bodell would not have been forced to tap that line of credit and pay interest on the amount
drawn. To the extent Robbins wants to offer his own impeachment evidence at trial and argue
to the jury that other factors caused Bodell to tap the line of credit, he is permitted to do so to the
fullest extent allowable by evidentiary and procedural rules, including effective crossexamination. However, his arguments do not provide a basis for pretrial exclusion of Weight's
opinions on consequential damages. Cf. Ong Int 7, 850 P.2d at 457 (holding that "loss of interest
on loans required to finance the business" is a proper consequential damage in fraud case).
Robbins also appears to argue that he was unaware of any line of credit that would factor
into Bodell's damages. However, Weight testified at his deposition that he was responsible for
"securing lines of credit" for Bodell, and that Bodell had historically borrowed money on those
credit lines at prime plus one-half percent. (Weight Dep. at 14:1-2; 22:16-23:6.) The fact that
default of the subject loan resulted in Bodell drawing on such a line of credit could not have
8

come as a surprise to Robbins, and it certainly does not provide a basis to exclude Weight's
testimony on consequential damages.
iii. Weight's Comparable Rate of Return is Properly Supported
Finally, Robbins claims that Weight's comparable rate of return—18%—is not properly
supported. Specifically, he claims that (1) Bodell would not have had an opportunity to make
any loan; (2) that Bodell would not have attained an 18% rate; and (3) that Bodell would not
have been able to collect on any loan it made. These arguments miss the point. It is obvious that
Robbins disputes Weight's conclusions, but this dispute does not justify exclusion of Weight's
opinions. Weight testified as a fact witness years ago that Bodell had many opportunities to loan
money, was able achieve interest rates of up to 50% on loans, and has been able to collect on
most loans. (Weight Dep. at 15:7-9; 17:11-12; 22:11-15.) This testimony, in addition to the
expert testimony he will offer at trial, easily provides at least a "just and reasonable inference"
supporting Bodell's damages. See Story, 282 U.S. at 563. Bodell need not show with absolute
certainty that it was about to put pen to paper on another loan but chose instead the subject loan
it was fraudulently induced to make. See id.; Ong Int 7, 850 P.2d at 457 (requiring proof only to
a reasonable certainty).
Bodell need only offer evidence to support a just and reasonable inference regarding what
returns it could have procured had it invested the capital of the subject loan elsewhere. See
Story?, 282 U.S. at 563. Again, Robbins is free make to the jury the same argument he makes in
his supporting memorandum, and the jury will then apply the law as instructed by the Court and
decide what Bodell's damages are. The fact that Robbins disputes Weight's testimony does not
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render the matter appropriate for resolution by the Court. To the contrary, this is the precise and
exclusive province of the jury.
II.

ROBBINS'S MOTION TO REOPEN FACT DISCOVERY AND EXTEND
EXPERT DEADLINES SHOULD BE DENIED
As stated and supported in detail above, Robbins has had ample time to conduct fact

discovery. Weight's expert report is supported by few, if any, new facts. The legal bases for
Bodell's damages calculations are based on well-settled Utah case law equally available to all the
parties from the inception of this case. Robbins will have had twelve weeks to conduct expert
discovery after he was served with Weight's report to ascertain the specific bases for Weight's
opinions regarding damages. To the extent he needs further factual inquiry on damages issues,
Robbins is free to so inquire at Weight's expert deposition should he choose to take it. Robbins
also identifies no specific prejudice under these circumstances. Accordingly, there is no basis to
reopen fact discovery, nor to extend the expert deadlines.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Robbins's motions to exclude Weight's opinions and extend
discovery deadlines should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this IO

day of July, 2007.
BURBIDGE, MITCHELL & GROSS,

By:
Robert J. Shelby
Attorneys for Plaintiff

10

°m>

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
PLAINTIFF BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT MARK ROBBINS'S
MOTIONS:
(1) TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT; AND
(2) TO REOPEN FACT DISCOVERY AND EXTEND EXPERT DEADLINES
on the'

day of July, 2007, to the following in the manner as indicated below:

VIA E-MAIL AND FIRST CLASS MAIL
John A. Beckstead
HOLLAND & HART
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

VIA E-MAIL AND FIRST CLASS MAIL
David W. Tufts
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

VC/U
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David W. Tufts (8736)
Erik A. Olson (8479)
Jason R.Hull (11202)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
P O. Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
Telephone: (801)415-3000
Facsimile: (801)415-3500
Attorneys for Defendant Mark H. Robbins
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE &
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY,
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company;
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a
Utah limited liability company; BANK
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF (1) MOTION TO EXCLUDE
EXPERT TESTIMONY OF MERRILL
WEIGHT AND (2) MOTION TO
REOPEN FACT DISCOVERY AND
EXTEND EXPERT DEADLINES

Case No. 030917018
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

Defendant Mark Robbins (ctRobbms") hereby submits this reply memorandum in support
of his motion to exclude the expeit testimony of Merrill Weight or in the alternative to reopen
fact discovery and extend expert deadlines.

INTRODUCTION
Despite having stated on at least five occasions that it was seeking to recover the
principal amount of $4 million loaned to Mr. Jenson, plus interest at the statutory rate, Bodell
Construction Company ("Bodell") now seeks damages in excess of $18 million based on new
damages theories that were never previously disclosed to the defense. Bodell offers no excuse
for this non disclosure. Mr. Weight's opinions should be excluded because the defense is unable
to prepare to meet these new theories without fact discovery—which is unavailable now due to
Bodell's belated disclosure.
In addition, Mr. Weight's new theory of damages—his so-called "Benefit of the Bargain"
theory which would measure damages as the contractual amount owed by Mr. Jenson under the
note—should be excluded because such an approach has never been accepted by any court in
fraud cases involving a loan transaction. In fact, Mr. Weight's theory has been expressly
rejected by at least one court as "not being apt" in loan cases because of the difficulty inherent in
valuing such non-tangible things. McLean v. Charles Ellis Realty, Inc., 76 P.3d 661, 667 (Ore.
Ct. App. 2003).' Also, Mr. Weight's calculation is not the "Benefit of the Bargain" analysis at
all because he does not compare the value of the loan as represented against the value of the loan
as made—he does not calculate a difference.
Mr. Weight's other damages theories should likewise be excluded because they were
never previously disclosed, and because there is no causal connection between Mr. Weight's
opinion and the evidence in this case.

McLean is an important case because it is the only known case where a party has argued for exactly what Mr.
Weight proposes heie—using the total amount owed under the note as a measure for fraud damages. McLean
firmly rejected this as a measure of fraud damages. 76 P.3d at 667.
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ARGUMENT
I.

MR. WEIGHT'S OPINIONS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE THEY ARE
NEW DAMAGES THEORIES NEVER PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED.
Bodell indicated in discoveiy that it would measuie its damages as the amount Bodell

loaned to Mi Jenson ($4 million, of which Mi Jenson lepaid moie than $3 million) plus mteiest
at the legal late Now, thiough Mi Weight, Bodell attempts to ambush the defense with thiee
entnely new, and entuely diffeient, alternative damages theoues Intioduction of these new
theoues is seveiely piejudicial and unjustified
A.

The Defense is Prejudiced by the Introduction of New Theories.

"[A] defendant is entitled to know which method [of damages]

plaintiff is choosing m

this case, and to know it in time to piepaie a defense " Piecision Seed Co v Consol Gram &
BaigeCo, 2006 U S Dist LEXIS 29520, * 17 (S D Ohio May 6, 2006) (striking new damages
theories not pieviously disclosed) (attached as Exh A) Bodell does not explain why it is
changing damages theoues now Instead, it aigues that theie is no haim because its new theoues
aie based on facts that aie "well-known by the paities and laigely undisputed " Bodell Opp at 2
That is not so
"Benefit of the Bargain" Theory To determine the value of the loan "as made1' vs "as
lepiesented" the defense needs to discover fiom thnd-paities Jenson and MSF Pioperties then
ability to lepay the $4 million loan at the time it was made The defense cannot get this
infoimatioii fiom Mi Weight, and it is not "well-known" oi "laigely undisputed "
"Reasonable Rate of Return" Theory To lespond to the leasonable late of letum
theoiy the defense needs discoveiy of Bodell's loan histoiy, the loan histones of those thndpaities fiom whom Mi Weight assumes his late, and discoveiy fiom the thud-paity that Bodell

claims he could have loaned to None of this has evei been disclosed
Consequential Damages To lespond to this new theoiy, the defense needs the history
of Bodell's ciedit line This would include subpoenaing bank lecoids and fact discoveiy of
Bodell's expenses, investments, and othei confounding causes of Bodell's use of the line
B.

Bodell Otfeis no Valid Excuse for Failing to Disclose these New Theoiies.

It is not "customaiy," as Bodell suggests, to wait until aftei the close of fact discoveiy to
disclose a damages calculation See Drug Mait Pharm Coip v Am Home Prods Coip , 472 F
Supp 2d 385, 421 & n 41 (E D N Y 2007) (disallowing plaintiffs from changing then
"damages theoiies" dining expert discoveiy), Piecision Seed, 2006 U S Dist LEXIS 29520 at
" ^9-15 (finding no justification foi failuie to disclose damages calculation even when the basis
foi the damages theoiy was pioduced dmmg discoveiy), UtahR Civ P 26(a)(1)(C) (lequmng
paities to disclose "computation of damages" m initial disclosuies), hi le Veeco Inst Sec Litig ,
2007 U S Dist LEXIS 5969, h 6 ( S D N Y Jan 26, 2007) (compelling lesponses to
mteiiogatoues "ielating to loss causation and damages" duimg fact discoveiy) (attached Exh B)
Bodell aigues that his new theoiies aie "available to any paity who wished to leseaich
what damages aie available to plaintiffs in fiaud actions m Utah " Bodell Opp at m, 3 That
misses the point The defense is not lequned to feuet out theories that diffei from the one that
Bodell explicitly said it was going to puisue
II.

MR. WEIGHT'S APPLICATION OF THE "BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN"
THEORY HAS NEVER BEEN APPLIED TO A LOAN TRANSACTION.
In Mi Weight's "Benefit of the Baigam" theoiy he simply calculates the contiactual

mteiest and othei fees that would be due fiom Mi Tenson undei the ternis of the note This type
of contiact based measuie has never been applied to a loan tiansaction as damages available foi
2
SIC 82234

fraud, and it is in no way an application of the benefit of the bargain theory.
A.

The Benefit of the Bargain Theory Does not Apply to this Loan Transaction.

No Utah court has ever applied the benefit of the bargain theory outside of the realm of
tangible property that can be valued. See e^g. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 150 (Utah 1952)
(real estate); Hecht v. Metzler, 14 Utah 408, 419 (Utah 1897) (real estate); Lamb v. Bangart, 525
P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1984) (livestock); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980) (real
Estate); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (real estate and business).
See also Mike Finnin Ford, Inc. v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 220 F.Supp.2d 970, 977-78
(software); Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 425 P.2d 891, 895 (Wash. 1967) (real estate as
security); Stewart v. Potter, 104 P.2d 736, 739 (N.M. 1940) (automobile); Schwab v. Phillip
Moms USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 992, 1058-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (cigarettes).
On the other hand, cases indicate that the benefit of the bargain theory is not applicable to
loan transactions where there is no real or personal property collateral. McLean v. Charles Ellis
Realty, Inc., 76 P.3d 661, 667 (Ore. Ct. App. 2003); Home v. Walton, 117 111. 130, 134-135 (111.
1886) (where there was only a loan, the damage "was the money [the fraud victim] parted with,
and interest thereon"). The reason for this is simple: the benefit of the bargain measure is not
"particularly apt where, as here, no property changed hands between plaintiff and defendants and
a value comparison is not available." McLean, 76 P.3d at 667. 2
B.

Mr. Weight has not Performed a Benefit of the Bargain Analysis, but Has
Merely Calculated the Terms of the Loan to Jenson.

Even if the Court were to extend the benefit of the bargain rule to a loan transaction, Mr.

~ McLean is important because it is the only known case where a party has argued for exactly what Mr. Weight
proposes here—using the total amount owed under the note as a measure for fraud damages. McLean firmly
rejected this as a measure of fraud damages. 76 P.3d at 667.
3
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Weight has not made a benefit of the baigain analysis consistent with the authority Bodell cites
The benefit of the baigam mle lequnes calculating "the diffei ence between the actual value of
what [is] leceived and the value theieof as lepiesented " Dilworth v Lauutzen, 424 P 2d 136,
137-38 (Utah 1967) Sigman v Stevens-Noiton, Inc , 425 P 2d 891, 893 (Wash 1967), cited by
Bodell, is illustrative In Sigman, the couit explained that the piopei measiue of damages was
"the difference between the value of the note and the mortgage had the same been as lepiesented,
and the actual value of such note and mortgage on the date of the loan—'the benefit of the
baigam' mle " Id at 895 The court explained that to calculate this diffelence one "must look to
the undei lying secunty, but one must also look to the lepayment ability of the bonowei, the
natuie of pnoi encumbiances, the position of the lendei m case of default, the income fiom
lentals, the chaiactei of the bonowei and other factois " Id at 895-96
Mi Weight does not calculate the actual value of the loan as made by Bodell, or what
that loan would have been worth if the lepiesentations were true—he does not calculate a
difference Mi Weight ignoies the fact that the loan as made actually did have value—as
evidenced by the fact that Jenson made substantial payments on the loan Thus, Mi Weight's
calculation should be excluded because it is not a benefit of the bargain analysis at all
III.

MR. WEIGHT'S "RATE OF RETURN" AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
CALCULATIONS ARE NOT BASED IN FACT.
Bodell cannot beai its buiden of showing that Mr Weight's "Rate of Return" and

consequential damages calculations aie a diiect and pioximate lesult ol Robbms' actions Dugan
v Tones, 615 P 2d 1329, 1250 (Utah 1980) As Bodell admits, causation must be shown with
Reasonable ceitainty " Qng Int'l ( U S A ) Inc v 11th Ave Coip , 850 P 2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993)
By assuming causation on this point, Mi Weight's calculation becomes too fai afield of the
4
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actual facts in the lecoid, theiefoie, Mi Weight's opinions should be excluded
Theie is nothing that lequnes this Couit to "admit opinion evidence which is connected
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expeit A court may conclude that theie is simply
too gieat an analytical gap between the data and the opinion pioffeied " Geneial Electnc Co v
Toinei, 522 U S 136, 147 (1997) Bodell completely ignoies facts that nullify Mr Weight's
opinions Significantly, Mr Weight's opinion claims mteiest on funds bonowed by Bodell that
exceed the $4 million loaned to Jenson These amounts cannot be attiibutable to the defendants
In addition, Mi Weight does not considei any of the other potentially confounding causes of
Bodell's alleged damages—including othei investments made by Bodell and Mi Bodell's
divoice obligations Mi Weight's testimony on consequential damages should be excluded
because it fails foi causation
Bodell also ignoies evidence that shows that Mr Weight's "Rate of Return" calculation is
not connected to the evidence m this case Fust, Mi Weight himself admitted that Bodell only
makes loans if it can "find" them Weight Depo at 14 8-11 Second, Mi Weight does not
considei Bodell's histoiy of making loans in assuming an 18 peicent figuie of leturn, but looks
to loans made by thud paities Thud, Mi Weight ignoies the evidence of lecoid of Bodell's
actual late of Ietuin on these types of tiansactions—Mi Bodell's testimony that the letum is
between 5 and 15 peicent, not the 18 peicent Mi Weight claims Bodell Depo at 16 7-18 Mi
Weight's failuie to considei these facts cieates too big of an "analytical gap" between the
evidence and Mi Weight's opinions, theiefoie, Mi Weight's testimony as to late of ietuin
should be excluded

5
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Weight's Benefit of the Bargain theory, Modified Benefit of
the Bargain Theory, Consequential Damages calculation and Comparable Rate of Return
calculation should be excluded. In the alternative, if these theories are going to be allowed,
defendants should be granted additional time to conduct fact discovery relating to the facts that
Weight bases his calculations on and the deadlines for expert disclosures and the trial date should
be extended accordingly until such additional discovery can be completed.
Dated: July 25, 2007

DURHAM JONES

1

& PINEGAR, P.C.

David W. Tufts
Erik A. Olson
Jason R. Hull
Attorneys for Mark Robbins
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LEXSEE 2006 U S DIST LEXIS 29520
PRECISION SEED CO., et al., Plaintills, -vs- CONSOLIDATED GRAIN &
BARGE COMPANY, Defendant.
Case No. 3:03-cv-079
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29520

Ma> 6, 2006, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Sanctions disallowed by
Pieciswn Seed Co v Consol Giain & Baige Co , 2006
US Dist LEXIS 29755 (S D Ohio, May 16, 2006)
PRIOR HISTORY: Piecmon Seed Co v Consol
Giain & Baige Co , 2006 US Dist LEXIS 29524 (S D
Ohio May 5 2006)
COUNSEL: [ x l] Foi Piecision Seed Co, Mai tin Land
Co, Plaintiffs Cynthia P McNamee, Michael Patnck
McNamee, Nikolas P Mann, McNamee & McNamee
PLL, Beavei Geek, OH, Patnck Jonathan Jams, Fieund
Fieeze & Arnold - 3, Dayton, OH
Foi David W Maitin, Plaintiff Cynthia P McNamee,
Michael Patnck McNamee, Nikolas P Mann, McNamee
& McNamee PLL, Beavei Geek, OH
Foi Consolidated Giain & Baige Company, Defendant
Omn Ehezei Piaiss, Saiah Catheiine Hellmann, Husch &
Eppenbeigei, LLC, St Louis, MO, Robeit Edwaid Pennine, Gottschlich & Poitune, LLP, Dayton, OH
JUDGES: Michael R Meiz, Chief United States Magistiate Judge
OPINION BY: Michael R Meiz
OPINION
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE REL4TING TO DAMAGES NOT DISCLOSED IN PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORY
RESPONSE AND IN EXPERT REPORT
This case is betoie the Couit on Defendant's Motion
m Limine to Exclude Any Evidence Relating to Damages Allegedly Suffeied by Plaintiffs that Was Not Dis-

closed in Plaintiffs' Damages Intenogatoiy Response and
in the Conespondmg Expeit Repoit of Giegoiy H Toman and Request foi Expedited Ruling (Doc No 132)
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion (Doc No 134)
Procedural History
[*2] This case was lemoved to this Couit on Maich
12, 2003 ' A Piehmmaiy Pietnal Confeience Oidei was
enteied by fudge Rose on Septembei 24, 2003, that contemplated phased discoveiy with liability issues in Phase
I and damages issues in Phase II and a tnal in June 2005
(Doc No 36, See also the paities Rule 26(f) Repoit,
Doc No 31)
1 On Maich 31, 2006, it was officially lepoited
to Congiess as having been pending longci than
the piesumptive thiee-yeai limit set by the Civil
Justice Refoim Act of 1990 Such cases lequne
the highest pnonty foi tnal consistent with
Speedy Tnal settings of cnminal cases
Undei Fed R Civ P 26(a)(1)(C), each paity m fedeial litigation is lequned to disclose without demand
a computation of any categoiy of damages claimed by the disclosing paity,
making available foi inspection and copying as undei Rule 34 the documents oi
othei evidentialy matenal, not pnvileged
oi piotected fiom disclosuie, on which
such computation [*3] is based, including
matenal beanng on the natuie and extent
of injuiies suffeied,

The paities agieed m then Rule 26(f) Repoit (Doc No
31) to make the Rule 26(a)(1) disclosuies on oi befoie
August 6, 2003 On that date, Plaintiffs seived on Defendant the following statement
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In their complaint, the plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages, punitive damages, an accounting, and attorneys' fees.
Counsel for the parties have agreed to
postpone any specific computation of any
of these categories of damages pending
the conclusion of "Phase I" of the parties'
discovery. Upon completion of Phase I of
discovery, the plaintiffs will automatically, and promptly, supplement this disclosure to provide the necessary computation (and supporting documentation) for
all categories of damages remaining relevant at that time.

(Exhibit 1 to Doc. No. 132). Plaintiffs have never supplemented this disclosure.
On September 12, 2003, Defendant served on Plaintiffs the following interrogatory:
20. With respect to each item of damage
that Plaintiffs claim in the First Amended
Complaint, state:
a. the nature of the damages (including but not limited to whether the alleged
[*4] damage relates to the handling fee,
the
storage
fee, non-payment
of
weigher/grader, cost of purchase of the
Facilities, cost of repairs to the Facilities,
and/or cost of demolition of the Facilities);
b. the precise amount of each claim
of damage;

(Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant's Third Set of Interrogatories, Exhibit 2 to Doc. No. 132).
On April 21, 2005, Judge Rose entered an Amended
Preliminary Pretrial Conference Order which eliminated
the phased discovery; set a discovery deadline of November 3, 2005; and continued the trial to its present
date, May 22, 2006. After the schedule was amended,
Defendant sought an answer to its [*5] damages interrogatory. On July 22, 2005, Plaintiffs provided the following answer to Interrogatory No. 20.
ANSWER:
See Plaintiffs' Financial Expert Witness Report, filed July 7, 2005, which
contains detailed responses to subparts (a)
- (d) above.
Plaintiffs' financial expert specifically
reserved the right to supplement his report
based upon additional documents or evidence that might become available.
In addition, CGB maintains documents that support and will affect Plaintiffs' calculation of damages contained in
the Financial Expert Witness Report.
These documents, specifically with respect to Topic No. 4, have recently been
ordered by the Court to be produced. See
Decision and Order (Doc. # 101).
Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this response based upon any documents produced as a result of the Court's
recent Decision and Order (Doc. # 101).

c. describe in detail all facts on which
you rely in making each claim of damage;
d. describe in detail the method by
which you calculate each item of damage;
and
e. identify and produce all documents
which support, refer or relate in any way
to your responses to this interrogatory.

Plaintiffs responded
ANSWER:
The Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory because it is unrelated to Phase I of
discovery in this case, The Plaintiffs will
respond to this interrogatory during Phase
II of the discovery proceedings.

Defendant then deposed Plaintiffs' damages expert,
Mr. Toman, just before November 1, 2005, discovery
cut-off. He testified that he had no other opinions about
damages beyond those he had disclosed and he has never
supplemented his testimony or expert report.
On April 26, 2006, after a dispute in settlement [*6]
negotiations about how much Plaintiffs could recover at
trial, Plaintiffs served a supplemental answer to Interrogatory 20 as follows:
ANSWER:
Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory
to the extent that it calls for legal conclusions and seeks information protected by
the attorney-client privilege and/or the
work product doctrine.

^LllP.
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Plaintiffs fuithei state that, at the time
this inteuogatoiy was initially answeied,
and at the time initial disclosuies weie
made puisuant to Rule 26(a)(1), the paities had agieed to implement two phases
of discoveiy - liability and then damages
Without waiving these objections, and
subject theieto, Plaintiffs respond as follows
a. Damages with respect to remaining claims are as follows:
Count 1 - bieach of contiact, failuie
to negotiate stoiage fees foi second and
thud yeai in good faith, non-payment of
weighei/giadei
Count 3 - bieach of fiduciaiy duties
ansing fiom attempt to foim paitneiship
legaidmg seed piogiam and seed manual
Count 4 - fraud legaidmg CGB's intent to woik foi mutual benefit and concealment of fact that it had no intention of
hononng paitneiship and intended to use
seed piogiam foi [*7] its own use
Count 5
Seciets Act

violation of Uniform Tiade

Count 7 - conveision of Mai tin Land
Company funds
b. Precise amount of each damage
claim:
Count 1 - $ 350,000 foi stoiage fees
foi both yeais plus $ 47,000 foi
weighei/giadei foi a total of $ 397,000
Count 3 - specific dollai amount unknown and to be deteimined by the juiy
as no authouty addiesses measuie of
damages foi bieach of fiduciaiy duty duimg foimation of paitneiship, howevei, at
the veiy least, R C 1775 20 piovides the
lemedy of an accounting
Count 4 - specific dollai amount unknown and to be detei mined by the juiy,
howevei, compensatoiy damages include
puichase puce of Facilities, tiavel time
and expenses
Count 5- specific dollai amount to be
detei mined at tnal, while Plaintiffs' economic exeit Gieg Toman's lepoit states
damages in the amount of $ 152,275, he
specifically iesei\ed the light to supple-

t

ment his opinion on the quantity and expiessly based the figuie on assumptions
and limited documentation, in addition,
Sixth Cucuit authouty permits David
Mai tin to testify as to tiade seciet damages and the amount of damages will be
calculated based on a minimum of [H 8]
500,000 bushels
C o u n t 7 - $ 5,500
c The facts suppoitmg each claim aie
found in Gieg Toman's expeit report,
deposition testimony from this case and
all documents pioduced m discoveiy
d The methods of damages calculations aie descnbed above and m Gieg
Toman's expeit lepoit, with lespect to
damages on the tiade seciets claim, the $
4 75 maiket puce pei bushel at relevant
time less $ 3 85 total cost pei bushel = 90
cents maigin pei bushel x numbei of
bushels (500,000 minimum)
e All documents suppoitmg each
damage claim have been exchanged m
discoveiy

(Exhibit 6 to Doc No 132)
Analysis
Defendant seeks to exclude at tiial any damage theoiy oi evidence not disclosed by Plaintiffs' damages expeit, Gieg Toman, in his lepoit oi deposition because it
lead Plaintiffs' July, 2005, answei to Inteuogatoiy 20 as
saying that Toman would be the sole source of damages
testimony (Motion Doc No 132) Defendant lehes on
Fed R Civ P 37(c)(1) which piovides
A paity that without substantial justification fails to disclose infoimation lequned by Rule 26(a) oi 26(e)(1), oi to
amend a pnoi lesponse [ h 9] to drscovery
as lequued by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless
such failuie is haimless, peimitted to use
as evidence at trial, at a healing, oi on a
motion any witness oi infoimation not so
disclosed

Defendant notes that Plaintiffs nevei supplemented
then Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure and Toman nevei supplemented his expeit lepoit, the only supplementation on
damages has been the amended answei to Inteuogatoiy
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20 which came less than a month befoie tnal when the
paities disagieed in settlement negotiations about Plaintiffs' potential lecoveiy Defendant digues the amended
answei is not timely supplementation because it mtioduces new theones, new amounts, and at least one new
damages witness, Plaintiff David Mai tin, and Defendant
has had no oppoitunity foi chscoveiy on this amended
answei Theiefoie, Defendant aigues, the late supplementation is not justified and ceitainly not haimless,
since discoveiy has closed
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion in Limine because they
claim "(A) CGB has not demonstiated the Plaintiffs'
lesponse did not comply with Fed R Civ P 26(a) oi
alternatively supplementation was justified, (B) CGB
was not piejudiced [ 4 0 ] by the supplementation, and
(C) CGB's own actions mandate denial of the Motion m
Limine " (Memoiandum in Opposition, Doc No 134, at
2)
Plaintiffs asseit fust that Defendant mismterpiets
then Answei to Intenogatoiy No 20 to say they would
lely solely on Mi Toman to testify on damages (Doc
No 134 at 6), but the Couit finds that to be a completely
leasonable interpietation of the ongmal Answei While it
indicates Mi Toman may supplement his lepoit, he has
nevei done so While it indicates Plaintiff may disco\ ei
new documents as a lesult of the Couit's oidei compelling Defendant to pioduce and may supplement based on
those documents, Plaintiffs nevei supplemented on then
own initiative as Rule 26(e) lequnes and have sought to
add fai moie than numbeis denved from late-pioduced
documents
1. Duty to Supplement
Plaintiffs next aigue that, befoie it can justify sanctions undei Fed R Civ P 37(c)(1), Defendant must
show that "the 'new' damages infoimation fell within the
ambit of Rule 26(a) and, m fact, cannot do so
because
the Plaintiffs mfoimed CGB of then intention to put on
evidence legaidmg the costs of [^11] the subject Facilities ovei thiee yeais ago " Id at 9 Plaintiffs claim Defendant acknowledges this fact in footnote 4 of the Motion in Limine In fact that footnote leads
Plaintiffs' claim foi damages concerning
the puichase puce of the Facilities is outlageous Indeed, on May 31, 2005, CGB
pieviously moved foi summaiy judgment
with lespect to this exact damages claim
See CGB's Second Motion foi Paitial
Summaiy Judgment, Document 79 1, pp
17-19 On June 21, 2005, Plaintiffs lesponded that such issue was not upe foi
this Couit's decision See Pltfs' Opposition
to Second Motion foi Paitial Summaiy

ludgment, Document 90-1, pp 38-39
Now, Plaintiffs appeal to be making a
claim foi such damages

(Doc No 132 at 5 ) In fact, the footnote is not an acknowledgment that Plaintiffs have evei answeied Intel logatoiy No 20 as to damages foi the purchase puce of
the Facilities Instead, it is an expiession of outiage that,
despite having made such a claim dunng the pendency of
the suit, Plaintiffs have not pioduced an answei to Intellogatoiy No 20 with respect to such damages Foi example, what is the claimed amount of such damages9
Even the Apnl 26, 2006, answei [h 12] says the amount
is as yet undetei mined
With lespect to damages foi misappiopnation of
tiade seciets, Plaintiffs asseit that
undei Ohio law the damages to be
awaided foi the impioper use of a tiade
seciet aie often determined by a juiy, not
by a mathematical calculation established
by an expeit Lay witness testimony is
unquestionably appiopnate foi this puipose

(Memoiandum in Opposition, Doc No 134, at 6 ) Plaintiffs asseit that tiade seciet damages "simply do not fall
within the ambit of Rule 26(a) " They purpoit to quote
the Advisoiy Committee to this effect
As explained m the Advisoiy Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to
Rule 26, the supplementation "
obligation applies only with lespect to
documents then leasonably available
Likewise, a paity would not be expected
to piovide a calculation of damages
which, as in may [sic] patent infiingement
actions, depends on infoimation in the
possession of anothei paity oi peison "

(Doc No 134 at 9-10) This is a senous misquotation,
quoted language appeals in the Advisoiy Committee
Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Fed R Civ P
26(a)(1)(C) which piescnbes the initial [ t 13] disclosuie
lequnement, not in the Notes to Fed R Civ P 26(e),
the supplementation requirement.
In asseitmg they had no duty to supplement, Plaintiffs lely on Johnson v H K Webstei Inc , 775 F 2d 1, 3
Fed R Seiv 3d 20 (1st Cir 1985) Howevei, the Fust
Cncuit in that case was inteipietmg the pie-1993 veision
oi Fed R Civ P 26(e) which pi ovided
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Supplementation ot Responses: A
paity who has lesponded to a lequest fot
discoveiy with a lesponse that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his lesponse to include nifoimation theieaftei acqiuied, except as follows

The 1993 Amendments to Rule 26 veiy substantially
changed the obligation to supplement The Fust Cncuit
itself lecognized this m Klonoski v Mahlab 156 F3d
255 (1st Cu 1998) holding e\piessly with lespect to
Johnson v Webstei that "pie 1993 cases analyzing the
sanction issue undei the pie amendment iiibnc letain
only limited authouty in this post amendment eia " Id at
269 n 5 Klonoski is not cited by Plaintiffs, but was
leadily levealed when the Couit [ x 14] shepaidized
Johnson
Based on then analysis of Rule 26, Plaintiffs asseit
they weie not lequued to supplement the pnoi answei to
Inteilogatoiy 20 at all, but that it was "piovided solely as
a giatuitous accommodation to CGB, as it is the juiy that
will make this ultimate deteimination at tnal anyway
See Aveiy Denmson Coip v Fow PiUais Enteipnse
Co and PY 45 Fed Appx 479 60 Fed R Evid Seiv
353 (CA 6 2002) " The fact that a juiy will decide a
question does not excuse a paity fiom telling its opponent what testimony it will place befoie the juiy to make
that deteimination Aveiy Denmson does not purpoit m
any way to speak to the duties of a paity in discoveiy
Plaintiffs weie undei a duty imposed by Fed R
Civ P 26(e) to timely supplement both then Rule
26(a)(1) disclosures and then answei to Intenogatoiy 20,
then aigument that they had no such duty in unpeisua
si\e
2. Justification lor Late Supplementation:
Plaintiffs then aigue "Mi Mai tin's testimony about
the Plaintiffs' damages with legaid to CGB's unauthoilzed use of the Seed Manual is solely based upon piojec
tions [ 15] and documents piovided by and in the possession of CGB " Id at 10 They note that the 500,000
bushel piojection which will foim the basis of Mi Mai
tin's piojected testimony is taken duectly fiom Consoh
dated's documents pioduced in discoveiy Id
Plaintiffs claim then late supplementation is justified
by Defendant's failuie to tequest supplementation until
the time when it was pioduced (Memoiandum in Opposition, Doc No 134, at 11) Plaintiffs also aigue that
then failuie to supplement is justified by Consolidated's
hawm> moved foi summaiy judgment on Plaintiffs' tiade

seciet claim Id They aigue "[i]f CGB had piovided the
Plaintiffs with mfoimation legaidmg Piecision Soya,
which it was lequued to do, then the Plaintiffs would
have known eaiher that tiade seciet damages would be
lelevant foi tnal" Id Howevei, the duty to supplement
undei Fed R Civ P 26(e) is not tnggeied by an opposing paity's lequest oi suspended by an opponent's sum
maiy judgment motion Instead, "[t]he obligation to supplement disclosuies and discoveiy lesponses applies
whenevei a paity learns that its pnoi disclosuies oi le
spouses [*16] aie in some mateual lespect incomplete oi
mcoiiect" Advisoiy Committee Notes to 1993 Amend
ment to Rule 26(e)
Assuming Plaintiffs learned veiy late in the discov
eiy penod about the Piecision Soya-Consolidated
500,000 bushel piojection, ' they weie without justification m waiting six months to amend the answei
2 The Couit heie meiely uses Plaintiffs' chaiactenzation of this mfoimation, as the Couit has not
seen this mateual
3. Late Supplementation is Harmless
Next Plaintiffs asseit that their late disclosuie is
haimless because Count 5 foi misappiopuation of tiade
seciets was pled fiom the veiy beginning of the case and
"the natuie of damages available foi a violation of Ohio's
Umfoim Trade Seciets Act call foi a detemnnation by a
juiy and simply do not lend themselves to the absolute,
mathematical calculation demanded by CGB " (Memoiandum m Opposition, Doc No 134, at 12 )
This aigument misses the point entnely The fact
that a juiy will make the deteimination of damages m no
way [*17] implies that an opposing paity is not entitled
to discoveiy the testimony on which the juiy will make
that deteimination The authouty cited by Plaintiffs does
indeed hold that "plaintiffs have used a numbei of diffeient methods of calculation to determine damages " MidMiclugan Compute) Systems Inc v Glassman 416 F 3d
505 510 (6th Cu 2005), quoting Aveiy Denmson Coip
v Fow Pillais Enteipnse Co, 45 Fed Appx 479 485
(6th Cu 2002) But this authouty suppoits Defendant's
position on the instant Motion lathei than Plaintiffs' if
theie aie a numbei of diffeient methods a plaintiff might
choose among for pioving damages, a defendant is entitled to know which method this paiticulai plaintiff is
choosing m this case, and to know it m time to piepaie a
defense
Appaiently Plaintiffs now expect to use a "leason
able loyalty" appioach to damages, which is one of the
measuies of damages contemplated by Ohio Re\ised
Code § 1333 63 and Mid Michigan supia They state
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Mi Mai tin ceitamly has the light to testify as to his belief about what a reasonable loyalty should be [but] his testimony
[*18] is not dispositive In sum then,
CGB cannot be haimed or prejudiced by
the Aptil supplementation because it is
the juiy's calculation of loyalty damages
that is important, not Mi Mai tin's

(Memoiandum in Opposition, Doc No 134, at 13 ) But
even the Apnl 26, 2006, supplementation does not say
Plaintiffs aie using a leasonable loyalty method, what
Mi Mai tin believes the leasonable loyalty late is, how
he leached that conclusion, and why the late he will testify to is leasonable The fact that the Sixth Cucuit has
appioved the leasonable loyalty method says nothing
about Mi Mai tin's competence to testify what a leasonably loyalty late is oi that he can take the stand to state his
"belief without having disclosed the basis foi it pnoi to
tnal

States 1999 US App LEXIS 14943,
1999 WL 455435, at *3 (1999) (footnote
omitted), see also Salgado v Genet al Motois Coip, 150 F3d 735, 742 (7th Cir
1998) [*20] (noting that "the sanction of
exclusion is automatic and mandatory
unless the sanctioned paity can show that
its violation of Rule 26(a) was eithei justified oi haimless") We agiee with the cucuits that have put the bin den on the potentially sanctioned paity to piove haimlessness See Salgado, 150 F 3d at 74142, Wilson v Biadlees of New England
Inc 250 F3d 10, 21 (1st Cu 2001),
Heidtman v County of El Paso, 171 F 3d
1038, 1040 (5th Cu 1999) The decision
not to impose sanctions is leviewed foi an
abuse of disci etion See King v Foul Motoi Co , 209 F 3d 886, 900 (6th Cu ) , ceit
denied, 531 US 960, 148 L Ed 2d 298
121 S Ct 386(2000)

4. Competing Disco\ery Misconduct
In the last section of then Memoiandum m Opposition, Plaintiffs ask the Couit to weigh any violation of
Rule 26(e) which they aie found to have committed
against Consohdated's discoveiy violations They asseit
"CGB's failuie to forward the Piecision Soya documentation, standing alone, moie than offsets any haim CGB
might expenence due to the late supplementation
"
(Id [""19] at 16), leading to the conclusion Plaintiffs
should not be sanctioned at all In suggesting this would
be appiopnate, Plaintiffs lely entuely on case authonty
fiom befoie the 1993 Amendment to Fed R Civ P
37(c)(1) which piovides in peitinent part as follows
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose infoimation required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to
amend a pnoi response to discoveiy as
lequned by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless
such failuie is haimless, peimitted to use
as evidence at tnal, at a heaung, or on a
motion any witness oi infoimation not so
disclosed

In mteipieting this Rule, the Sixth Cucuit has held
Fedeial Rule of Civil
Pioceduie
37(c)(1) lequnes absolute compliance
with Rule 26(a), that is, it "mandates that
a tnal couit punish a paity foi discoveiy
violations in connection with Rule 26
unless the violation was haimless oi is
substantially justified " Vance v United

Robei ts v Galen of Va , Inc, 325 F 3d 776, 782 (6th Cu
2003) Plaintiffs have not pioved that then failuie to
comply at an appiopnate time withFedf R Civ P 26(e)
was eithei haimless oi substantially justified
The Couit expiessly lejects Plaintiffs' aigument that
Defendant's lesistance to discovery justifies then late
lesponse The piopei method of dealing with discoveiy
violations is to file [*21] a motion to compel When
Plaintiffs did so, they leceived this Couit's assistance
(See Decision and Oidei, Doc No 101)
Conclusion
Accoidmgly, Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence Relating to Damages Allegedly Suffeied by Plaintiffs that Was Not Disclosed in Plaintiffs'
Damages Intellogatoiy Response and in the Conespondmg Expeit Repoit ot Giegoiy H Toman is GRANTED
Plaintiffs' damages testimony at tnal is limited to that
disclosed by Giegoiy H Toman in his expeit lepoit and
deposition If Mi Toman states in his expeit lepoit that
the amount of damages from imposing a leasonable loyalty late is dependent on the numbei of bushels Consolidated would have sold and Plaintiffs can show the numbei of bushel piojection they lely on was made by Consolidated m documents which Consolidated should ha\ e
pioduced eaihei but did not pioduce until the end of discoveiy oi which Plaintiffs had to obtain fiom Piecision
Soya, then Mi Toman may base his testimony on that
figuie
May 6, 2006
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s/ Michael R. Merz

Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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OPINION BY: GEORGE A YANTHIS
OPINION
DECISION AND ORDER
Befoie the Coiut aie discoveiy disputes concerning
the objections of the Lead Plaintiff to fifteen uiteiiogatones issued by the Defendants m this action The Coiut
mles as follows

Heie, as stated above, Lead Plaintiffs have long ago
piovided the list of witnesses who they believed had peisonal knowledge of the allegations [*5] in the complaint Defendants essentially seek the identity of witnesses mteiviewed by counsel foi the Lead Plaintiffs and
lehed upon m the piepaiation of the complaint Such
infoimation would demonstiate which witnesses that
Lead Plaintiff deems impoitaiit and is piotected fiom
disclosuie by the woik-pioduct pnvilege The Coiut fuithei finds that the fifty-five potential witnesses identified
heie by Lead Plaintiff as foimei officeis, dnectois, and
employees of Veeco was not an unmanageable numbei,
paiticulaily given the disclosuie of the names on Apnl
10, 2006 Moieo\ei, the Couit concludes that Defendants
have not demo nsti ated a substantial need foi the answeis
and given the extensive disco veiy in this case will not
suffei an undue bin den without the infoimation sought
Accoidingly, Defendants' motion to compel lesponses to Intenogatoiy Nos 1-3 is denied
B Intei i ogatoiy Nos 4-13

A Intel wgatones 1-3
Inteilogatoiy 1 seeks the identity of the peisons
identified in the complaint heiein as CW1, CW2, and
CW3 Intenogatoiies 2 and 3 lequests Lead Plaintiff to
identify othei peisons who piovided Lead Plaintiff with
infoimation concerning the allegations in the complaint,
and any documents piovided by those peisons Lead
Plaintiff asseits that the infoimation sought by Defendants is piotected by the woik-pioduct doc time and Defendants have not demolishated a substantial need foi
compelling disco\eiy
[ 4] Defendants piovided its Rule 26 disclosuies
on Apnl 10, 2006 that included a list of peisons whom
Lead Plaintiff believed had knowledge of the allegations
in the complaint Lead Plaintiff has confiimed that the
list included the names of CW1, CW2 and CW3 In le
Initial Public Offenng Sec Litig, 220 FRD
30
(SD NY 2003), lends suppoit to Lead Plaintiffs position that the identity of the thiee confidential witnesses
set foith m the complaint filed by the Lead Plaintiff
should be piotected fiom disclosuie by the attorney
woik-pioduct doctnne In holding that the names of witnesses who allegedly enteied into tie-in agieement weie
not piotected by the woik-pioduct pnvilege, that coiut
noted that" plaintiffs have not piovided a list of potential witnesses, let alone one that includes eveiyone lequned to entei into tie-in agieements " Id at 36 The
coiut emphasized that defendants weie simply asking foi
the list of potential witnesses, " not the subset of people
intei viewed by counsel" Id

Lead Plaintiff objects to Intenogatoiy Nos 4-13 as
contention intenogatoiies that aie piematuie Defendants
asseit that said lequests aie not contention intenogatoiies
and, in any event, they would not be piematuie as the
discoveiy deadline is Januaiy 31, 2007
Local Rule 33 3(c) piovides [ x 6] that at the conclusion of othei discoveiy, and at least 30 days pnoi to the
discoveiy cut-off date, intenogatoiies seeking the claims
and contentions of the opposing paity may be seived
unless the coiut has oideied otherwise The Couit concludes that said lequests aie not contention intenogatoiies Accoidingly, Lead Plaintiff is duected to lespond to
the intenogatoiies
Intei i ogatoiy Nos 14-15
Lead Plaintiff asseits that intenogatoiy Nos 14-15
lelating to loss causation and damages aie contention
intenogatoiies oi should be leseived foi expeit discoveiy Local Rule 33 3(a) piovides m pait that intenogatoiies duected to "the computation of each categoiy of
damage alleged" aie allowed at the commencement of
discoveiy As such, Lead Plaintiff is duected to lespond
to said intenogatoiies based on the infoimation available
to it Lead Plaintiff may supplement said Iespouses as
they deem appiopnate aftei expeit discoveiy
SO ORDERED
Dated Januaiy 26, 2007
White Plains, New Yoik
GEORGE A YANTHIS, U S M J

